A critical analysis of factors influencing internet diffusion in South Africa and its implications on the rollout of e-government services by Senatore, Luca
  
 
 
A Critical Analysis of Factors Influencing Internet 
Diffusion in South Africa and its Implications on 
the Rollout of e-Government Services 
 
Luca Senatore 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Humanities, University of Witwatersrand, 
Johannesburg, in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts 
 
Johannesburg, 2010
i 
 
Declaration  
 
I, Luca Senatore, declare that this is my own unaided work. It is being submitted for 
the degree of Master of Arts at the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has 
not been submitted before for any other degree or examination at this or any other 
University. 
 
________________________________________ 
 
_____day of _______________2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
Abstract 
 
Staying up-to-date with Internet and other Information and Communication 
Technology developments is vital for a country’s economic growth and for a country 
to stay internationally competitive. Despite the rapid growth and uptake of the 
Internet around the world, South Africa has continued to struggle to keep up with this 
trend as the number of people who have access to the Internet is relatively low. 
Numerous factors continue to have a large effect on the diffusion of the Internet 
which in turn leads to implications for the uptake and rollout of e-Government 
services. Regulatory issues, ineffective policies, increasing State involvement, 
obsolete Universal Service Obligations, and a weak, underfunded regulator continue 
to hinder the widespread uptake of Internet and high speed Internet offerings.  The 
low diffusion of Internet has lead to the South African government investing a large 
amount of capital into e-Government projects and strategies which are only benefiting 
a small portion of the population and thus exacerbating the ever growing digital 
divide.     
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
The Internet is the fastest growing media medium worldwide. It took only three years 
for the Internet to reach over fifty million users. By contrast, it took thirty eight years 
for radio and thirteen years for television to have fifty million users (Dholakia et al 
2003:5). Staying abreast with Internet developments and other Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICTs) is crucial for a country or region to stay 
internationally competitive.  Furthermore, keeping up with Internet developments not 
only has a large effect on economies but also can provide social empowerment and 
social development. South Africa and Africa, as a whole, has seen large growth in 
Internet users year or year, however, both country and continent have continued to 
rapidly fall behind the rest of the world in terms of Internet usage and Internet 
diffusion (The International Telecommunication Union 2007: 13).  Although figures 
vary, it is currently estimated that the number of Internet users in South Africa  range 
between 4.5 million and 5.1 million users (Internet World Stats 2008 and Buckland 
2009).  With a population of just over 49 million, this equates to an estimated ten 
percent of the population accessing the Internet, well below international standards1
 
.        
As with societies, governments worldwide have become reliant on Internet access and 
have begun embarking on utilising the Internet and other ICTs to render public 
services.  From social, political and economic levels the way forward for South Africa 
requires the integration of ICTs and the use of ICTs such as the Internet to deliver 
government services in an easily obtainable way.  This type of utilisation of the 
Internet and other ICTs has become known as e-Government and has become a ‘buzz 
word’ for leading economies and developing economies alike.  The rollout of e-
Government policies and strategies will aid the South African government in service 
delivery and in doing so strengthen the countries democracy. 
                                                 
1 For example: 12 percent of the population in Algeria access the Internet, 12.5 percent in Zimbabwe, 
15.9 percent in Egypt, 34 percent in Brazil, 48.9 percent in Argentina, 59 percent in Czech Republic, 
52 percent in Poland, 51.7 percent in Italy and 69.3 percent in France. 25.6 percent of the World’s 
population accesses the Internet (Internet World Stats 2009a; Internet World Stats 2009b; Internet 
World Stats 2009c).   
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For the purpose of this study, Internet connectivity refers to gaining access to the 
Internet either through a fixed-line or wireless solution via a broadband or dialup 
service.  A fixed-line solution provides the last mile through a physical copper or fibre 
optic connection.  A wireless solution provides the last mile through wireless 
technologies.  Fixed-wireless (for example: WiMAX and CDMA) and mobile (for 
example: 3G HSDPA) solutions have been collectively grouped under ‘wireless 
solutions’.  The definition of broadband, from a government and regulators point of 
view does not provide a minimum speed.  The latest definition is provided by the 
Draft Broadband Policy of 2009, Provision 1.3.2 which states that “...Broadband will 
be interpreted as an always available, multimedia capable connection.”  This research 
will not make use of this definition as it is highly interpretive and goes against world 
norms2
 
.  Instead the research defines broadband as being a telecommunication 
network connectivity with a speed greater than 128kbs.  Although it could be argued 
that this speed is considerably low compared to international standards, 128kps is 
considered to be ‘broadband’ in the South African market as defined by industry 
players.  Dialup refers to a connection speed of 56kps or below. 
Internet diffusion is used broadly in this paper to refer to increases in both supply 
(such as bandwidth, domain registrations and number of ISPs), and demand measures 
(such as users, traffic volumes and numbers of Internet hosts) with respect to the 
Internet. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 As broadband technologies are always changing and broadband speeds continue to increase, the 
definition of broadband also continues to evolve. The definition of broadband differs per country 
however the Organisation for Economic and Co-Operation and Development (OECD), of which 30 
industrialised countries are members, defines broadband as a connection capable of download speeds 
of at least 256kbps. The International Telecommunications Union defines broadband as a high speed 
Internet connection capable of minimum speeds of 1.5 or 2mbps (OECD 2009: 10; International 
Telecommunication Union 2003). 
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1.2. Problem Statement  
 
The Internet is a global communication system available in virtually every country 
and is the largest and fastest growing form of mass media in the world (Truetzschler 
2000: 75).  Although the Internet is growing rapidly around the world; especially in 
North America, Europe and Asia; South Africa has not been able to keep up with this 
trend as the number of people who have access to the Internet is relatively low 
(Goldstuck 2008b).  When comparing South Africa with the rest of Sub-Saharan 
Africa, South Africa leads with regards to Internet traffic and telecommunication 
infrastructure. However, in terms of connectivity, the country has fallen behind 
Nigeria, Morocco and Egypt and if current trends continue, Kenya will also surpass 
South Africa (Buckland 2009). With regards to users per one hundred inhabitants, 
South Africa only ranks six on the continent; with 10.8 users per one hundred 
inhabitants; falling behind the Seychelles, Morocco, Mauritius and Tunisia 
(International Telecommunication Union 2007: 12-13).  These figures are in light of 
South Africa having the continent’s most advanced and well developed 
telecommunication and ICT infrastructure as well as the highest Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) and budget in Africa (The International Telecommunication Union 
2007: 12-13) 
 
South Africa continues to struggle with low levels of Internet diffusion despite many 
attempts by the government to increase connectivity through policies, policy 
outcomes, infrastructural rollout and through universal service and universal access 
such as Universal Service Obligations imposed on telecommunication companies.  
This study attempts to understand why such a small proportion of South Africans, 
mainly situated in the three major urban areas of Gauteng, Durban and Cape Town, 
have access to the Internet.  To gain a better understanding of factors influencing 
Internet diffusion in South Africa key private and public sector institutions have been 
analysed to determine whether they are advancing or hindering the rollout of Internet 
access across the country.  Public sector institutions that have be analysed are the 
Department of Communications, the telecommunications regulator and ‘watch dog’, 
the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa, and the agency entrusted 
in fostering the adoption of universal service and universal access, the Universal 
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Services and Access Agency of South Africa.  Private sector institutions analysed 
include the former incumbent monopoly, Telkom, the newly established second 
national operator Neotel and the three cellular operators.  State-owned enterprises 
such has Sentech have also been included as they provide a significant effect on the 
rollout of telecommunications infrastructure.  Furthermore, smaller Wireless Internet 
Server Providers (WISPs) and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) have been looked at 
as they also play a significant role in Internet diffusion.   
 
The research paper will further look at the internal policies and mandates (issued by 
the regulator) of private sector institutions and state-owned enterprises which are 
responsible for the rollout of telecommunication and Internet infrastructure.  As South 
Africa does not have a single ICTs policy, the study has had to analyse the many 
different policies and acts.  Such acts include the Electronic Communications Act of 
2005, which forms the basis of the government’s ICT policy as well as the past 
repealed Telecommunication Act of 1996 and the Telecommunications Amendment 
Act of 2001 which have helped shape the telecommunication landscape today.  
 
As the South African government continues to embark on the rollout of e-Government 
services on a national, provincial and local level, the issue of connectivity arises once 
again. With the country’s low Internet diffusion, e-Government services are only 
available to a small percentage of the population.  In order for e-Government projects 
and strategies to be successful, the diffusion of Internet in South Africa needs to 
rapidly increase.  Norris (2001: 106) reiterates this notion by arguing that 
“technological developments directly influences how far political organisations can 
go to provide online services and information, and indirectly produces greater 
incentives for political organisations to do so, as the general public gradually becomes 
wired”. Norris (2001: 106) further argues that the success of e-Government initiatives 
can be measured by technical indicators such as Internet access and distribution of 
Internet users. 
 
The South African Revenue Service (SARS) and the Department of Labour are two e-
Government portals/websites that have been analysed in this research in order to gain 
a better understanding of the types of e-Government services currently being offered 
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in South Africa. The large amount of capital and vast resources being injected into 
various e-Government projects have in turn benefited very few.  If the issues 
surrounding low Internet diffusion are not addressed in a timely manner, the 
advantages e-Government can provide will merely be overshadowed by its 
contribution to the digital divide.  
 
1.3. Aim of the Research 
 
This research aims to critically analyse the factors influencing Internet diffusion in 
South Africa and determine what affect the current Internet diffusion landscape will 
have on the government’s e-Government strategies.  
 
1.4. Research Questions 
 
• What factors are influencing the slow roll out of Internet access (and high 
speed Internet access such as broadband) in South Africa? 
 
• How effective are the policies that ensure the role out of adequate Internet 
access to all parts of South Africa? 
 
• To what extent will the current status of Internet diffusion have an influence 
over e-Government policies and strategies? 
 
1.5. Rational  
 
This study attempts to fill a gap in academic research undertaken on Internet diffusion 
and factors influencing the diffusion of Internet in South Africa.  Focus will be placed 
on three highly contested issues that centre on a policy matter or legal question with a 
high degree of relevance to the diffusion of the Internet, rather than high costs alone 
which has been widely research (e.g.: Goldstuck (2007), Goldstuck (2008b), South 
Africa Foundation (2005) and Christian (2005)).  High costs of Internet access is 
discussed, however emphasis is placed on three Critical Negotiation Issues (explained 
in-depth in the Conceptual Framework chapter).  This approach has been used in the 
6 
 
past to analyse Internet diffusion in South Africa by Lewis (2005).  Although the 
study conducted by Lewis (2005) has extreme relevance, it focuses on the period 1990 
to 2003.   
 
Most research conducted in this field tends to be outdated (e.g.: Lewis (2005), 
Goldstuck (2004) and Naidoo et al (2005)).  As technology is advancing at a rapid 
level, more people are becoming connected to the Internet every year and new 
policies are being drafted; research on factors influencing Internet diffusion must be 
constantly undertaken.  This study will look at Critical Negotiation Issues influencing 
the diffusion of Internet from 2004 to 20093
 
 with reference to major issues and 
advancements which have occurred prior to the above time frame. 
Furthermore, majority of studies undertaken on Internet diffusion tend to focus purely 
on the factors that have contributed to the current Internet diffusion trends and give no 
link to other policies and programs in place or policies and programs being rolled out 
in the future.  This study will differ in that it will attempt to highlight how the current 
state of Internet diffusion in South Africa will have large consequences for successful 
e-Government policies currently in place and e-Government policies and projects 
being rolled out in the near future. 
 
Since 1994, the South African government has placed a large emphasis on service 
delivery, economic growth and addressing the socio-economic inequalities brought by 
the Apartheid regime.  These inequalities, in the past have been addressed through 
policies and initiatives such as the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) 
and the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) program (Schroder 2002: 
10; Ayogu and Hodge 2001: 2-3).  In order to build on previous policies and 
initiatives, and to accelerate service delivery, the South African government has 
embarked on making use of ‘e-Government’ or ‘e-Governance’.  e-Government and 
making use of ICTs have become an increasingly integral aspect of the government’s 
                                                 
3This timeframe was chosen as it builds on the work of Lewis (2005) Negotiating the Net: the Internet 
in South Africa (1990–2003).  The period 2004 to 2009 also encompasses major telecommunication 
reforms and events such as the introduction of a new telecommunications act, new policies and the 
establishment of a new second national fixed-line operator. Additionally in this timeframe 
telecommunication prices have dropped dramatically partly due to the arrival of a new undersea cable 
and in anticipation of addition cable systems landing in the future.  
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public service delivery program, evident by the more than fifteen billion Rand which 
has been invested in the program (Davenport 2007 and Nthoiwa 2009).    
 
In addition to the South African government’s commitment to e-Government, it has 
also pledged to bridge the ever increasing digital divide.  The differentiation between 
the Internet-haves and the have-nots adds a fundamental cleavage to existing sources 
of inequality and social exclusion.  This complex interaction appears to increase the 
gap between the promise of the information age and the bleak reality for many people 
in South Africa and around the world (Castells 2001: 247). 
 
In order for the South African government to achieve its goals of continuous 
economic growth, the rolling out of effective e-Government services, and bridging the 
digital divide, there is a need for a high diffusion of Internet, which allows access to 
all South Africans.  Critically analysing the influences over the diffusion of Internet 
will provide further insight into the commitment of government to achieving its goals, 
especially its goal of rolling out a successful e-Government program that is available 
to all its citizens.   
 
1.6. Research Design 
 
This research has taken a predominantly qualitative approach to data analysis with 
regards to Internet diffusion and e-Government. A qualitative, technological 
determinist approach would justify the need for increasing Internet diffusion for the 
successful rollout of e-Government from a social, political and economic perspective. 
Through a technological determinist standpoint technology is seen as a key governing 
force in society and that social progress is driven through progressive technological 
innovation (Smith and Marx 1994: 2).  However, for this study, the research 
understands the limitations of technological determinism in that it ignores human 
agencies that makes use of such technologies and that human agencies play a vital 
role in the diffusion of Internet (Croteau and Hoynes 2003: 306).      
 
The study makes use of Critical Negotiation Issues theory as a conceptual and 
analytical framework.  By utilising Critical Negotiation Issues theory, the paper will 
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analyse three highly contested issues that have been hindering (or advancing) the 
rollout of affordable Internet access and telecommunication infrastructure.  Critical 
Negotiation Issues is a recent theoretical and analytical approach developed by 
Wilson (2005).  The three Critical Negotiation issues that have been identified as 
having a large influence on Internet diffusion are Telecommunication Liberalisation, 
Regulation and Policy Making, and Universal Service and Universal Access.  In 
addition the use of Critical Political Economy theory aids the research in gaining a 
better understanding of ownership patterns and prices that have continued to have a 
detrimental effect on the uptake of Internet services.  
 
1.7. Research Structure 
 
This dissertation contains seven individual chapters.  Chapter One fulfils the roll of 
introducing the study whilst Chapter Two illustrates the background and context in 
which the study fits into.  Chapter Three offers a review of the literature and Chapter 
Four the conceptual and analytical framework used.  Chapter Five explores the 
methods that have been applied and states the limitations of the study.  Chapter Six 
discusses the factors influencing Internet diffusion in South Africa whilst Chapter 
Seven discussion the implications current Internet diffusion trends are having on e-
Government programs underway.  Chapter Eight concludes the study and provides a 
summary of the observations made throughout.  
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Chapter 2: Background and Context 
 
2.1. Internet Access in South Africa 
 
As in the rest of Africa, a primary aim of the telecom reform process in the early 
1990s in South Africa was to open the telecom market to new entrants, especially 
mobile service providers, network operators and ISPs. South Africa and other 
developing countries also faced pressure from Bretton Woods institutions4
 
 and other 
international organisations to liberalise their markets. Liberalisation, privatisation and 
deregulation thus became market norms (Makaya 2001: 1).  The South African 
telecommunication landscape at the time of the first democratic elections in 1994 
reflected the socio-economic inequalities created by the Apartheid regime.  Although 
government programs such as the RDP and GEAR have, to a certain extent, been 
successful in improving basic services such as housing and access to electricity and 
water, telephony services are still largely insufficient, particularly in rural areas. 
(Schroder 2002: 10). Increasing affordable access to telecommunications in the 
interest of social and economic development has been a key goal of the South African 
government (Barnard and Moolman 2008: 175). This goal of affordable access has, to 
a large extent, never materialised.  Those with access to the Internet are the select few 
with the adequate resources to gain connectivity.    
Despite South Africa being the 26th largest economy in the world and the largest in 
Africa, it only ranks 49th in number of Internet users (CIA World Factbook 2009a; 
CIA World Factbook 2009b).  In 2000, there was an estimated 2.4 million users 
connected to the Internet.  Presently it is estimated that the number of Internet users in 
South Africa are between 4.5 million and 5.1 million users (Internet World Stats 2008 
and Buckland 2009).  This equates to an estimated ten percent of the population 
(Goldstuck 2007).  South Africa has continued to slip down the international rankings 
when it comes to Internet connectivity.  In the late 1990’s the country was ranked 11th 
in the world for Internet usage, far higher than countries at comparable levels of 
development such as Brazil and Mexico.  However, the country failed to capitalise on 
                                                 
4 Bretton Woods institutions are the International Monitory Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. 
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early growth and enthusiasm (Buckland 2009).  In 1995, South Africa ranked 14th but 
slipped to 40th in 2002 and slipped further to 43rd in 2005.  Brazil now ranks 7th and 
Mexico 16th (Lewis 2005: 2; CIA World Factbook 2009b).   
 
In the early 1990’s Internet access in South Africa, as was the case in many countries, 
developed originally in the universities and largely beyond the range of Telkom’s 
corporate radar (Janisch and  Kotlowitz 1998; Lewis 2005: 7).  Using network 
infrastructure leased from Telkom, private ISPs had propelled South Africa to one of 
the 20 most Internet-connected countries in the world by the mid-1990s (Horwitz and 
Currie 2007: 451).  Horwitz and Currie (2007: 451) state that that the potential of the 
Internet did come to Telkom’s attention and it began to launch its own consumer 
Internet solutions in 1996 at a tariff considerably lower than the private ISPs.  
Because all South African Internet providers had to, by law, lease lines from Telkom, 
and because dial-up access was subject to high, metered call tariffs, Internet use began 
to weaken (Horwitz and Currie 2007: 451).  Thus as a result of the high costs of 
leasing lines from Telkom coupled with high metered call tariffs, South Africa began 
to rapidly lose ground in Internet access rankings.    
 
As mentioned earlier, there is currently an estimated 5.1 million Internet users in 
South Africa, however it must be understood that this only accounts for people 
accessing the Internet on computers.  Those accessing the Internet via mobile phones5
                                                 
5 Accessing the Internet via certain mobile phones is achieved. Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) is 
a technology that allows mobile phone users to access certain websites.  Although WAP users make up 
a significant share of Internet users in South Africa, it falls outside the scope of this research and will 
not be discussed further.  
 
have far exceeded desktop users (Buckland 2008).  Joubert (2008) suggests that there 
is an estimated 9.5 million unique mobile phone web users in South Africa.  Almost 
seven million of these users have no access to desktop Internet.  Mobile phone web 
users are likely to grow to an estimated ten million unique users during 2009 (Joubert 
2008).  Accessing Internet on mobile phones has greatly benefited Internet diffusion 
in South Africa.  Using mobile phones as a tool for gaining access to the Internet is 
considerably limited when compared to gaining access on a desktop computer and 
few websites are compatible with mobile phone use.  With the high cost of mobile 
service and the fact that most mobile phones are not enabled for enhanced services, 
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mobile Internet access does not provide a short- or long-term solution to Internet 
expansion (Research ICT Africa 2008: 1). 
When looking at broadband Internet services, it becomes apparent that South Africa is 
also falling behind world trends.  Currently South Africa has an estimated 800, 000 
unique broadband users with year or year growth being distinctively low (Goldstuck 
2007). The International Peer Benchmarking Study;  a 2009 report commissioned by 
the Department of Communications; compared telecommunications in South Africa, 
South Korea, India, Brazil, Malaysia and Chile.  The five benchmarked countries 
were selected for their similarity with the South African market (Vecciatto 2009).  
The report stated that broadband penetration rates in South Africa fare the worst 
among the countries selected.  South Africa has around two broadband subscribers per 
one hundred inhabitants, far lower than South Korea’s thirty two and Malaysia’s 
twenty four percent household broadband penetration rates. Furthermore, South 
Africa also came in last place with the slowest broadband speeds (Vecciatto 2009). It 
is believed that the broadband consumer base could grow to an estimated 5.6 million 
subscribers by 2014 as a result of dialup subscribers switching to broadband services 
(MyBroadband 2009a).  
There are two major methods of connection to the Internet in South Africa: through a 
fixed line connection or wirelessly.  South Africans are able to connect to the Internet 
using a variety of technologies namely ADSL, 3G HSDPA, WiMAX, Wi-Fi and more 
recently via CDMA.   
Telkom is currently the only operator offering fixed line solutions even though its 
fixed line monopoly came to an end in 2006 with the introduction of a second national 
fixed line operator, Neotel.  Currently Neotel has embarked on the rollout of wireless 
solutions with the intention to rollout physical fixed line offerings in the future 
(Neotel 2009).  There tends to be more choice in the wireless Internet environment 
which was as a result of the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa 
(ICASA) approach to ‘managed liberalisation’ (Cohen 2008: 119).  Vodacom, MTN, 
iBurst have the largest market share with regards to wireless Internet offerings (Cohen 
2008:120).  Telkom has also entered the wireless environment by providing 3G 
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Internet services in the metropolitan centres of Gauteng.  These 3G services will be 
rolled out to other centres in South Africa in the near future (Telkom 2009a)  
Although there are numerous regional Wireless Internet Server Providers (WISPs), 
their position in the market is still relatively small.  The same is true for Neotel who 
only launched consumer offerings in 2008 (Neotel 2009).  As Neotel is a relatively 
young entry into the telecommunication and Internet providing environment it is still 
unclear as to what effect it is having on Internet diffusion.  
2.2. Regulating South African Telecoms through Policy  
 
The primary piece of legislation governing the South African telecommunication 
industry is the Electronic Communications Act of 2005 (ECA).  The Act was passed 
into law in July 2006 and fundamentally overhauled the telecommunication’s 
regulatory landscape. Gillwald (2009a: 5) states that the Electronic Communications 
Act of 2005, which started as the Convergence Bill of 2001, was enacted with the 
intention of preparing the sector for a converged and competitive environment. 
Specifically, it sought to ensure a non-discriminatory access regime, an effective 
competition framework and efficient and equitable spectrum assignment use in a 
technologically neutral licensing framework.  Sibinda (2008: 217) also argues that the 
ECA recognises that markets are better positioned to deliver more value for money 
for consumers and restrict regulatory intervention to cases where there is 
demonstrable evidence of market failure. Prior to the ECA the telecommunication 
industry was governed by two major acts of Parliament: the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996 and the Telecommunications Amendment Act of 2001.  In 2006, the ECA 
was billed thus repealing and replacing these two acts.  
 
The Telecommunication Act of 1996 provided Telkom with a full government 
granted monopoly over the rollout of fixed-line infrastructure and providing fixed-line 
services until 7 May 2002. Exclusivity could be extended for another year if rollout 
targets were met (Laing 2004). This decision to retain a state monopoly at the expense 
of liberalisation was motivated by the ANC led South African government’s desire for 
Telkom to play a key role in the reconstruction and development of the country after 
the fall of Apartheid (Barendse 2004: 51). Furthermore, the Act compelled Value 
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Added Network Service (VANS) providers and the mobile cellular operators, all of 
whom compete with Telkom in its downstream activities in various ways, to acquire 
their facilities from Telkom (Gillwald 2009b: 481).  This clause further entrenched 
Telkom’s monopoly and forced VANS or ISPs to lease facilities from Telkom at 
unregulated costs.  In addition to forcing VANS to acquire key facilities and 
infrastructure from Telkom, the Act allowed Telkom to compete directly with VANS 
in an already competitive sector.  This clause provided Telkom with an incentive to 
engage in anti-competitive pricing, quality and access practices (Gillwald 2009b: 
481). 
 
The Telecommunications Amendment Act of 2001 was, as the name suggests, an 
amendment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.  The new amended Act began to 
introduce completion in the telecommunications.  It provided for a Second National 
Operator (SNO) to be licensed (USA 2006: 18-19).  After the extended licensing 
process, the SNO became known as Neotel. With the Telecommunications 
Amendment Act came the introduction of Under-Serviced Area Licences (USALs).  
Tlabela et al (2007: 51-52) suggests that Act provides for USALs to be issued to 
Small, Medium and Micro-Enterprises (SMMEs) to supply telecommunication 
services.  The aim of USALs is to lower telecom costs in rural areas (where 
teledensity is less than five percent) and to provide low-income groups in those areas 
with telephone services and connectivity to the Internet.   The designated USAL 
licence areas potentially cover 21.4 million people, representing an estimated forty 
five percent of the total population (Tlabela et al 2007: 51). 
 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the Telecommunications Amendment Act 
of 2001 although now repealed by the ECA have had a lasting effect on the 
telecommunication industry and thus the diffusion of Internet.  The ECA did bring 
with it a more effective regulation and modernisation.  However many issues still 
plague the industry as a result of this two pieces of policy. 
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2.3. The Regulator and its Establishment  
 
In order for a telecommunication sector to flourish and protect consumers at the same 
time, a strong regulator and effective policies are needed.  This notion has been 
echoed worldwide through the establishment of independent regulatory bodies 
entrusted to oversee the sector.  The same has been done in South Africa since 1997.  
Gillwald (2005: 471) reiterates this notion by suggesting that in line with global 
trends, and in compliance with recommendations made by the World Trade 
Organisation, South Africa’s telecommunication market has been overseen by a sector 
regulator, firstly by the South African Telecommunications Regulatory Authority 
(SATRA) and now by the The Independent Communication Authority of South 
Africa (ICASA). 
 
ICASA was established in 2001 with the merger of SATRA and the Independent 
Broadcasting Authority (IBA) (USA 2006: 18).  ICASA derives its mandate from four 
statutes: the ICASA Act of 2000, the Independent Broadcasting Act of 1993, the 
Broadcasting Act of 1999 and the ECA. The introduction of the ECA resulted in the 
amendment of certain sections of the ICASA Act (Sibinda 2008: 217).   
 
ICASA has been given the function of producing regulations and policies that govern 
the broadcasting and telecommunication industries.  It issues licences to providers of 
telecommunication services and broadcasters and monitors the broadcasting and 
telecommunications environment as well as enforces compliance with rules, 
regulations and policies (ICASA 2009).  ICASA also acts as the ‘watchdog’ of the 
broadcasting and telecommunication industry and protects consumers from unfair 
business practices, poor quality services and harmful or inferior products (ICASA 
2008). 
 
Numerous industry experts, telecommunication advocates and Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs) have criticised ICASA for its inability to reduce the high costs of 
telecommunications in South Africa.  Furthermore the regulator has been blamed for 
inefficient policy making aimed at protecting the interests of telecom incumbent, 
Telkom.  The independence of ICASA has also been questioned.  Melody (2003) 
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suggestions under telecom laws, almost every decision made by ICASA must be 
approved, and can be vetoed, changed unilaterally or delayed indefinitely by the 
Minister of Communication.  This ability to change or veto any decision made by the 
regulator has often been exercised resulting in major changes and delays.  These 
matters are discussed in detail in the Findings: Factors Influencing Internet Diffusion 
in South Africa chapter.   
 
2.4. The Benefits of the Internet and ICTs for the Developing World 
 
A question that tends to be raised is what do developing countries stand to gain from 
investing in ICTs as opposed to investing that capital into education, healthcare or 
increasing agricultural yields?  
 
The above question was highlighted and answered in the United Nations (UN) 
Millennium Report, compiled in 2000.  The UN Millennium Report simply stated that 
an investment in ICT today, is an investment in tomorrow (Sonaike 2004: 51).  
Nations able to harness the benefits of ICTs “enjoy access to global markets, which 
spurs GDP growth; greater access to educational opportunities, and up-to-the-minute 
medical information, which improves standard of living; and a means of monitoring 
the government to ensure the protection of human rights” (Sonaike 2004: 51).  The 
UN Millennium Report (2000) further argued that:  
 
“a country that chooses not to board the ‘Internet Express’ (today) in order to 
respond to the immediate emergency needs of its people, runs the risk of being 
further and further marginalized, and possibly left out of the new global 
market and its economic and social opportunities. The consensus among 
member countries is not whether to respond to the challenges brought about 
by the revolution in ICT, but how to respond and how to ensure that the 
process becomes truly global and (that) everyone shares the benefits.” (UN 
Millennium Report 2000) 
 
Although it may be seen as unjustifiable to invest large sums of money into ICTs as 
opposed to healthcare and basic education, investments in ICTs can have profound 
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effects on social, economic and political situations.  Nulens and Van Audenhove 
(1999: 451) state that the fact that one speaks of an emerging Information Society in 
the North illustrates the prominent role attributed to ICTs in the transformation of 
society.  The benefits of ICTs are not considered confined to the West alone.  Several 
observers believe that the widespread use of ICTs in developing countries will 
improve the economic and social situation of the Third World populations as well.  
Nulens and Van Audenhove (1999: 451) further state that technological innovation in 
ICTs and the drastic reduction in prices will enable Africa to ‘leapfrog’ stages of 
development and catch up with the global Information Society.  This notion is echoed 
by the World Bank which made the ambitions claim that for every ten percentage-
point increase in high speed Internet connections there is an increase of 1.3 percentage 
points in GDP growth6
 
 (Zhen-Wei Qiang 2009). Furthermore, the OECD finds that a 
one percent increase in the number of telephones available in a nation corresponds to 
a three percent growth in per capita national income (Doh et al 2004: 237)  
It becomes apparent that ICTs do have great benefits for the developing world. As 
with these advantages, ICTs can also have a detrimental effect.  Thompson (2007: 2) 
argues that as with all forms of enabling social infrastructure, ICTs have the power to 
create new inequities, as well as exacerbate existing ones.  This can occur both at the 
macro-level, by structurally integrating communities into wider, uneven networks of 
capital, production, trade and communication, as well as at the micro-level, where the 
frozen discourse of software can ‘smuggle’ whole, possibly inappropriate value 
systems into new environments.  The inequality associated with ICTs, known as the 
‘digital divide’, holds one of the greatest negative effects when it comes to the role 
out of Internet access.   
 
Smyth (2006: 1-2) suggests that the concept of a ‘digital divide’ has been around 
almost as long as ICTs have been publicly available. While traditionally it has come 
to mean a division in society, based on socio-economic factors, this notion has 
limitations.  Location, age, culture and background also play a significant role in how 
                                                 
6 This claim was made in the World Banks ICT Report entitled: Information and Communications for 
Development 2009: Extending Reach and Increasing Impact. 
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likely users are to embrace ICTs.  While the digital divide is commonly classified as a 
social/political issue referring to the socio-economic gap between communities and 
countries, it should be remembered that this term also refers to gaps that exist between 
groups regarding their ability to use ICTs effectively. The reasons for this ‘ability 
gap’ include differing levels of literacy and technical skills, as well as the gap 
between those groups that have access to relevant, high quality digital content and 
those that do not (Smyth 2005: 2). The major issue contributing to the ‘digital divide’ 
is that of affordability and lack of adequate infrastructure.  Thussu (2000:249) 
reiterates this point by claiming that many developing counties lack affordable access 
to information resources and their telecommunication systems need technological 
upgrading.  The biggest problem developing countries face is that in order to widen 
access, telecommunication tariffs need to be reduced and the sector opened to 
international operators, thus undermining the often subsidized domestic telecoms.  
 
The upgrading and rolling out telecommunication infrastructure is extremely capital 
intensive. Spending large capital on the role out of such services can be viewed as 
unjustifiable when it will reach such a small minority.  Such inequalities are deeply 
rooted within societies and differ per country or region (Thomson 2007: 2-4).  
Challenging the digital divide can be extremely difficult, and given the rate at which 
technologies are advancing in the developed world it could be argued that it is 
impossible.  
 
The Internet was once hailed as a democratizing and even subversive communication 
tool, but the commercialization of the Internet is perceived by many as betraying the 
initial promise of its potential to create a ‘global public sphere’ and an alternative 
medium (Thussu 2000: 242).  Although the Internet, to a large extent has become 
commercialised, it can still act as political and educational tool and can also help 
provide or speed up service delivery.  From an educational perspective, Truetzschler 
(2000: 76) states that the Internet is an extremely powerful research tool enabling any 
person to gather information on any conceivable topic.  The Internet can be further 
used as a vast educational resource both in terms of lifelong learning and formal 
education as it exists in all countries.  Information on any possible topic can be found 
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on the net in the form of general websites, online books, scholarly journals, discussion 
forums and news sites (Truetzschler 2000: 79).   
 
The rise of the Internet has also opened the possibilities of digital dialogues across the 
world, and has given one of the biggest boosts for freedom of speech.  The 
unregulated aspect of the Internet and the freedom of speech it brings have also 
provided a platform for extremist organisations to promote their views and to spread 
hatred and violence.  Although the Internet can provide extremist groups with a voice, 
it has also played a significant political role in promoting links between community 
groups, non-governmental organisations and political activists from around the world 
(Thussu 2000: 242-243).  The Internet can further strengthen democracy by providing 
another platform for debate and discussion.  Truetzschler (2000: 77) supports this 
notion by arguing that the Internet does not only provide near instant information 
from governments and parliaments to those who have access; it can also be used as a 
medium for discussion and debate during parliamentary election times.  It becomes 
evident that the Internet provides the ideal instrument to further democracy as it 
allows citizens with access to be almost as informed as their leaders (Castells 2001: 
155).  The above benefits as outlined by Thussu (2000), Truetzschler (2000) and 
Castells (2001) form the foundation to theories relating to e-Government and e-
Governance. 
 
2.5. Explaining e-Government and e-Government Policy  
 
The way forward for governments, as for private sector institutions, is through the use 
of ICTs.  Adapting to newer technologies holds great benefits such as increased 
productivity, short and long term cost reductions and better communications between 
private and public institutions and their end users.  Governments worldwide are 
becoming more reliant on ICTs to deliver services to their citizens and to improve 
communication channels.  This new approach to governance has become known as e-
Government.      
 
Netchaeva (2002: 467) states that the concept of ‘e-Government’ first appeared in the 
early 1990s but it was put into practice only towards the end of the decade.  e-
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Government policies and strategies first began appeared in industrialized countries. 
Nowadays, many countries in the world have e-Government projects; the most 
economically advanced States having the most advanced e-Government programs and 
strategies. To adopt e-Government means to transfer government activities into online 
forms. The goal of this transformation is the same as the goal of transferring a private 
company’s activity to the Internet (Netchaeva 2002: 467). 
 
One of the major issues facing governments, particularly in developing countries, is 
that of achieving good governance.  Heeks (2001: 3) supports this notion by stating 
that: “as is true all over the world, governments in the developing nations cost too 
much, delivers to little, and are not sufficiently responsive or accountable”.  The 
concept behind e-Government has become the ICT enabled route towards achieving 
good governance by offering new ways forward, helping to improve government 
processes and building interactions with and within civil society (Heeks 2001: 2-3).   
 
Fundamentally, e-Government is about transforming government organisations to 
become more efficient and more customer centred.  ICTs are the tools that can help to 
bring this about (e-Government Services Research Project 2003: 7). The  E-
government Services Research Project (2003: 7) argues that ICTs can be used to 
either improve the ‘back office ‘ processes that support service delivery, or improve 
the ways in which services are delivered to government’s customers.  Heeks (2001: 2) 
suggests that one may see e-Government as ‘integrated governance’ since it integrated 
both the processing and communication technologies and since it integrates people, 
processes, information and technologies in the process of achieving good governance 
objectives. However, the use of ICTs such as the Internet to provide citizens, 
businesses and non-government organisation with information and delivery of public 
services is enjoyed by few South Africans (Kuye and Naidoo 2003: 2-3).  
 
The first public policy on e-Government was drafted by the Department of Public 
Service and Administration in 2001 entitled, “Electronic Government, The Digital 
Future: A Public Service IT Policy Framework”.  The policy outlines a ten year 
implementation plan for implementing e-Government in South Africa. According to 
the policy, the implementation plan draws on tested worldwide practices and seeks to 
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avoid the mistakes, and improve on the successes of other governments implementing 
e-Government initiatives (Trusler 2003: 2).  A problem with the policy is that it does 
not extend to addressing Internet diffusion nor does it provide recommendations on 
how to increase connectivity.  Farelo and Morris (2006: 4) highlight that the policy 
recommended that an e-Government initiative should address three main domains: the 
application of IT for intra-governmental operations or government to government; the 
application of IT to transform the delivery of public services or government to 
citizens; and the application of IT to perform private business services or government 
to business.  As this research attempts to analyse how Internet diffusion is affecting 
the goals of e-Government, focus will be placed on two of domains: government to 
citizen and government to business.  
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
In order to answer the research questions that have been raised in the Introduction 
chapter, it is essential to explore literature that is specific to Internet diffusion and e-
Government in order to lead the analysis in the correct direction.  Although research 
on Internet diffusion and e-Government is easily obtainable, research on Internet 
diffusion and e-Government relating to South Africa tends to be limited and found 
mainly in the area of ‘grey literature’. Grey literature being information sources not 
part of academic literature, for example: news articles, company reports, policy 
reports, government papers and working papers (Hart 2001: 30)  
 
The literature review forms the foundation to this study and is divided into two 
sections: literature relating to Internet diffusion and literature relating to e-
Government.  This research will attempt to fill a gap in literature undertaken on 
Internet diffusion and e-Government in South Africa.  
 
3.2. Internet Diffusion 
 
Due to the nature of the Internet and the ever increasing number of people gaining 
access to the Internet coupled with the  rapid advancement of technology, there has 
been extensive research conducted in the field of Internet diffusion and the need for 
an extensive telecommunication infrastructure for any economy to be successful.  
According to Kitsing and Howard (2009: 14) there is no uniform definition for 
Internet diffusion in literature. Often scholars use the terms Internet diffusion, 
penetration, adoption, connectivity, access, use, and digital divide to describe the 
same phenomena. Dholakia et al (2003: 2) state that a diffusion of an innovation is a 
macro process concerned with the spread of the innovation from its source to the 
public. Dholakia et al (2003) provides an appropriate definition to the term diffusion, 
especially with regards to the diffusion of technology and Internet diffusion. In a 
South Africa context, Giovannetti et al (2003: 187) suggests that measurements of 
Internet diffusion in South Africa are based on indicators such as connectivity, 
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number of Internet hosts, number of websites, languages used and number of users in 
proportion to population.   
 
Numerous studies conducted on Internet diffusion in South African tend to focus on 
the fact that the slow uptake of Internet services and broadband Internet offerings 
have been as a result of prohibitive costs and poor infrastructure by the fixed-line 
telecom incumbent, Telkom (e.g.: Guomundsdóttir (2005); Christian (2005); Brown et 
al (2009))    
 
Guomundsdóttir (2005: 4 -5) argues that the slow rollout and the basic cost of Internet 
access have hindered more of the population in gaining Internet access.  The cost of 
Internet in South Africa is extremely high when compared to other countries in 
Africa, North America, Europe, Asia and Australia.  These high costs make it difficult 
for majority of the population to gain access to the Internet, resulting in Internet 
access figures becoming stagnant.  Similarly, Christian (2005) argues that South 
Africans pay from one thousand to two thousand percent more for Internet access than 
their international counterparts.  High costs have led to South Africa falling far behind 
the rest of the world in terms of broadband speeds and broadband penetration.  A 
study conducted on consumer choice and Internet in South African homes found that 
costs (total costs) associated with fixed and wireless Internet access was one of the 
greatest influences in the uptake of Internet services (Brown et al 2009: 9-10).  
Although the study found that numerous other factors, such as perceived ease, the 
media, customer service and compatibility play a significant role in the uptake of 
Internet services, costs tends to be the major impediment.   
 
The growth of broadband in terms of penetration has also been extremely slow.  If 
South Africa’s fixed line broadband penetration continues to grow at the current rate, 
it will take an estimated sixty six years to reach Australia’s current penetration 
(Christian 2005).  When looking at South African prices compared to other countries, 
it becomes evident as to why Internet diffusion is so small and mainly concentrated in 
wealthier urban areas.  Although these studies play a significant role in understanding 
Internet diffusion trends in South Africa, they tend to focus on private institutions as 
the main cause of high prices.  Furthermore, they fail to take into account the role 
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policies, policy outcomes, ownership patterns, State involvement and communication 
infrastructure plays in the diffusion of Internet services. 
 
Research ICT Africa (2008: 1) claims that like in other countries worldwide, and 
especially in Africa, fixed-line growth is almost static in South Africa, but with a 
slight decline in residential telephone lines.  This is despite the introduction of pre-
payment for fixed services.  The reason for the introduction of pre-paid fixed services 
not having been as successful as mobile services is the relatively high cost of line 
rentals which continue to be a barrier to the take up of services and which fail to offer 
the very low denomination chargers for remaining on a mobile network.  As a result 
of the high cost of owning a fixed-line compared to a mobile line, South Africans 
have turned away from fixed-line services at the expense of the growth of high speed 
Internet.  Research ICT Africa (2008: 2) further claims that mobile Internet services 
(such as HSDPA) offered by mobile networks MTN and Vodacom have leveraged the 
benefits of mobility and the initial high prices and caps of fixed broadband services.  
A large proportion of South African Internet users use HSDPA as a substitute for 
fixed broadband, unlike many mature economies where it serves as a complementary 
service to fixed broadband services.  Although MTN and Vodacom offer competition 
from their HSDPA solutions, they also target the top end of the market, leaving a 
large number of South Africans disconnected.  In addition to the above notion, 
Gillwald (2006a) states that although fixed-line operator Telkom has done little to 
positively affect Internet diffusion, wireless services from MTN, Vodacom, Cell C, 
iBurst and Wi-Fi service providers have aided South Africans by providing Internet 
access more affordably and with less of a reliance from the poor service and 
infrastructure offered by Telkom.   
 
There are many factors contributing the high cost of Internet in South Africa, many 
blaming monopolies  in the industry, a supply and demand factor and a government 
policy which is in place to protect telecom companies at the expense of users and 
potential users (e.g.: Horwitz and Currie (2007); Ponelis and Britz (2008)).  Gillwald 
(2006a: 27; 39) adds that the slow process of policy implementation by the ICASA 
has contributed to the slow rollout of infrastructure and added to the high costs of 
Internet access.  The implementation and licensing of a second national fixed-line 
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operator (Neotel) and third mobile phone operator (Cell C) were lengthy with 
deadlines being constantly extended.  This resulted in the other networks gaining a 
large portion of market share (Gillwald 2006a: 27; 39).  For Internet access to become 
assessable for majority of the population there has been a call for the speedy 
introduction of competition, competition which will need a level playing field heavily 
regulated by policy (Information Society 2004).  The need for telecommunication 
liberalisation has been suggested as a key potential factor that will aid in the uptake of 
Internet services by introducing lower costs and better services.  Atkinson (2009: 9) 
states that most economists argue that competition brings important consumer benefits 
by forcing companies to cut costs, improve service, and reduce ‘excessive’ profits. 
Without competition, economists argue, companies get lazy, limit their innovation, 
provide poor service, and reap monopoly profits. However it has also been widely 
argued that the results of liberalisation and privatisation are not always positive. 
Liberalisation and privatisation can lead to job losses, higher prices and can aid in 
increasing the digital divide.    
 
Schroder (2002: 2) claims that when British Telecom (BT) was privatised in 1984, it 
was forced to cut its work-force from 240 000 workers to 100 000 and it is debatable 
whether such job losses were absorbed by new competitors entering the market. 
Adding to the potential negative effects of liberalisation and privatisation, Ospina 
(2002: 11-12) argues that government monopoly provision and particularly in 
developing countries, local telephone service was often subsidized using the revenues 
from national and international long distance services in a practice known as cross-
subsidisation. The introduction of competition, whether in local or long distance 
services or both, requires the removal of cross-subsidies in order to ensure fair 
competition in local services and the competitiveness of the incumbent in long 
distance services. This results in price rebalancing, which in turn increases the price 
of local telephone service and decreases the price of long distance services (Ospina 
2002: 11-12).  It has also been noted that liberalisation and privatisation leads to the 
concentration of infrastructure and services in wealthier regions of the country thus 
negatively affecting the digital divide (Makaya and Roberts 2007). Although this may 
be a valid point, it has be widely argued that regulatory intervention in the form of 
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universal service and universal access obligations can be used to overcome the 
concentration of resources (e.g.: Hodge (2003b); USA (2006))    
 
Lack of policy and regulation in dealing with the high price of Internet access and 
bringing adequate competition to the telecom market has also resulted in anti-
competitive behaviour from Telkom, behaviour which is not severely dealt with by 
the regulating body ICASA (Lewis 2005: 8; 20).  The high price of communications 
in South Africa and its constraining effect on access and usage suggests that there is 
insufficient competition in the market in order to bring down prices. One can also 
conclude that regulation is not acting effectively as a proxy for competition (Research 
ICT Africa 2008: 4).  The lengthy regulation and licensing process has also resulted in 
heavy delays in the role out of WiMAX services.  WiMAX being a high-speed 
wireless broadband service and is the closest alternative to ADSL.  Many believed 
that WiMAX would have been the solution to providing rural areas with broadband if 
it had been speedily and efficiently introduced (Goldstuck 2008a).  Internet access 
being poorly regulated, centralised in urban areas and aimed at wealthy groups have 
given rise to the growth of the ‘digital divide’.  
 
Another notion that relates to high costs of Internet access and availability of access is 
that of supply and demand.  Muller (2007) argues that as more and more people start 
to subscribe to Internet services and broadband services, Internet access costs are 
likely to drop.  The business of Internet access is like any other business which relies 
on the economic model of supply and demand.  This theory may not be true for the 
case of South Africa, where the number of people accessing the Internet has risen year 
on year yet prices have stayed constant or dropped very slightly (Muller 2007).  A 
second issue with this theory is that high Internet costs have made it difficult for 
people without access to gain access, thus high have created an uptake barrier and as a 
result made little impact on the supply and demand model.  
 
High costs and poor infrastructure in many parts of the country have not only led to 
the end-user suffering but also big business and SMMEs being affected.  The costs of 
Internet access have lead to South African businesses struggling to stay competitive 
internationally.  Doyle (2002: 142) suggests that the Internet is often promoted as a 
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means for businesses to lower their costs and improve their efficiency in various 
ways.  It speeds up communication and information flows and can be used by firms to 
provide staff, suppliers and prospective customers with access to information about 
products, processes and services.  Lowering the costs of Internet to a ‘world’ level and 
introducing regulation that supports competition will allow South African businesses 
to compete more fairly in an environment that is becoming more reliant on the 
Internet and ‘e-commerce’ (Youngs 2002: 395).   
 
The media industry (in terms of traditional media) has also become reliant on the 
Internet in order to expand readership and provide different products to its audiences 
(Truetzschler 2000: 82-83).  Although the economic viability of on-line newspapers 
and print newspapers having an online edition are still unclear, greater Internet 
diffusion will allow more readers to access such information and aid in the ‘digital 
divide’ becoming less developed (Truetzschler 2000: 83). Thus when analysing 
previous literature and theory, it becomes evident that the small diffusion of Internet 
in South Africa is as a result of high costs and the lack of efficient regulation and 
policy in place to provide a competitive landscape.   
 
Majority of research (e.g.: Goldstuck (2007), Goldstuck (2008b) Guomundsdóttir 
(2005), South Africa Foundation (2005) and Barnard and Gianella (2008)) conducted 
on Internet diffusion in South Africa have tended to place focus on one major 
influence: cost.  Many studies agree that costs are the largest contributor to the small 
Internet diffusion in South Africa; however, very few studies provide detailed insight 
into the reasons as to why the cost of Internet is high and what factors have influenced 
such high prices.  This research differs in that it intends to understand what has 
influenced the high costs of telecommunication and Internet associated with South 
Africa. Furthermore, this research fills a gap in literature undertaken on Internet 
diffusion in South Africa as numerous issues, apart from costs, have been attributed to 
the low diffusion of Internet.  
 
In order to fill this gap in literature, private and public institutions as well as policies 
and regulations have been analysed to gain a better understanding as to why high 
costs have acted as a barrier to increasing Internet diffusion. In addition, the concept 
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of universal service and universal access are explored to gain an understanding as to 
what measures have been have been put in place, from a governmental level, to insure 
the diffusion of Internet is increased evenly in all socio-economic segments of 
society.   
 
3.3. e-Government 
 
Studies on e-Government in South Africa have also been extensive.  Majority of 
research conducted in this field tends to place focus on how the South African 
government is perusing policy towards e-Government and on the notion of ‘e-
readiness’.  Such studies are also inclined to rank e-Government services in South 
Africa with other countries around the world.  Although such studies play a crucial 
role in academia, there is a lack of detail into how effective the penetration has been 
and why penetration stands at where it is (Farelo and Morris (2006); Palvia and 
Sharma (2007)).  Davenport (2007) states that studies on e-Government has become 
an fundamental aspect of new media studies.  Furthermore, e-Government studies in 
South African have also arisen due the fact that ICTs are becoming an increasingly 
integral aspect of the South African government’s public service delivery programme.  
This is evident by the billions of Rands which have been invested in the sector as well 
as governments continuous drive to discover and adopt new technologies that can 
align public service delivery with policy outcome.   
 
Palvia and Sharma (2007: 1) claim that there are many definitions to what e-
Government actually entails.  Some definitions are often conflicting and inconclusive.  
However, Palvia and Sharma (2007: 1) state that the best definition has been given by 
the World Bank which states that:  
 
“e-Government refers to the use by government agencies of information 
technologies (such as Wide Area Networks, the Internet, and mobile 
computing) that have the ability to transform relations with citizens, 
businesses, and other arms of government. These technologies can serve a 
variety of different ends: better delivery of government services to citizens, 
improved interactions with business and industry, citizen empowerment 
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through access to information, or more efficient government management. The 
resulting benefits can be less corruption, increased transparency, greater 
convenience, revenue growth, and/or cost reductions.”  
 
Fang (2002: 3) defines e-Government as : Government activities that take place over 
electronic communications among all levels of government, citizens, and the business 
community, including: acquiring and providing products and services; placing and 
receiving orders; providing and obtaining information; and completing financial 
transactions.  Such activities and services benefit citizens through the use of new 
media technologies, most particularly through web-based communication (Fang 2002: 
2).  Gartner (2000) definition suggests that e-Government is the continuous 
optimisation of service delivery, constituency participation and governance by 
transforming internal and external relationships through technology, the Internet and 
other new media forms.  Panganiban (2004: 7) suggests that e-Government is the use 
of information and communication technologies to transform government by making 
it more accessible, effective and accountable.  
 
Fang (2002: 5) and Panganiban (2004: 7) both distinguish between the concept of ‘e-
Governance’ and ‘e-Government’.  The notion behind e-Governance goes beyond the 
scope of e-Government. While e-Government is defined as a mere delivery of 
government services and information to the public using electronic means, e-
Governance allows citizen direct participation of constituents in political activities 
going beyond government and includes e-Democracy, e-Voting, and participating in 
political activities online.  Broadly speaking, e-Governance will cover government, 
citizen participation, political parties and organisations, parliament and judiciary 
functions.  Thus Fang (2002: 5) and Panganiban (2004: 7) both argue that e-
Government is concerned with delivery of governmental services and information that 
is not that different from traditional systems found offline whilst e-Governance is 
more concerned with citizen participation and e-Democracy.  It must be understood 
that although e-Governance can strengthen the democratic process, e-Government can 
as well through access to information and services that were once difficult to find.   
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Harris (2000) offers one of the strongest summaries of what e-Governance is and 
entails by suggesting that:  
 
e-Governance is not just about government web site and e-mail. It is not just 
about service delivery over the Internet. It is not just about digital access to 
government information or electronic payments. It will change how citizens 
relate to governments as much as it changes how citizens relate to each other. 
It will bring forth new concepts of citizenship, both in terms of needs and 
responsibilities. e-Governance will allow citizens to communicate with 
government, participate in the governments' policy-making and citizens to 
communicate each other and to participate in the democratic political 
process. Therefore, in broadest sense, e-Governance has more implications 
than e-Government. 
 
Although e-Governance is more concerned with e-Democracy and strengthening 
democratisation, many believe the e-Government performs a similar function as well. 
Netchaeva (2002: 469) states that e-Government does not necessarily mean 
democracy.  e-Government portals perform two main functions: to help the population 
in their everyday life (online services) and provide citizen participation in the 
democratic process.  On the one hand, e-Government is an instrument for better 
governance and for improving communication between government, business and 
citizens. On the other hand, some specialists think that IT use in governance may 
intrinsically change relationships in society, help to achieve real democratic means 
and even transform people’s social and political consciousness (Netchaeva 2002: 
469).  Westen (2001: 3) supports this above notion by arguing that new 
communications technology (such as ICTs) will not just affect democracy; it will 
transform it.  This is because democracy is an interactive form of government, the 
revolution in interactive communications will inevitably have its greatest effect on the 
most important ‘interactive institution’: government itself. 
 
The rollout of an extensive e-Government program with the aid of the Internet can 
provide citizens living outside major cities and towns the potential to access 
government services without having to travel large distances.  Applying for social 
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grants and pensions and receiving them electronically as well as applying for birth 
and marriage certificates online can reduce costs for the citizen in terms of transport 
costs and time wasted in long queues at government departments (Chilwane 2007).  
Chilwane (2007) adds that ICTs linked to government services alone does not produce 
e-Government: new technologies must be implemented hand in hand with 
organisational change and skills development.  The role-out of Internet and 
telecommunication infrastructure is essential for e-Government to become a reality 
for every citizen.  Although affordable access to the Internet is crucial for an e-
Government strategy to be effective, communities in rural areas and those unable to 
afford the high costs of Internet access will not have the means to access such 
services, thus if Internet diffusion continues to be low, e-Government will merely 
broaden the gap between the information-haves and the information have-nots.  
 
3.4. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has provided an overview of literature that is specific to research 
conducted on Internet diffusion and e-Government in South Africa.  Although there is 
a substantial amount of research conducted on Internet diffusion in South Africa, 
majority of such research falls within the area of grey literature (i.e.: research 
conducted outside academia).  As a result of majority of literature found outside 
academic research, this study relays extensively on grey literature for its foundation.  
Furthermore, literature conducted on factors influencing Internet diffusion tends to 
place focus on one aspect alone: high prices. As mention above, high prices play a 
significant role in the diffusion of Internet in South Africa, however many studies 
provide little detail as to why prices are substantially higher than other countries and 
other countries on a similar development level to South Africa. This study attempts to 
fill a gap in literature undertaken on Internet diffusion in South Africa by analysing 
how key private and public institutions as well as how policies and regulations have 
contributed to high prices and have aided the low diffusion of Internet found in South 
Africa. 
 
Furthermore, majority of literature conducted on e-Government has focused on how 
the South African government is pursuing the goals of e-Government and how 
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successful policies pertain to e-Government are and have been. In addition, a large 
proportion of research takes the form of benchmark studies in that the level of e-
Government in South Africa is compared to other developed and developing 
countries. Little research has been conducted on how effective the penetration of e-
Government services have been. This research differs in that focus is placed on how 
Internet diffusion patterns in South Africa have influenced the uptake of e-
Government services and e-Government programs that have been rolled out in the 
past.  This research is in contrast to many studies conducted in that focus is not placed 
on the effectiveness of e-Government portals on fulfilling the goals of e-Government 
and studies conducted on whether e-Government portals provide easily obtainable 
government services. Instead this research fills a gap in literature in that it links 
Internet diffusion levels to e-Government success.     
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Chapter 4: Conceptual Framework 
  
4.1. Introduction 
 
This research will analyse the factors influencing the diffusion of Internet in South 
Africa by making use of Critical Negotiation Issues as a conceptual framework as as 
outlined by Lewis (2005) and Wilson (2005) and then link it to government’s policy 
and programs of e-Government. Critical political economy of the media will also be 
utilised as a conceptual and theoretical framework. This chapter provides an over 
view of what Critical Negotiation Issues and Critical Political Economy entail.   
 
4.2. Critical Negotiation Issues 
 
Critical Negotiation Issues is an emerging conceptual framework which has not 
received widespread scholarly attention. Lewis (2005: 1) states that the majority of 
the studies done on Internet in Africa and Internet diffusion are marked by a structural 
or determinist approach that tends to place technology or market structure in an 
independent role as an unequivocal driver of positive change.  There is a 
corresponding tendency to downplay the role of society and social forces, to minimize 
the aspect of social construction of the Internet, and hence, to overlook contestation 
between diverse and competing interest groups as a motive force. Lewis (2005: 1) 
further states that such an approach has often tended to concentrate on the macro-
economic causes of Internet diffusion, such as Gross Domestic Product per capita, 
assuming a straightforward, incremental roll-out of Internet technologies and 
applications.  However useful such studies may be, whether they focus on ‘e-
readiness’, or policy priorities, institutional reforms, and best practices, they have 
underplayed the experience of the development and diffusion of a new social 
technology, such as the Internet. The dynamic texture of the politicking, bargaining, 
manoeuvring, and struggling for economic and social leverage that accompany the 
expansion of such a valuable wealth-generating resource have often been lost (Lewis 
2005: 2). 
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Wilson (2005: 1) argues that the contemporary study of ICTs rests on several faulty 
assumptions that limit our ability to understand and act upon their diffusion. These 
misunderstandings also limit ones efforts to enhance wider access to knowledge for 
the ever growing numbers of people in the developed and developing world.  These 
limitations show up in faulty theories, faulty concepts and faulty methodologies and 
thus lead to faulty policies and stunted performance.  Wilson (2005: 1) further argues 
that the dominant tradition of e-readiness reports, descriptions of policy intentions, 
and discussions of institutional arrangements tends to undervalue the very factors that 
most drive the policies that affect access to knowledge, and suffer from serious 
shortcomings.  The dominant tradition tends to be static, techno-determinist, a-
political, macro-oriented and avoids identifying winners and losers.  In order to fully 
appreciate the factors that most share access to knowledge, and enhanced access to 
ICTs, analysts and practitioners must pay much more attention to leadership, politics 
and historical and social contexts.  A small group of researchers and theorists have 
been working on an alternative theoretical framework and methodology for several 
years, designed to capture the leadership and political elements of ICT diffusion, 
while retaining conceptual rigor, methodological transparency and a focus on points 
of policy leverage.  This new approach to ICT or Internet diffusion research has 
become known as Critical Negotiation Issues (Wilson 2005: 2).  Critical Negotiation 
Issues, as a theoretical, analytical and conceptual framework is a recent framework 
which was created by researchers and theorists at the University of Maryland in the 
United States.  The research was conducted for Negotiating the Net, a project 
designed to generate an in-depth analyses of Internet diffusion in Ghana, Kenya, 
Rwanda, South Africa, and Tanzania.  The authors of the project consider historical, 
structural, and political factors involved in each country’s case study (Wilson 2005).  
The book, Negotiating the Net in Africa: the Politics of Internet Diffusion, was 
published in 2006, edited by Ernest Wilson and Kelvin Wong, provided the basis of 
Critical Negotiation Issues theory as a conceptual and analytical framework. 
 
Lewis (2005: 4) suggests that the focus on Critical Negotiation Issues as an analytical 
tool proceeds from the premise that policy and legal frameworks have a key influence 
on economic growth and social development. Some social actors or interest groups 
benefit from particular policies and seek to maintain them. Others find that their 
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abilities to accumulate wealth, or to derive other forms of social and economic 
benefit, are hindered by existing policies.  This in turn leads them to mobilize for 
changes to existing policies and laws, or for their replacement by entirely new ones. 
The ensuing struggle for policy hegemony becomes potentially what is characterized 
here as a Critical Negotiation Issues.  It must be understood that not every 
disagreement or dispute constitutes a Critical Negotiation Issue.  Lewis (2005: 4) 
further suggests that there are three defining factors that allow an issue to be 
characterized as being of critical negotiation importance in the context of the Internet. 
First, a Critical Negotiation Issue should centre on a policy matter or legal question 
with a high degree of relevance to the development or diffusion of the Internet: one 
for which the outcome will have a significant impact in shaping the future direction 
and form of that diffusion. Second, a Critical Negotiation Issue should be 
characterized by a high degree of contestation. It is engaged in by means of 
antagonistic behaviour on the part of the competing social actors or interest groups; 
usually on the basis of the perceived impact (either negative or positive) its resolution 
will have on business, livelihood, or another fundamental interest. Third, owing from 
the above two characteristics, a Critical Negotiation Issue will, if left unresolved, 
impede the future development and further diffusion of the Internet, both because of 
its degree of relevance and its level of contestation.  
 
The study conducted by Lewis (2005), highlighted four Critical Negotiation Issues 
that have hindered the diffusion of Internet in South Africa.  The four Critical 
Negotiation Issues are: Anti-competitive behaviour; Access to facilities; 
Telecommunication liberalisation, privatisation and regulation; and E-commerce 
policy. In brief, Lewis (2005) describes what each Critical Negotiation Issue entails:  
 
The highly contested issue of Anti-competitive behaviour was initially manifested 
through clashes between the start-up companies in the sector over market share, but 
subsequently in the face off between Telkom’s ISPs and those in the private sector, 
over market dominance, and ultimately, commercial survival itself.  The beginnings 
of the South African Internet industry was initially created through comradeship but 
was later replaced by cut-throat competition, by an aggressive drive to dominate the 
small (but rapidly growing and highly profitable) market (Lewis 2005: 5; 9).   
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Access to facilities, the second highly contested issue, focused in terms of which the 
private sector ISPs sought to secure connectivity from the monopoly provider of 
infrastructure, Telkom.  Telkom which in turn either sought to purposely delay the 
process or refused to supply access, initially largely through bureaucratic inertia and 
ignorance of what the Internet was. Later Telkom used its government granted 
monopoly as a weapon in the anti-competitive behaviour mentioned above.  
Regulatory policy at the time provided Telkom with a sole licence to provide vital 
infrastructure to commercial ISPs.  This meant that all providers of Internet and 
related services were required by law to purchase leased lines7
 
 and other means of 
telecommunications access from Telkom, which itself competed directly in the ISP 
market (Lewis 2005: 5; 14). 
Telecommunication liberalisation, privatisation and regulation, the third issue, saw 
intense contestation over the shape, structure, and dynamics of the telecoms market as 
an extensive policy reform was embarked on in the years following the advent of 
democracy in South Africa.  The passing of the Telecommunications Act in 1996, 
confirmed Telkom’s exclusivity in public switched telephony and telecommunications 
facilities until 2002.  Its provisions dashed the hopes of many in the private sector for 
a rapid liberalisation of the sector. A number of players felt betrayed by the process, 
angry that their recommendations had been excised from the final legislation. A 
mistrust was created, which coloured relations between the government and the 
private telecommunication and ISP sector for years to follow (Lewis 2005: 5; 17).  
 
E-commerce policy, the last highly contested issue and which is, to a degree a special 
instance of the previous Critical Negotiation Issues, but one with direct and 
immediate implications for Internet development. As Internet-enabled e-commerce 
began flourishing the Department of Communications released an e-commerce 
discussion paper, thereby launching a formal process to formulate an e-commerce 
policy leading to legislation.  The working paper resulted in legislation in the form of 
the Electronic Communications and Transactions Bill of 2002. The key issues of 
                                                 
7 Leased lines are private telephone circuit permanently connecting two points and are mainly used by 
large businesses and government to link two points or offices. 
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contention were similar to those arising from the earlier telecommunications reform 
attempts: complaints about the inability of stakeholders in the participatory process to 
exert meaningful influence and have their interests reflected in the outcome; concern 
at the wide-ranging oversight powers the bill granted to government; and the 
significant number of issues left to the discretion of the executive arm of government 
via the minister of communications or the director general.  Once again, the policy 
outcomes created a contentious relationship between the government and the private 
sector (Lewis 2005: 5; 21).    
 
As stated before, although the Critical Negotiation Issues brought up by Lewis (2005) 
may be valid, the study was focused on Internet diffusion between 1990 and 2003 and 
since then, there have been significant changes in the sector in particular with concern 
to access to facilities and anti-competitive behaviour.  Lewis (2005) concludes by 
suggesting that there has been a significant move to deal with the issues of anti-
completive behaviour, access to facilities and e-commerce policy.  As it has been 
established (and will be discussed below), three of the four Critical Negotiation Issues 
highlighted by Lewis (2005) have, to a large extent, been addressed by policy, 
government and regulatory intervention.  This study will thus build on one of the 
issues and establish two new issues.     
 
The three Critical Negotiation Issues which have emerged from the data collected as 
having a significant impact on Internet diffusion in South Africa are 
Telecommunication Liberalisation, Regulation and Policy Making and Universal 
Service and Universal Access.   
 
4.2.1. Telecommunication Liberalisation 
 
As with many other countries worldwide, South Africa’s telecommunication sector 
established itself through a government granted and controlled telecom monopoly, 
which allowed for such companies to grow and institute dominance with little or no 
competition.  Telecommunication liberalisation is the introduction of competition into 
the telecoms sector by allowing commercial enterprises to set up new 
telecommunication businesses as long as they comply with certain government 
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defined policies, rules and regulations. It is a fundamental shift in the way a 
government, at the national level and through international treaty agreements, 
regulates the provision and use of public telecoms resources (International Chamber 
of Commerce 2004: 9). Ospina (2002: 2) suggests that the popularisation of neoliberal 
ideology resulting from the spread of neoclassical economic ideas among the 
decision-making elites in developed and developing countries and their interpretation 
as a justification for less State intervention has been one of the main driving forces 
behind the privatisation and liberalization initiatives during the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
One of the primary goals of liberalising the South African telecommunications sector 
is to increase access to communications infrastructure by boosting local and foreign 
direct investment in the sector and thus addressing the imbalance in infrastructure 
provision and reducing costs associated with the uptake of telecom services.  
 
The International Chamber of Commerce (2004: 9) suggests that technological 
advances in computers and digital technology in the 1980’s and 1990’s radically 
changed the telecoms sector, creating opportunities for market entry by a range of 
competitors.  Governments realised that monopoly networks and services were 
limiting the development of new markets and services. Economic stimulation and the 
need to attract investment in the telecoms industry became the catalyst for 
governments to start the telecommunication liberalisation process.  It must be 
understood that telecommunication liberalisation does not de-regulate nor does it 
strive for privatisation (International Chamber of Commerce 2004: 10).  A liberalised 
telecommunication sector demands more from regulators and the countries regulatory 
body.  The establishment of a market driven policy framework and pro-competitive 
regulations is essential for the short- and long-term success of a liberalised telecom 
sector. 
 
Telecommunication Liberalisation, in brief, deals with the South African 
government’s continual policy of ‘managed liberalisation’; Telecom monopolies; 
introduction and effects of completion; and State ownership patterns and increasing 
State ownership. 
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4.2.2. Regulation and Policy Making 
 
For a telecommunication sector to thrive financially, protect consumers and promote 
competition at the same time, a strong regulator and effect policies are vital.  In a 
study conducted on thirty African and Latin American countries between 1984 and 
1997, privatisation of telecommunications by itself was found to be negatively related 
to main line penetration and connection capacity.  The presence of a strong regulator 
and competition, however, resulted in increases in penetration and decreases in 
overall prices (Makaya and Roberts 2003: 42-43).  A strong regulator and effective 
regulations also have a lasting effect on an economy’s growth and sustainability.  van 
Leijden and Monasso (2005: 37) suggest that it is widely known that major investors 
and investment bankers in telecom infrastructure need answers to only two questions 
to determine whether a country has a favourable environment for investment.  Firstly, 
is the regulator independent from the Government and secondly, is the regulator 
independent from the incumbent operator? 
 
Sibinda (2008: 218) outlines two theoretical approaches to regulation and policy 
making: neo-liberals and structuralist. The neo-liberals approach is that a common 
working strategy for most countries and in all situations is to liberalise and not do 
much else. It has strong theoretical premise that markets are efficient and that the 
necessary institutions already exist to make markets function effectively, and if there 
are deviations from optimality, they cannot be effectively remedied by governments. 
In contrast, a structuralist approach sees a vital role for policy in industrial success. 
The structuralist view puts less faith in free markets as the driver of dynamic 
competitiveness, and more in the ability of governments to effectively mount 
interventions (Sibinda 2008: 218).  These two grounding theories in essence provide 
two approaches to regulatory intervention and policing making, one being a market-
driven approach and the other a non-market-driven approach.  
 
Broadly speaking, Regulator and Policy Marking examines ICASA’s role as a 
regulator; its strengths and weaknesses; the regulators constraints; and the current 
policies and former policies that have and may have affected Internet diffusion in 
South Africa 
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4.2.3. Universal Service and Universal Access 
 
The Group of Eight (G8) countries have emphasized that ICTs empowers, benefits 
and links people the world over.  Access to digital opportunities is a necessity and 
therefore be open to all segments of society (Mansell 2001: 282).  The above 
statement made by the G8 forms the basis of what has become known as universal 
service.  Universal access and universal service are one of the most used terms in 
telecommunications, and in the delivery of public services.  Crémer (2001: 9) states 
that universal service and access is defined as the provision of a service at ‘affordable’ 
prices to all citizens, sometimes with the added requirement that the price be the same 
for everyone.  In the case of the Internet, the call for universal service is often justified 
by the existence of a ‘digital divide’.  The notion that “it is not fair that some people 
do not have access to the benefits of cheap information” is one of the more popular 
most often used in the political arena for the justification of universal service and 
access (Crémer 2001: 9). 
 
Although often used interchangeably, the terms universal service and universal access 
with regards to telecommunication have different meanings.  There is still no 
universal consensus on what each term refers to and why they should be policy goals; 
this often leadings to a highly contested debate from policy makers.  The two term 
provide a range of meanings that is so wide as to allow both right- and left-wing  
politicians to consider it a admirable objective, notwithstanding the fact that their 
respective interpretations of that objective may actually be polar opposites (Preston 
and Flynn 2000: 91).   The International Telecommunication Union provides the best 
explanations of the two terms by broadly defining universal service as referring to a 
telephone line for every household, whereas universal access refers to a publicly 
available telephone, not necessarily in one’s home, but provided through payphones, 
telecentres, multi-purpose community centres or other community-based centres 
(Msimang 2006: 217).  Although having different meanings the overriding objectives 
of universal service and universal access policies are to expand and maintain the 
availability of affordable telecommunications services to the public (USA 2006: 15).  
In particular, universal service and universal access policies are aimed at providing 
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affordable telecommunications services to those segments of the population who 
would not normally be served (for example: high cost areas such as remote and rural 
regions, as well as lower income groups).  
 
The last Critical Negotiation issue, Universal Service and Universal Access, as a 
whole,  analyses the strides and failures of Universal Service and Access in South 
Africa, provides examples of countries with Universal Service and Access, and looks 
at telecom companies’ individual service obligations. Furthermore, it encompasses the 
body entrusted with the role out of Universal Service and Access in South Africa.  
 
4.3. Linking Critical Negotiations to High Costs   
 
These three Critical Negotiation Issues have been identified as they meet the criteria 
of Critical Negotiation Issues as stated above; however, this does not mean that there 
are no other issues of key importance influencing Internet diffusion.  High prices, for 
example, have remained a key constraint on the South African Internet industry and 
are an ongoing hindrance on the development of the Internet growth (Muller 2007).  
Although the issue of pricing does not fit the criteria of Critical Negotiation Issues, it 
does play a significant role in Internet diffusion and thus will be addressed separately.   
 
By analysing the three Critical Negotiation Issues, it becomes evident that the issue 
regarding high costs are directly linked and as a result of all three issues.  The three 
Critical Negotiation Issues identified for this study will further have a lasting 
influence over the South African government’s policy and attempts to create a 
successful e-government program. 
 
4.4. Critical Political Economy  
 
In addition to Critical Negotiation Issues, the use of Critical Political Economy theory 
is a necessity in research conducted on Internet diffusion. Critical Political Economy 
theory is used as a secondary conceptual framework as it is concerned with the 
production, distribution and consumption of resources as well as ownership structures 
and the influence they have on resources and products (Inglis 1990: 111).  Golding 
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and Murdock (2000: 74) argue that Critical Political Economy is interested in the 
interplay between economic organisation and political, social and cultural life.  Mosco 
(1996: 25) adds that Critical Political Economy can be defined as the study of the 
social relations, particularly the power relations that mutually constitute the 
production, distribution and consumption of available resources. 
   
According to Boymal et al (2007: 409) political economic dimension is important to 
the study of technological innovation including those relating to Internet diffusion as 
technological innovation is a dynamic process involving political, social, 
organisational and technological change. One of the reasons for this is that politics 
and technology have power as their central focus, and large technological innovation 
at a societal level is deeply interwoven with politics in modern societies.  
Additionally, in recent studies on ICTs and Internet diffusion, several authors suggest 
that institutions such as political parties, telecommunication operators and regulators 
play a major and multifaceted role in the diffusion of technological innovation in 
society. Agreeing to this notion Milner (2006: 179) argues that political institutions in 
particular matter for the adoption of new technologies because they affect the manner 
and degree to which winners and losers from the technology can translate their 
preferences into influence. Groups that believe they will lose from the Internet try to 
use political institutions to enact policies that block the spread of the Internet. These 
‘losers’ hope to slow down or stop its diffusion, and some institutions make this easier 
to do than others. In addition, Boymal et al (2007: 409) suggests that without 
governmental support and financing, the deployment of national information 
infrastructures would have been impossible.  As specific institutional interests and 
legitimate positions are at stake, government institutions, telecommunications 
operators and service providers try to implement institutional policies and influence 
political decisions to shape technological outcomes according to their own particular 
status, visions and interests (Boymal et al 2007: 409).   
 
On a basic level, Dholakia et al (2003: 16) argue that the diffusion and adoption of 
ICTs entail decisions at various levels (individual, organization, national, 
international) about allocation of scarce resources. Critical Political Economy theories 
help explain how individuals, organizations and governments make decisions 
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regarding the allocation of resources in ICT investment.  Therefore, in order to 
analyse the above in a South African context and understand the effect it has on the 
rollout of Internet services and infrastructure, the use of Critical Political Economy as 
a theoretical framework is necessary.  Critical Negotiation Issues alone cannot answer 
such questions and thus the two theoretical approaches are used throughout the 
research to complement each other.   
   
Private telecommunication companies and ISPs in South Africa fall within a 
capitalistic market system and thus have the ultimate goal of profit making.  Linklater 
(2001: 713) defines capitalism as “a system of production in which human labour and 
its products are commodities that are bought and sold in the market-place”.  Within 
private, profit striving telecommunication companies, ownership structures and 
patterns have a large influence over the direction companies take and as a result will 
influence the diffusion of Internet services and infrastructure (Wunnava and Leitter 
2009).  Furthermore, Critical Political Economy approach sees the fact that culture is 
produced and consumed under capitalism as a fundamental issue in explaining 
inequalities of power, prestige and profit.  It extends to the debates over whether 
cultural industries serve in the interest of the wealthy and powerful only 
(Hesmondhalgh 2007: 24).  From this perspective, a Critical Political Economy 
approach aids in the understanding as to why inequalities such as the digital divide 
arise and why such inequalities continue to grow unimpeded.     
 
A Critical Political Economy theoretical approach will therefore be used to analyse 
the ownership patterns in telecommunication companies and to analyse and determine 
the impact and influence they have on the diffusion of Internet.  Furthermore, this 
theoretical approach identifies the influence politics and economics have on both 
positive and negative factors effective Internet diffusion. With regards to pricing, 
Critical Political Economy theory is also needed to gain an understanding of the 
influence ownership patterns and monopolies have, and have had, over the high costs 
of Internet access that are found in South Africa.  
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4.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has provided an outline of Critical Negotiation Issues as used as a 
conceptual framework for this study.  The identification of three Critical Negotiation 
Issues has supplied the basis of this study in that they have provided insight into the 
major factors influencing Internet diffusion in South Africa.  Telecommunication 
Liberalisation, Regulation and Policy Making and Universal Service and Universal 
Access are the three Critical Negotiation Issues that have been identified as having a 
significant impact on Internet diffusion.  Furthermore, these three issues have been 
selected as they fulfil the requirements of Critical Negotiation Issues as defined by 
Lewis (2005) and Wilson (2005). 
 
In addition to Critical Negotiation Issues, this study has used Critical Political 
Economy theory in order to aid in answering the research questions posed at the 
beginning of this study.  Critical Political Economy theory also assists in analysing 
the effect ownership patterns and government ownership patterns in 
telecommunication companies have on the diffusion of Internet. Furthermore, 
ownership patterns play a large role in the enforcement of regulation and in the 
making of policy.  Critical Political Economy theory also provides an analysis method 
in determining as to why the cost of telecommunications and Internet access in South 
Africa are incomparably higher than in other countries. 
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Chapter 5: Methodology 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
The core focus of this research is to critically analyse the factors influencing the 
diffusion of Internet in South Africa by making use of three Critical Negotiation 
Issues as explained in the previous chapter.  Furthermore this research attempts to link 
the effects Internet diffusion is having on the rollout of e-Government services, 
currently and in the future.  It is recognized that the adoption of ICTs and the 
expansion of Internet diffusion is a multifaceted phenomenon that takes place in a 
variety of ways over time.  In addition to this, the researcher asks ‘why’ the status quo 
is way it is by analysing events, policies and legal rulings that have shaped the 
diffusion of Internet.  In this respect, the research takes on a qualitative approach.   
 
5.2. Research Approach 
 
Due to the nature of this research, this study makes use of a qualitative approach to 
data collection as opposed to a quantitative approach which is more concerned with 
numerical reflections.  At a basic level, Price (1997:192) defines quantitative research 
as simply recording the number or quantity of events, compared to qualitative 
research, which aims towards discovering more about the meanings found within 
events. The Fundamental distinctions between qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies are found in the location of meaning in texts. A quantitative analysis 
emphasizes a fixed meaning that can be repeatedly identified by different readers 
using the same analytical framework. Qualitative analysis procedures emphasize the 
capacity of texts to convey multiple meaning, depending upon the receiver (Gunter 
2000: 82). 
 
Creswell (2003: 179) suggests that a qualitative inquiry employs different knowledge 
claims, strategies of, and methods of data collection and analysis.  Qualitative 
procedures rely on text and image data, have unique steps in data analysis, and draw 
on diverse strategies of inquiry.  Creswell (2003: 182) further suggests that qualitative 
research is fundamentally interpretive.  The researcher makes an interpretation of the 
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data.  This includes developing a description of individual or setting, analysing data 
for themes and categories, and finally making an interpretation or drawing a 
conclusion about its meaning personally and theoretically, stating the lessons learned, 
and offer further questions to be asked.  A quantitative method is not well suited 
studying deep questions about textual and discursive forms. It is not good at exposing 
aesthetic or rhetorical nuances within texts (Deacon et al, 1999: 105). Furthermore, 
qualitative research approach is generally a social research that is based upon the need 
to understand human action and social interaction from the perspectives of insiders 
and participants (Greenstein 1991:49).  A qualitative method is thus primarily 
concerned with description and explanation of data rather than measurement of the 
data as observed by quantitative research techniques (Greenstein 1991: 49).   
 
Numerous research conducted on Internet diffusion tends to follow a qualitative 
methodology.  This includes Wilson and Wong (2005) Negotiating the Net: The 
Politics of Internet Diffusion in Africa  ¸ Lewis (2005) Negotiating the Net: The 
Internet in South Africa (1990-2003), Naidoo et al (2005) The South African Telecoms 
Innovation System and the Diffusion of Broadband and a recent study by Ochara et al 
(2008) entitled Internet Diffusion in Kenya and Its Determinants: A Longitudinal 
Analysis which was conducted at the University of Cape Town.  The study of Internet 
diffusion in a particular country or region tends to and should be reliant on a 
qualitative approach (Wilson and Wong 2005, Lewis 2005, Ochara et al 2008).   
 
Although qualitative research has been criticised for being impressionistic, subjective 
and limited in scope (Bryman 2004: 284 -285), it does provide a good grounding for 
understanding and interpreting factors influencing Internet diffusion in a particular 
country or region and thus a qualitative approach will be ideal for this type of 
research. 
 
5.3. Methods of Data Collection 
 
This research project has made a significant reliance on three methods of data 
collection: secondary research, document analysis and interviews.  Deacon et al 
(1999: 16) suggests that a range of agencies regularly produce statistics and other 
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materials that one is able to use in a research report or a study.  Official sources and 
research conducted by universities, independent institutes and individual researchers 
are particularly useful for answering certain kinds of research questions.  Such 
sources provide useful information for mapping general patterns in the field one is 
researching.  Furthermore, some research projects are conducted annually or at 
regular intervals and act as running records to help identify changes and continuities 
over time (Deacon et al 1999: 16).  The notion of accuracy is an obstacle when 
analysing secondary sources however, for this study, numerous studies were analysed 
and claims crossed-referenced in order to ensure accuracy.  
 
5.3.1. Secondary Research 
 
As there is a rapidly increasing number of people gaining Internet access and the rapid 
advancement of Internet technologies, the study has gained much of its secondary 
research form online journals and the Internet itself as they are both often updated and 
stay abreast with continues advancements.  Hewson et al (2003: 24) suggests that the 
Internet provides researchers with quick and easy access to a wealth of information 
that is constantly updated and results in research being conducted more accurately, 
appropriately and more efficiently.  However, there is a tendency for researchers to 
become too heavily reliant on the Internet and the assumption arises that if 
information is not easily found on the Internet it does not exist (Hewson et al 2003: 
24).  This above notion has become known as ‘FUTON bias’ or ‘Full Text on the Net’ 
bias (Ghosh and Murali 2003).   
 
Although this study has made a heavy reliance on Internet sources, it has avoided the 
notion of FUTON bias as it also makes use of more traditional methods of gaining 
data (e.g.: books, journals and interviews).  News articles that appeared on general 
newspaper websites and technology and Internet inclined website are also used to gain 
an understanding of existing trends in the market and to get updates on developments 
currently taking place. A qualitative analysis of news articles provide an 
understanding on the progress, hindrances and stances private and public sector 
officials and institutions have with regards to the Internet diffusion.  
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5.3.2. Document Analysis 
 
In order supplement news articles and secondary research and strengthen the research, 
document analysis has been used to analyse government policy relating to ICTs. The 
Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) and the Universal 
Service and Access Agency of South Africa (USAASA) policies were also examined.  
These institutions policies stem from Bills and Acts of Parliament which have been 
examined in this research. Legislation dealing with Internet access, ICTs and 
telecommunications was analysed in the study to determine whether there are 
provisions made to accelerate the rollout of ICT and Internet access and if these 
provisions are being adhered to and are effective. Altheide (1996: 24) notes that 
document analysis relies on the researcher’s interaction and involvement with selected 
documents relevant to a research topic. Document analysis in terms of looking at 
policies, drafts and final forms of legislation and press releases from government 
departments and regulatory agencies play an important role in research projects and 
aid in answering ones research questions (Deacon et al 1999: 18-20). 
 
5.3.3 Interviews 
 
In addition to secondary research and document analysis, interviews were also 
conducted.  This provided the study with insight given by industry players.  
Interviews allowed the research to become less reliant on solely secondary research 
and document analysis.  Furthermore, interviews provide the basis of Critical 
Negotiation Issues as the conceptual framework demands that information is gathered 
from experts in the telecommunication industry as well as those responsible for policy 
making and/or change (Wilson 2005: 2-4).   
 
Jensen (2002: 240-241) points out that multiple interviews can be used to increase 
information and broaden a point of view.  Thus four interviews were conducted over 
the course of the research.  Two interviewees, one a senior councillor from ICASA 
and the second an upper management advisor from MTN South Africa, wished to stay 
anonymous.  Additionally they both agreed to do interviews in their own capacity and 
not on behalf of the organisation they represented.  The MTN South Africa 
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interviewee is an advisor in policy making and strategies involving the rollout of 3G 
Internet services.  The third interview was conducted with the acting CEO of the 
USAASA, Winile Lamini. The fourth interview was conducted with Charley Lewis, a 
senior lecturer at the School of Public and Development Management, University of 
the Witwatersrand and author of Negotiating the Net: The Internet in South Africa 
(1999-2003).  Furthermore, Charley Lewis is a specialist in ICT policy and regulation, 
universal service and consumer protection at the Link Centre, University of the 
Witwatersrand.  These four interviewees were selected as provided insight from two 
public sector institutions and one private sector telecommunication operator as well as 
insight from an academic perspective.   
 
The research employed a semi-structured approach to interviewing8
 
.  Bryman (2004: 
321) states that in a semi-structured interview, the research has a list of questions or 
topics to cover, often referred to as an ‘interview guide’, but the interviewee has a 
great deal of leeway in how to reply.  Questions may not follow on exactly in the way 
outlined by the schedule.  Questions that are not included in the guide may also be 
asked as the interviewer picks up on things said by the interviewee (Bryman 2004: 
321).   According to Berger (2000:112), semi-structured interviews support a ‘casual 
quality’, which can set the tone of the interview in a manner that can elicit trust and 
therefore may encourage the interviewee to divulge pertinent information. 
This semi-structured approach to interviewing was beneficial in this study as 
interviews were conducted on a ‘one on one’ basis as opposed to group interviews 
(focus groups) in which a different approach would be used (Kvale 1996: 101). 
Qualitative research has been often criticized for its overreliance on the interview 
technique (Silverman 1998: 10-13).  Additionally and as Lewis (2005: 3) points out, 
there is a potential for interviewees to mislead or dissemble for self-justification or 
other reasons, there is the difficulty of uncovering the subconscious intent or tacit 
objective beneath the overt professed motivation.  To address the above concern, each 
interviewee was asked the same or similar questions in order for data gathered to be 
cross referenced for accuracy. In addition to these standardised questions, a different 
                                                 
8 See Appendix A for the Interview Guide  
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batch of questions, each pertaining to the particular interviewee, was asked for the 
benefit of gaining further insight from their own perspectives.   
 
While a semi-structured interview method could be seen as less quantitative and open 
to interview bias, it does present the best structure for gaining an insight into factors 
influencing Internet diffusion as well as the influence Internet diffusion is having on 
e-Government strategies and implementations.  
 
In addition to interviews, two annual conferences where attended: IWeek9 and the 
MyBroadband Conference10
  
.  The two conferences place focus on ICTs and ICT 
developments in South Africa with a bias towards Internet and Internet access 
advancements.  The conference provided insight through a series of lectures 
conducted by academics, industry insiders, the private sector and by government 
agencies such as ICASA.  
5.4. Methods of Data Analysis 
 
Critical Negotiation Issues was used as an analytical theoretical and conceptual 
framework to identify the issues hindering or advancing the diffusion of Internet in 
South Africa.  As discussed in the previous chapter, for this study three Critical 
Negotiation Issues have been identified: Telecommunication Liberalisation; Universal 
Service and Universal Access; and Regulation and Policy Making.  These three issues 
provide the base of the data analysis section.  Critical Political Economy theory also 
aids this research project to analyse influences over Internet diffusion.  A Critical 
Political Economy perspective was utilised when analysing costs of Internet access 
and ownership patterns of telecommunication operators and thus determine how both 
are influencing the rollout of telecommunications infrastructure and policy.   
 
                                                 
9 IWeek took place between 2nd and 4th of September 2009 at The Forum in Bryanston, Johannesburg. 
10The MyBroadband Conference took place on the 12th of November 2009 at Vodaworld in Midrand, 
Johannesburg. 
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5.5. Limitations  
 
There have been a number of noticeable limitations identified in this study.  This first 
limitation pertains to interviews.  Critical Negotiation Issues demands that a number 
of interviews be conducted with industry experts and those responsible for policy 
making in order to fully understand what factors influence Internet diffusion in a 
particular country or region.  As the knowledge base surrounding Internet diffusion is 
a still relatively small, sourcing interviews from industry players and industry experts 
proved difficult given the time constraints.  Majority were either too busy or outside 
Gauteng at the time interviews needed to be conducted.  Although the necessary 
alternative arrangements were provided by the researcher, such interviews did not 
come to fruition.  Sourcing interviews from ICASA and the Department of 
Communications also proved difficult as on numerous requests interviews were 
denied. In order to overcome such constraints it was decided by the researcher to 
attend two ICT conferences, mentioned above, to gain insight provided by regulators, 
company representatives and industry experts who offered lectures and speeches at 
each conference.  
 
As this research study has made a heavy reliance on secondary research and document 
analysis to gather data, it brings with it the limitation of having sources that may be 
outdated given the rapid advancements and changes taking place in this field of study.  
In addition to interviews conducted and conferences attended, the research has 
attempted to overcome this limitation by sourcing news articles published by 
reputable news agencies that provide constantly updated information pertaining to the 
various topics being discussed. 
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Chapter 6: Findings: Factors Influencing Internet Diffusion 
in South Africa 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter seeks to critically analyse which factors are advancing or hindering 
Internet diffusion in South Africa.  In order to answer the research questions posed, 
Critical Negotiation Issues as a conceptual framework was utilised.  With the aid of 
the three Critical Negotiation Issues identified in this research, four major factors 
have been recognised as continuing to provide the greatest influence.  The Regulator, 
Regulation and Policy Making; State Ownership Patterns; The Failures of Universal 
Service and Universal Access and; Pricing and Undersea Cables all have both positive 
and negative effects on Internet diffusion in South Africa. 
 
Although the timeframe analysed for this study is between 2004 and 2009, reference 
has been made to events, achievement and hindrances that have taken place prior to 
2004. It is imperative to analyse events, achievement and hindrances prior to 2004 as 
they provide a fundamental understanding as to why issues of Internet diffusion have 
arisen today.     
 
6.2. The Regulator, Regulation and Policy Making 
 
On a basic level, Makaya (2002: 9) argues that a regulatory agency such as ICASA 
should facilitate the accomplishment of policy goals with regard to the telecoms 
sector.  Regulatory reform is often undertaken for some public policy objectives such 
as increasing teledensity, increasing investment in a sector and increasing competition 
through liberalisation. The regulatory regime has to make sufficient provision for the 
attainment of these goals. Problems may arise where the objectives are not clearly 
stated or where they are conflicting.  Achieving policy goals will normally involve 
promoting effective competition whilst protecting consumers. The regulator will also 
be responsible for the realisation of universal service, universal access and other 
social aspects of telecommunications (Makaya 2002: 9). 
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As argued above, a liberalised telecommunication sector coupled with an efficient 
regulator and effective policies are necessary to aid Internet diffusion and increase 
growth. Reiterating this notion, it is argued that that “increased competition without 
quality regulation will bring no benefits at all” (Alison Gillwald, IWeek 2 September 
2009).  With this argument in mind, it is essential to analyse how ICASA and certain 
policies are hindering or advancing the spread of Internet in South Africa.   
 
ICASA, being the telecommunications regulator, and thus indirectly the ‘Internet 
regulator’, has often been accused of being ‘soft on Telkom’ and protecting its 
monopoly over the telecommunication market.  But, Naidoo et al (2005: 7-8) argue 
that in reality the regulator was in a very weak position with respect to promoting 
liberalisation and preventing anti-competitive behaviour in the past; its ability to act 
was proscribed by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which served to protect the 
monopoly position of Telkom.  Naidoo et al (2005: 7-8) further argue that ICASA has 
limited resources and personnel and depends on government for funding.  The 
government has not been averse to interfering with the regulator; for example a 
previous head of the organisation was sidelined and removed for acting too 
independently of government.  As a result, the effect of legislation and regulation has 
been to severely restrict the growth of Internet diffusion (Naidoo et al 2005: 8). 
 
ICASA has also been perceived as a weak regulator, lacking the resources and 
expertise to regulate the sector effectively.  Barnard and Gianella (2008: 103-104) 
believe that this is a result of its independence being compromised by the strong role 
the Department of Communications plays in the industry.  The Department of 
Communications is responsible for the development of policies and legislation in the 
telecommunications sector, and has a strong say in regulatory issues through policy 
directives, the appointment of ICASA Councillors and with budget approvals.  
(Barnard and Gianella 2008: 104). Like many other countries, the regulator’s entire 
operating budget is determined, supplied and annually reviewed by Parliament, with 
no provision to use regulatory fees raised from industry towards operating costs 
(Cohen 2003: 10). The way in which ICASA is funded is inscribed in the ICASA Act 
of 2000. This method of funding has tended to lead to the regulator being restrictively 
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underfunded and as such, ICASA’s lack of recourses and reliance on money from the 
government has been seen to be a major problem that has prevented it from 
effectively regulating the industry.  The adequate funding of a regulator is 
fundamental to effective regulation. Tarjanne (2007: 44) suggests that in countries 
where the regulator is under-resourced or inadequately funded, it is all too easy for the 
regulator to be captured by narrow sectoral or commercial interests. This can happen 
as easily in the industrialised countries as in the developing world, and it can be done 
by legitimate means: such as by lobbying, by sponsoring favourable studies, by 
constant recourse to the courts to slow down progress, and as well as by non-
legitimate means. Regulatory capture invariably produces results which militate 
against the public interest, which are economically sub-optimal, and which can be 
narrowly protectionist (Tarjanne 1997: 44).      
 
Additional resources will enable the regulator to hire and secure policy and regulatory 
experts as well as ensure the equipment and support structures that these people will 
require to do their jobs properly (Knott-Craig 2009).  Knott-Craig (2009) proposes a 
different funding structure by stating that ICASA should be funded purely from 
licence fees11
 
, and that the government only receives normal tax on profits and 
dividends of operators, value-added tax and import duties.  Currently ICASA is reliant 
on the National Treasury for funding and the amount of funding issued is at the 
discretion of the Treasury.  This alternative funding model may ensure that the 
regulator is properly funded and at the same time may lead to less government 
interference (Knott-Craig 2009).  Agreeing to this funding model, Tarjanne (1997: 45) 
argues that a properly funded regulator should receive funds not from the State but 
rather from the industry it regulates; however, this should be done in an open, 
transparent and shared way, and not through hidden transactions or under-the table 
dealings.  
The enactment of the ECA in 2005 has brought greater powers to ICASA and granted 
more independence from government (and Department of Communication) 
interference (Cohen 2008: 116).  Cohen (2008: 116-117) states that ICASA receives 
                                                 
11 In some countries communication regulators are permitted to use a percentage of licence fees toward 
operating costs. For example: Brazil (1 percent), Botswana (78 percent), United Kingdom (82 percent) 
and the United States (87 percent) (Cohen 2003: 12). 
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its regulatory powers from the ECA, ICASA Act and the ICASA Amendment Act but 
many critics believe that the independence of the regulator is still undermined by the 
Minister of Communications and the President who still have vast powers over it.  It 
could be argued that ICASA is independent in name only and it has very little 
authority of its own. By international standards established by the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) Agreement on Basic Telecommunications and other organisations, 
ICASA does not qualify as an independent regulatory agency (Melody 2003).   
 
Government interference is an ongoing challenge for not only ICASA but the industry 
as a whole.  The reluctance to grant ICASA true autonomy stems from the ANC’s and 
ANC-led government’s distrust of independent government agencies.  Horwitz and 
Currie (2007: 447; 449) argue that the ANC-led government has been leery about 
permitting real independence for government institutions, and in the case of ICASA, 
has purposely not given it adequate operating resources. The regulator has suffered 
not only from having to do many difficult tasks without adequate human skills 
capacity, but was in effect not permitted to develop and exercise those capacities 
because its authority and budget are so often undercut by the Ministry and the 
Department of Communications.  Ministry representatives and ANC parliamentarians 
fought very hard to limit the statutory independence of the regulator in the final 
legislative debates in Parliament, arguing that the then SATRA, an institution of a 
democratic government should be ‘aligned’ with government and not independent of 
it.  The inherent distrust the ANC-led government initially displayed toward 
independent agencies has resulted in a weakened regulation that has merely 
intensified the incumbent’s power over the regulator and in the market place (Horwitz 
and Currie 2007: 460). 
 
The Minister of Communications and the government continue to undermine the 
autonomy of ICASA, placing strain on its ability to regulate the industry properly.  
This argument has been highlighted in a 2008 court case between ICASA and JSE-
listed technology group Altech. The court case was brought by Altech, essentially to 
force ICASA to issue a new category of telecoms licences to anyone who applied, 
rather than cherry-picking a select handful that the regulator decided were worthy 
(Mail & Guardian 2008).  The landmark High Court ruling in August 2008 found that 
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VANS, which include ISPs, were entitled to Individual Electronic Communications 
Network Service (I-ECNS) licences. The licences would allow VANS, such as Altech 
and others, similar capability as bigger industry players, like Telkom, Neotel, 
Vodacom, MTN and Cell C, to develop and operate their own telecommunications 
networks (Webb 2008).  I-ECNS licence holders, in theory, would have the ability to 
compete directly with the major operators in terms of voice and data services through 
the use of their own infrastructure.   
 
The basis of the court case between ICASA and Altech was in light of a statement 
made by former communications minister, Dr Matsepe-Casaburri, in 2004.  
MyBroadband (2008c) states that in September 2004 the Minister of Communications 
published various determinations as per the Telecommunications Act; one of these 
determinations was that VANS may self-provide facilities from 1 February 2005. 
ICASA, after holding workshops and calling for industry input, also released an 
official statement that VANS may self-provide from 1 February 2005. Self-provision 
contemplates the procurement of telecommunication facilities by a VANS licensee 
from any telecommunication facility supplier and to use them under and in 
accordance with its licence to provide telecommunication services.  MyBroadband 
(2008c) further states that in January 2005 the Minister retracted her statement 
claiming that “the issue of self-provisioning was issued in the government’s policy 
determinations only in relation to mobile cellular operators in terms of fixed links, to 
give full meaning to the intention to reduce the costs of telecommunication services in 
South Africa. It is the intention that value-added network operators may obtain 
facilities from any licensed operator as specified in the determinations.”  According to 
Altech, a media statement is not binding and this statement is further in conflict with 
ICASA’s internal documents stating that VANS can self provide (MyBroadband 
2008c).   
 
In essence, the landmark High Court ruling, to large degree, liberalised the South 
African telecommunication sector entirely as an estimated six hundred VANS licence 
holders would now have the same licence under the ECA as Telkom, Neotel, 
Vodacom, MTN, Cell C, iBurst and Sentech.  It must be noted, however, that out of 
the estimated six hundred VANS in South Africa, only a few have the financial 
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capability to roll out their own networks, thus not posing a great threat to the current 
operators nor would the market be oversaturated.  The rollout of infrastructure is 
prohibitively expensive and financially unfeasible for a large majority of VANS/ISPs.  
It is estimated that out of all I-ECNS licence holders only the five biggest ISPs have 
the financial capability to rollout limited infrastructure and still it is unclear whether 
the large capital expenditure on infrastructure is feasible for them in the short- and 
long-term.12
 
   
In light of the ruling, ICASA stated and confirmed that it would not appeal the court 
case (Olivier 2008).  The Department of Communications and the Minister of 
Communications opposed ICASA’s decision not to appeal the ruling by stating that 
Minister would sideline ICASA’s decision and appeal the court case herself (McLeod 
2008).  The Ministers application for leave to appeal the High Court ruling was 
refused on all points.  It is unlikely that the new Minister or the Department would 
attempt to appeal the case again (McLeod 2008).  The former Ministers decision to go 
against ICASA’s statement and appeal the court ruling further suggests that the 
independence of the regulator is still undermined by the government and the Minister 
of Communication.  If a decision is made by ICASA which goes against the will of 
the Minister and/or the government, it is likely that they will intervene and change the 
decision to work in their favour.  The appeal may also suggests that after years of 
statements and promises, the Department of Communications and the government 
have no intention of speeding up liberalisation in the telecommunications sector.  
 
With the fall of apartheid in 1994, many telecommunication industry analysts 
believed that the South African fixed-line telecommunication industry would be 
liberalised, ending Telkom’s inherent monopoly that it enjoyed for so many years 
(Lewis 2005: 17).  However, as mentioned previously, Lewis (2005: 17) argues that 
the Telecommunications Act of    1996 further confirmed Telkom’s exclusivity over 
public-switched telephony and telecommunications facilities.  Telkom’s extended 
exclusivity has had a dramatic effect on the telecoms market and is, to a large extent, 
still influential today.  
                                                 
12 Self-provision by I-ECNS licence holders was debated on the Broadband Panel Discussion at the 
MyBroadband Conference, 12 November 2009. 
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In 1996, South African government policy makers decreed that retaining a State 
monopoly would increase the number of fixed phone lines faster than allowing private 
businesses to enter the market and stimulate it with competition.  It was felt that rapid 
infrastructural rollout to previously under-serviced areas was critical to the promotion 
of economic growth and economic empowerment by stimulating local economies 
(Hodge 2003: 2-3).  As these under-serviced areas were either low-income or rural in 
location, it was argued that immediate competition in fixed-line services would not 
best serve the objectives since new entrants would target the more lucrative and easily 
established business and long-distance markets first and not seek to rollout in under-
serviced areas. Competition within the telecom market would also squeeze the 
profitability of Telkom and therefore limit its ability to offer services in unprofitable 
areas (Hodge 2003: 2-3).   
 
Telkom was thus given a full monopoly over the rollout of fixed-line infrastructure 
and providing fixed-line services until 7 May 2002.  Although its exclusivity could be 
extended for another year if rollout targets were met, Telkom never applied for this 
extension by the 2001 deadline (Laing 2004).  Telkom’s reluctance in applying for an 
extension could have been because the government’s five-year plan had, to great 
extent, failed.  It is estimated that up to two thirds of the new lines Telkom installed to 
meet government`s targets were soon disconnected (Laing 2004).  Anderson (2004) 
suggests that many industry experts argue that Telkom’s entrenched monopoly 
between 1996 and 2002 was one of the largest obstacles for economic growth during 
that period.   
 
Telkom’s extended government granted monopoly remains an issue of concern that 
would have an effect on Internet diffusion in South Africa for many years.  It could be 
argued that the high costs of Internet access and lack of adequate fixed-line 
infrastructure is a direct result of a lack of competition in the fixed-line sector, aided 
by the government’s reluctance to relinquish its control of the telecommunication 
industry.  Thussu (2000:249) reiterates this point by claiming that many developing 
counties lack affordable access to information resources and their telecommunication 
systems need technological upgrading.  The biggest problem developing countries 
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face is that in order to widen access, telecommunication tariffs need to be reduced and 
the sector opened to international operators, thus undermining the often subsidized or 
lucrative domestic telecoms.  The International Chamber of Commerce (2004: 20) 
confirms this notion by adding that one of greatest challengers for telecom 
liberalisation is the reluctance by governments to give up incumbent operators.  This 
is due to the fact that such incumbents generally act as ‘cash cows’ for the national 
budget.  However it must be stated that the loss of direct revenues to the state as a 
result of liberalisation may also be offset by higher tax revenues generated by market 
entrants and as a result of growth throughout the economy which will be facilitated by 
telecoms liberalisation (International Chamber of Commerce 2004: 21)  
 
The commercial ISPs sector, since its onset in 1993, has continued to enjoyed market 
liberalisation that has lead to an abundance of competition.  In 2009 there were 154 
ISPs registered with the Internet Service Providers’ Association (ISPA 2009).  It 
could be seen that the large amount of competing ISPs has resulted in downward 
pressure on prices and an increase in Internet diffusion across South Africa.  Because 
ISPs are reliant on Tier-1 service providers such as Telkom, they are unable to 
directly affect the rollout of telecommunication infrastructure and are limited by 
pricing structures placed on them for bandwidth.  Instead, ISPs fall within the multi-
faceted environment of providing Internet access and thus indirectly have a great 
impact on the diffusion of Internet in a particular country or region.  There is 
continued speculation and conflicting arguments as to why Telkom allowed ISPs to 
grow relatively unimpeded during the 1990s (Lewis 2005: 8-9).  By allowing ISPs to 
foster, Telkom effectively placed itself in a position for major competition in the 
Internet provision market.  Charley Lewis claims that “Telkom saw itself as a data 
carrier and viewed the abundance of ISPs as a new revenue stream that wouldn’t 
threaten the core nature of its business” (interview 2 November 2009).  Others argue 
that “Telkom initially did not recognise the impact that Internet could and would have 
on their revenue” (anonymous interview 15 October 2009).  Liberalisation of ISPs has 
been and still is essential in driving consumer uptake of Internet services and offering 
consumer choice within the sector.  However competition within the ISP sector alone 
cannot have a major affect on Internet diffusion in South Africa and therefore the 
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liberalisation of telecommunication sector as a whole is essential in bringing about 
any meaningful change13
 
.  
The Telecommunications Amendment Act of 2001 made amendments for the 
establishment of competitors to Telkom.  The process of introducing a second 
national fixed-line operator was marred in difficulties, initially over selecting an 
appropriate equity investor for the licence consortium, and later because of internal 
fighting among the members of the consortium (Lewis 2005: 20).  The result of the 
often troubled and frequently aggressive negotiations around telecommunications 
reform in South Africa has been the entrenchment of Telkom as a sole provider of 
telecommunications and thus Internet infrastructure.   
 
With the introduction of policy allowing a second national fixed-line operator, the 
South African government and the Department of Communication embarked on the 
model of what has now become known as ‘managed liberalisation’. The concept of 
managed liberalisation was birthed by the former and late communications minister 
Ivy Matsepe-Casaburri. The sentiment that the industry should be liberalised in a 
controlled environment did not make the late minister or her Department popular 
amongst industry players and experts (Jones 2009a).  The desire by government and 
the former Minister to pursue a policy of managed liberalisation is explained by the 
Department of Public Enterprise (2008) which argues that the objective in pursuing 
the managed liberalisation strategy were threefold.  Firstly, it aimed at promoting 
greater competition and thus ensuring cheaper and more reliable telecommunication 
services.  Secondly, to ensure that teledensity increased to around seventy to eighthly 
percent.  Thirdly to promote domestic ownership, in particular ownership by those 
previously disadvantaged.  Furthermore, the managed liberalisation approach is 
intended to ensure that competition is introduced in a responsible manner, both at a 
facilities or infrastructure level and also at a service based level (Department of Public 
Enterprise 2008).  Although a managed approach to liberalisation could be seen as a 
positive to ensure the above goals are met, in practise it has left minimal choice for 
consumers and has done little to increase Internet diffusion. 
                                                 
13 This notion was highlighted on the Broadband Panel Discussion at the MyBroadband Conference, 12 
November 2009.  
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Ramshai (2008) states that twelve years of failed policy over managed liberalisation 
has resulted in a lack of choice and competition as well as high prices for South 
African consumers and businesses.  Goldstuck (2008b) reiterates this notion by 
arguing that there was a significant slowdown in Internet users in South Africa during 
the period between 2001 and 2006 when Telkom’s monopoly was at its strongest and 
most damaging.  This was a clear indication that government’s “managed 
liberalisation was a deeply flawed and damaging policy, becoming a euphemism for 
maintaining the status quo” (Goldstuck 2008b).  Goldstuck (2008b) further argues that 
former Minister Matsepe-Casaburri should not be blamed for this failed approach to 
liberalisation as she was merely pursuing the officially cabinet-backed policy 
directives.  Thus government’s decision to push for managed liberalisation merely 
provided Telkom with a five year period to prepare itself for eventual competition.  
This provided Telkom with further growth through monopolistic business practices 
and provided potential competitors with an even more difficult landscape to establish 
themselves in.  
 
With the establishment of the Zuma administration in April 2009 and the subsequent 
appointment of a new Minister of Communications, Siphiwe Nyanda, it was widely 
hoped that the notion of managed liberalisation would be dropped.  Furthermore the 
release of the Draft Broadband Policy in September 2009 details how government 
plans to boost competition in the telecoms space (Jones 2009b).  The Draft Broadband 
Policy brought further assumption that true liberalisation was entering South Africa’s 
telecommunication sector.  However Minister Nyanda, shortly after the release of the 
Draft Broadband Policy, stated that he believed that the view that markets would self-
regulate and promote competition among themselves would never occur, even if the 
market was fully liberalised (Jones 2009a).  The Minister also cited the situation with 
the banking sector in the United States, which aided the 2008 and 2009 global 
financial crisis, as an example of unregulated and liberalised markets that have not 
succeeded (Jones 2009b).  The Minister has further confirmed that he plans to uphold 
the policies of managed liberalisation (Jones 2009a and Jones 2009b).  In this sense, 
the Minister, his department and thus the government as a whole has taken on a 
structuralist approach to liberalisation and regulatory intervention in that it is 
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understood that markets alone cannot self regulate and that regulatory intervention 
and policies are needed to guide and protect the sector (Sibinda 2008: 218)   
 
Although the Minister makes a valid point that a neo-liberals approach of an 
unregulated liberalised market, will succeed, he reiterates a common misconception 
that telecommunication liberalisation has to equate to deregulation. Instead a 
liberalised market requires more regulation.  Pisciotta (1997: 335) states that most 
countries engaged in liberalisation commonly experience a need for increased 
regulation. Licensing, enforcement of licence obligations, rate rebalancing and 
review, interconnection rules, accounting standards and frequency allocation all 
normally require a significant degree of regulatory oversight, at least until fair 
competitive market rules are firmly established. Even then, perpetual changes in 
technology, network architecture and service provisioning continually raise issues and 
conflicts within the industry that must be resolved.  
 
In 2007, five years after the fixed-line liberalisation (or ‘managed’ liberalisation) 
process began, Neotel, the second fixed-line operator, began rolling out enterprise 
services and in 2008 began offering consumer products (Neotel 2008).  However, 
Neotel has often been quoted as saying that at present they are not attempting to 
compete with Telkom and would not engage in a ‘price war’ (MyBroadband 2007; 
Jones 2008a).  Neotel has continued to reinforce the government’s standpoint that a 
new entrant in the fixed line sector would target the lucrative and already established 
business markets and not be inclined to roll out infrastructure to under-serviced areas.  
Neotel has placed focus on the three major metropolitan areas of Gauteng, Cape Town 
and Durban.  Within these three regions, services are still limited to more lucrative 
middle and upper income areas and in areas where businesses are concentrated.  
Neotel being a private profit seeking company, accountable to local and international 
shareholders, cannot to be blamed for attempting to target particular segments of the 
market with their services.  As a private company working with in a capitalistic 
market system, it is understandable that the company aims to attract a profitable 
market that will provide the greatest return on investment.  
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As Neotel is a new entry into the telecommunication sector, it is difficult to gauge the 
effect that the company is, and will be having, on Internet diffusion and its effect on 
current pricing structures. In October 2009 Neotel had over thirty thousand 
subscribers and aimed to reach fifty thousand by the end of 2009.  The group intends 
to gain fifteen percent of market share by the time it reaches its fifth year of operation 
(Reuters 2009).  While Neotel has seen significant growth within their short existence, 
their limited coverage and small amount of subscribers (when compared to the already 
established telecom operators) it is still currently difficult to determine if it is making 
any significant change to Internet diffusion.  International experience demonstrates 
that the incumbent operator manages to retain its leadership position and market 
power long after liberalisation, this is true in Britain, Malaysia and Mexico and will 
most likely be the case for South Africa (Makaya and Roberts 2003: 43).  Makaya 
(2001: 1) suggests that incumbent leadership long after the introduction of 
competition is a direct result of the natural barriers competitors face such as the high 
levels of capital investment required and incumbency advantages such as customer 
loyalty.  Although the inherited fixed-line infrastructure has continued to limited 
Internet growth and diffusion in South Africa, wireless technologies and more 
competitive mobile Internet industry have began to provide a solution to increasing 
Internet penetration  
 
As Neotel has made it clear that it will make no attempt to compete directly with 
Telkom thus it could be suggested that access to the Internet via a wireless connection 
offers the only true competition against the fixed-line giant.  Speaking at an Internet 
forum in 2006, the then regional sales director of Motorola, Paul Budgen, stated that 
if Telkom remained insistent on hanging onto key infrastructure, competing service 
providers should just ‘go wireless’ (Mwanza 2006). 
 
Wireless Internet provides users with a more flexible and at times affordable 
connection.  There is also competition within the wireless Internet industry.  Potential 
clients are able to choose between the three largest providers, Vodacom, MTN and 
iBurst, as well as numerous, regional, Wireless Internet Server Providers (WISPs).  
Since 1994 the mobile telecommunications sector has been largely liberalised 
(Barnard and Gianella 2008: 104).  Cohen (2008: 120) argues that in South Africa 
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only about fifty percent of the broadband market relies on a fixed-line solution.  The 
increased rollout of wireless services is continually expanding the broadband 
customer base.  Fixed-line Internet services have been significantly impacted by the 
growth of mobile Internet services, which is a result of an often healthy competition 
between Vodacom, MTN and other mobile Internet providers and a strong downward 
pressure on prices (Endelbrecht 2008).  The use of wireless or mobile Internet 
solutions to grant access to those outside the fixed-line footprint has began to aid in 
expanding Internet diffusion in South Africa.   
 
Castells et al (2006: 239) suggests that fixed-line telecommunication operators are not 
interested in providing infrastructure to rural or remote areas as there is not enough 
guaranteed profits to be made.  The characteristics of these areas place those living 
there at a disadvantage that is not easy to overcome.  However, wireless technologies 
are able to bring new opportunities for development.  Castells et al (2006: 239) further 
suggests that wireless technologies create an alternative but better suited for the 
challenges of expanding Internet connectivity to rural areas because of the costs 
associated with wireless, given the fact that unlicensed spectrum is available and is 
cost effectively obtained from the telecommunications regulator.  The rollout of fixed-
line infrastructure to certain rural areas with a low population is uneconomical given 
the extremely high costs of providing a physical copper or fibre optic line to each 
individual household or business (providing the last mile) when compared to wireless 
technologies where one base station can provide coverage for many square kilometres 
(Castells et al 2006).  The economical benefits of wireless technologies for 
telecommunication operators has been further highlighted by Neotel’s choice to 
initially establish its voice and data network by utilising Code Division Multiple 
Access 2000 (CDMA2000), a hybrid 2.5/3G wireless technology, and WiMAX until 
it is able to financially offer a fixed-line service (Neotel 2008).   
 
By selling a fifty percent stake in Vodacom in 2008,  Telkom has now been allowed 
to embark on rolling out a W-CDMA (Similar to HSDPA and CDMA technologies) 
network to provide corporate customers, high-end residential customers and high 
cable theft / high maintenance areas with broadband access (Telkom SA 2009a; 
MyBroadband 2008a).   
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Telkom has made it clear that the rollout of a wireless service will not compete with 
HSDPA products being offered by cellular operators.  Its new wireless offering will 
merely complement its existing offerings.  As a fifty percent owner in Vodacom, 
Telkom had been restricted by a contractual clause to develop its own wireless 
Internet solution.  In October 2008, Telkom announced that it would sell its fifty 
percent stake in Vodacom thus allowing them to develop their own wireless network. 
Thirty five percent was sold to British based mobile phone giant Vodafone whilst the 
remaining thirty five percent was distributed amongst Telkom shareholders and sold 
to the public through the listing of Vodacom on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
(MyBroadband 2008b). The selling of Vodacom has increased Vodafone’s stake in 
the company to sixty five percent.  
 
Competitiveness and liberalisation of the mobile broadband sector has aided Internet 
diffusion in South Africa; however it must be understood that providing the last mile 
via wireless technologies is considerably less expensive than providing it via a 
physical copper or a fibre optic line (Goldstuck 2008b).  The Internet and broadband 
industry in South Africa is largely reflective of the historical monopoly situation. The 
introduction of competitors in the Internet market, although not on an equal footing 
with Telkom, and increasing competition in the voice market has resulted in a market 
that is slowly evolving. Nevertheless, the new industry players have made only a very 
small dent in the prevailing market structure (Naidoo et al 2005: 7).  The success of 
the mobile and wireless broadband sector has not been without its share of regulatory 
problems and controversies. 
 
6.2.1. Regulatory Delays and Ineffective Policy 
 
In addition to ICASA being criticised for being ‘soft on Telkom’ and its independence 
questioned, many critics also believe that the lengthy and costly regulation and 
licensing process has also resulted in heavy delays in bringing about change in the 
telecommunication and thus Internet industry.  Lengthy delays in the issuing of under-
serviced area licensees, licensing a second national fixed-line operator, allocating 
WiMAX spectrum and producing policy which is often flawed and open to 
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interpretation has cost the telecommunications sector millions of Rand, has done little 
to resolve the many issues facing the sector and is further hindered the diffusion of 
Internet (Goldstuck 2008a; Tobin and Bidoli 2005: 32l; Senne 2008).  The issuing of 
WiMAX spectrum has created one of biggest controversies in the telecoms market 
and resulted in many industry plays and critics questioning ICASA’s ability to 
effectively regulate and stimulate the sector.      
 
Delays in the awarding of licences for providing WiMAX high-speed wireless 
broadband service to businesses and consumers and the limited roll-out of services 
that have been licensed has resulted in dampening of its potential impact.  WiMAX is 
often seen as a solution to the small diffusion of Internet in South Africa and Africa as 
the deployment of WiMAX infrastructure is relatively cheap, easier to deploy and has 
a large reach, making it an ideal solution for providing broadband data and even 
telephone services to rural and remote areas. It is also seen as a powerful technology 
for bringing affordable yet quality Internet access to isolated communities (Goldstuck 
2008a).  When providing Internet via a copper landline (which is the traditional way 
of delivering ADSL broadband services) the end user must be within 5kms of the 
nearest telephone exchange.  When proving Internet via WiMAX, depending on the 
landscape one needs to be only within 20 to 30kms of the tower.  The large footprint 
that WiMAX provides makes it the ideal technology for areas with limited fixed line 
infrastructure, high cable theft and a small population density.  
 
The notion that WiMAX or any other wireless technology holds the key to rolling out 
Internet services to numerous rural communities is once again highlighted by Andries 
Delport, executive director of Vodacom.  Delport claims that “wireless is and will be 
the only solution to the rollout of Internet services to rural South Africa.  The country 
is just too vast and spread out for sustainable fixed line infrastructure” (MyBroadband 
Conference, 12 November 2009).  Although it could be argued that Andries Delport’s 
opinion is biased due to his position at Vodacom, it has been argued numerous times 
before that utilising wireless technology as the last-mile in countries with a similar 
geographic landscape to South Africa is essential for the even diffusion of Internet.  
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An example of the potential of WiMAX to increase Internet diffusion in South Africa 
is being highlighted in the remote and isolated village of Dwesa.  Dwesa is located in 
the former Transkei homeland in the Eastern Cape, 130kms north of East London.  
With the aid of the Telkom Centres of Excellence at the University of Fort Hare and 
Rhodes University, four WiMAX towers have been constructed at four schools, 
allowing the community to access the Internet at the various computer labs (Dalvit et 
al (2007: 11-12).  In addition to gaining Internet access, WiMAX technology has also 
led to the community establishing a website (www.dwesa.com) which sells arts and 
crafts made in the area and provides advertising to potential tourists.  The village of 
Dwesa is a true example of how the Internet (with the aid WiMAX in this case) can 
improve rural communities around South Africa in terms of access to knowledge and 
additional revenue streams.     
 
At present, only Vodacom/iBurst, Sentech, Telkom and Neotel have been issued 
commercial WiMAX licences by ICASA.  In 2006 Vodacom bought a ten percent 
stake in iBurst which gave them access to iBurst’s allocated spectrum (Finn 2007).  It 
was hoped that licences would not only be granted to large national operators, but to 
numerous VANS which would be able to provide addition competition and in turn 
would further liberalise the sector.  Once again, ICASA was criticised for further 
entrenching monopolies by providing WiMAX licences only to large operators (Finn 
2007).  ICASA issued licences to operators who met certain criteria which was 
claimed to ensure fairness and transparency in the licensing process.  In order to 
obtain a licence, an operator had to have industry knowledge, a solid track record, be 
broad based black economic empowered and had the ability to allow subscribers to 
migrate to and from their network (Jansen 2007).  The criteria issued by ICASA were 
seen to be vague with little detail as to what was meant by “industry knowledge” and 
“a solid track record”.  One interviewee argued that “although criteria for issuing 
WiMAX licences were extremely vague, many applicants were believed to have met 
the requirements but did not receive licences.  There was little feedback given to why 
certain applicants where denied a licence” (anonymous interview, 15 October 2009). 
 
In addition to the issuing of four commercial licences, ICASA also issued trial 
licences to numerous VANs including ISP giant Mweb.  Mweb was successful in 
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rolling out WiMAX services to around one thousand residential users including one 
hundred residential users in Soweto at a cost of over ten million Rand (Jones 2008b; 
Finn 2007).  Mweb provided proof that WiMAX could indeed provide the answer to 
bridging the digital divide in areas such as Soweto.  Despite Mweb’s trial being 
extremely successful, in April 2008 the trial came to an end, leaving millions of 
Rands worth of equipment and infrastructure dormant.  Mweb’s appeal to extend its 
trial licence was denied by the regulator (Jones 2008b).  It is still unclear as to why 
ICASA ended the trial so abruptly instead of continuing the trials until WiMAX 
spectrum had been announced.  One interviewee suggests that “the industry has been 
extremely frustrated with ICASA when it comes to the WiMAX spectrum saga.  
Numerous motives and delays go unexplained and ICASA’s ability to handle the 
allocation of spectrum has been continuously questioned” (anonymous interview, 15 
October 2009). 
 
ICASA argues that spectrum is extremely limited, with a large chunk already 
allocated to the incumbent.  At most, the regulator would only be able to allocate 
additional spectrum to three or four more operators (Jones 2008b).  Although 
WiMAX spectrum is limited, “ICASA should dish out the spectrum and those not 
using their allocated spectrum should lose it”14
 
.  The ‘use it or lose’ it approach to 
WiMAX spectrum policy is a highly contested debate that is normally aimed at 
Sentech.  Sentech, Neotel and Telkom are arguably not making the most of their 
allocated WiMAX spectrum (MyBroadband 2008d).  Although Neotel and Telkom 
have begun to rollout WiMAX services, Sentech is still to make use of its valuable 
spectrum.  Such spectrum could be passed on to companies such as Mweb who are in 
a position to utilise the spectrum and therefore aid in the diffusion of Internet.  A 
senior ICASA councillor argues that “the ‘use it or lose it’ approach is difficult to 
regulate or enforce.  ICASA does not currently have the resources or the expertise to 
manage WiMAX spectrum effectively let alone remove it from companies that do not 
use it” (anonymous interview, 29 September 2009). 
                                                 
14 Broadband Panel Discussion at the MyBroadband Conference, 12 November 2009. 
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Regardless of their short comings in the issuing of WiMAX spectrum, both ICASA 
and the Department of Communications have established targets which include, 
among other things, improving broadband connectivity and infrastructure, providing 
Internet and voice services to the poor, addressing high prices and establishing a more 
competitive playing field, but both the Department and ICASA still continue to lack 
any coherent policy framework for bringing about their goals (Cohen 2008: 117).  It 
has been stated that South African telecom acts and telecom policies are “not fit for 
purpose, probably impossible to implement and a patchwork of foreign policies with 
little relevance to the country” (Ewan Sutherland, IWeek 2 September 2009).  
Furthermore, incompetence on the regulators behalf has lead to acts such as the ECA 
which has “no guiding quality and lacks vision for the sector” (Alison Gillwald, 
IWeek 2 September 2009).  Policy issues tend to plague the not only the regulator but 
also the Department of Communications, resulting in a detrimental effect on the 
industry and on the end consumer.  An example of a poor policy outcome that is filled 
with controversy and open to interpretation is that of the ADSL Regulations of 2006.  
 
Implemented in August 2006 by ICASA, the ADSL Regulations intended to protect 
consumers, implement standards and provide better transparency from ISPs, Telkom 
and the then Second National Operator (now known as Neotel).  The policy was 
welcomed and had the potential to provide change within the sector however a 
number of provisions were extremely vague and interpretable and thus has made very 
little lasting impact (ISPA 2006a).  One provision that has created the largest amount 
of controversy and debate is Provision 3.4 which states that: “local bandwidth15 usage 
shall not be subject to the cap16
                                                 
15 Local bandwidth refers to bandwidth that can only be used to access content and websites that are 
hosted in South Africa. 
”.  This Provision is extremely interpretable and 
numerous ISPs, industry experts and telecom operators have different takes on this 
clause.  Consumers and telecommunication advocates interpret this provision to mean 
that local bandwidth usage should not be counted towards ones monthly Internet 
usage or that once ones bandwidth cap has been exhausted one would be entitled to 
unlimited free local browsing (Senne 2007).  In light of this interpretation, Telkom 
argues that in the absence of a regulatory definition of what ‘capping’ is, Telkom 
16 ‘Caps’ or bandwidth allowance is the amount data one is able to transfer (download and upload) for a 
given product or package.  
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defines capping as Internet usage, which includes local and international usage and 
thus cannot separate the two (Senne 2007).  In not defining ‘capping’ the ADSL 
Regulations in turn fails to protect consumers by providing Telkom and ISPs with 
such loopholes.  Currently no ISP offers free unlimited local Internet once ones 
bandwidth limit has been reached.  Instead certain ISPs, such as ISP giants Mweb and 
Telkom Internet, provide unlimited local Internet once their customers have been 
capped, however this is not a free service and customers are charge per megabyte of 
local data transferred.  
 
The ADSL Regulations have also been criticised for doing nothing to promote 
competition in the delivery of ADSL.  Instead, the Regulation tends to entrench a 
model of where Telkom is the only viable wholesale provider of ADSL access (ISPA 
2006b: 4).  The ADSL Regulation had the potential to provide more for consumers, 
promote competition within the provision of ADSL and the wholesale of ADSL 
services however short-sightedness has led to a policy that is not only unworkerable 
but flawed on many levels.  One interviewee confirmed this by arguing that “the 
ADSL Regulations were an embarrassment for ICASA and is mostly ignored by the 
ICASA because it provides no valuable input for them or the industry and because 
once again it obviously protects Telkom” (anonymous interview 15 October 2009).  
The repercussions of not adhering to the ADSL Regulations are also questionable.  
Provision 6.1 and 6.2 state that Telkom, Neotel and ISPs have to on a quarterly basis 
publish key performance indicators and statistics (such as contention ratios and 
average latency on their networks) as a commitment to good business practices.  This 
provision has been mostly ignored by majority of ISPs and operators with the 
exception of Telkom: albeit with its own interpretation of how it should be done 
(MyBroadband 2009b).  Those ISPs who ignore these provisions go unpunished by 
the ICASA suggesting that either the regulation is unenforceable or that the regulator 
is in such a weak position that it is unable to enforce its own policies.        
 
Once again, poor policies and poor policy outcomes have been attributed to the fact 
that ICASA lacks funding and skilled personal.  Relating to this notion, one 
interviewee stated that “companies and individuals have continued to grow frustrated 
with ICASA’s inability to regulate the industry and draw up proper policies because 
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of undertrained and unskilled people in positions of power.  Key positions have also 
been filled by those with no background in telecommunications or policy making” 
(anonymous interview, 15th October 2009). ICASA’s funding issues have also led to a 
“major exodus of skilled personal who find the private sector more lucrative” (Winile 
Lamini, 26 October 2009). 
 
6.2.2. Local-Loop Unbundling  
 
One objective that will speed up telecommunication liberalisation and bring to light 
ICASA’s ability to regulate the industry successfully is that of local-loop unbundling 
(LLU). Unbundling the local-loop is imperative to fully liberalise a 
telecommunication sector but brings with it an extensive (and often lengthy process) 
policy framework.  In addition, how best to promote competition through LLU is by 
far the most controversial topic in telecoms regulation (de Bijl and Peitz 2005: 50). 
Sutherland (2007: 1) defines LLU as the regulatory process of allowing multiple 
telecommunications operators use of connections from the telephone exchange to the 
customer premises. The physical wire connection between customer and company is 
known as a ‘local-loop’, and is generally owned by a single telecoms company, in the 
South African case, Telkom.  Unbundling the local-loop would allow other operators 
access to the Telkom owned and operated last mile thus eliminating the expensive and 
time consuming establishment of their own infrastructure.  Providing the last mile by 
new entrants is prohibitively expensive and largely unnecessary given the potential 
that LLU can provide.  Hausman and Sidak (2005: 137-138) present two rationales 
offered by regulatory agencies in support of mandatory unbundling. In general, 
mandatory unbundling is believed to generate competition in retail markets through 
greater innovation and investment and lower prices and secondly generate greater 
competition in wholesale markets (Hausman and Sidak 2005: 137-138).  Moreover, 
due to the former (and to a certain extent current) government ownership patterns in 
Telkom, South Africa’s national network and local-loops were built with taxpayers 
money and thus providing the argument that the local-loop should not belong to one 
operator/company.    
 
71 
 
LLU is commonly opposed by the country’s incumbent operators because of the naive 
and narrow minded view that new entrants choose to ‘leech off’ the incumbent’s 
network as an alternative to building their own local loop network (The Local Loop 
Unbundling Committee 2007: 2-3).  However, new entrants disagree and argue that 
they cannot economically replicate the incumbent’s local loop and that they cannot 
make available certain telecommunication services such as ADSL without access to 
the local loop infrastructure. As a result, not implementing LLU will promote the 
incumbent operator to go on monopolising the fixed-line telecommunication market 
and limiting innovation and in so doing reducing economic growth (The Local Loop 
Unbundling Committee 2007: 2-3).  This argument ties in with the current situation in 
South Africa where Neotel is unable to provide fixed-line Internet access such as 
ADSL due to the fact that they are not yet in a financial position to rollout the costly 
last mile.  It is therefore imperative that LLU be introduced in order to easily attract 
competition and thus indirectly aid in the diffusion of Internet. 
 
In 2007, former communications Minister, Dr Matsepe-Casaburri told Parliament that 
the unbundling process in South Africa should be urgently implemented but would 
give Telkom until the 1 November 2011 to unbundle the local-loop, thus providing 
Telkom with another extended monopoly (Ensor and McLachlan 2007).  By setting 
the deadline in 2011 provides Telkom time to strengthen its market dominance and 
prevents the newly formed Neotel from significant expansion (Barnard and Gianella 
2008: 102).  It must be understood though that the unbundling process is time 
consuming from a regulatory and policy perspective and numerous delays are usually 
anticipated.  The view adopted by the Local Loop Unbundling Committee in their 
2007 report is that South Africa should follow the same process as that adopted by the 
European Commission, which is to unbundle the local loop to encourage greater 
competition particularly in the supply of broadband services. Local loop unbundling 
essentially warrants the creation of a range of regulatory ‘products’ to achieve this 
end, including full-unbundling, whereby the entire copper/fibre last mile is leased to 
competitor providers, part-line unbundling, which provides access to the high 
frequency portion of the copper last mile to competitors to provide broadband 
services, and bitstream access, which provides competitors access to customers to 
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offer broadband services but does not require significant investment in infrastructure 
for them to do so (Hawthorne 2009: 2-3). 
 
As mentioned above, incumbent operators generally oppose LLU as they stand to lose 
the most due to increased competition and it is expected that Telkom will therefore try 
to “retard LLU process for as long as possible”17
 
.  Building on this notion, ICASA 
Councillor Fungai Sibanda argues that numerous major regulatory delays are caused 
by the private sector particularly when decisions that do not favour them are made. 
(IWeek 2 September 2009).  The LLU process has taken as long as a decade in many 
other countries, partly attributable to delaying tactics from the incumbent operator 
(MyBroadband 2009c).  Due to lengthy delays associated with the LLU unbundling 
worldwide it is questionable whether ICASA (and Telkom) will be able to reach the 
November 2011 deadline.  
Since the announcement and LLU report published in 2007, little has been said on the 
matter and it is unclear how much headway Telkom has made with the process. It is 
also unknown if there will be any consequences if the company does deliver open 
access by the set deadline (Jones 2009c).  An ICASA Councillor argued that “the 
unbundling process is extremely difficult and time consuming and setting the deadline 
for 2011 was very ambitious. [ICASA] is working on drawing up policy but it is very 
far behind and unlikely to meet the deadline at this current rate” (anonymous 
interview, 29 September 2009).  Numerous countries around the work have 
introduced LLU with varied degrees of success.   
 
Although not on a comparable level to South Africa, Japan is held up as the prime 
example of the potentially positive effects of LLU.  The Japanese government 
mandated LLU in 1997 and in 2001 extended these regulations to include unbundling 
of fibre optic facilities, including FTTH18
                                                 
17 Broadband Panel Discussion at the MyBroadband Conference, 12 November 2009. 
 (Wallsten 2006: 9).  Japan viewed itself as a 
late starter in the broadband market, especially in comparison with South Korea, but 
in a short period was able to become a global broadband leader, partly attributed to a 
successful LLU process (Sutherland 2007: 5).  Through the utilisation of NTT’s (the 
18 FTTH or Fibre-to-the-home is a method used to connect to the Internet through fibre optic cables as 
opposed to ADSL which uses copper cables.  
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former fixed line monopoly) local loop, numerous operators offer very high speed, 
low priced broadband connections to consumers.  Widespread competition has lead to 
broadband speeds of up to 100 Mbps through FTTH and 50/12.5 Mbps 
(download/upload) for ADSL offerings (Sutherland 2005: 6; Wallsten 2006: 9).   
 
LLU in the United States has been far less successful than in Japan and many other 
European Union member States.  Sutherland (2005: 7) suggests that in the United 
States LLU was implemented by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, with the 
details left to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to decide upon. After 
several attempts, implementation mandatory unbundling was abandoned, because of 
disagreements amongst the five Commissioners and a series of reversals in the courts. 
Unbundling is now available only on commercial terms to those operators willing to 
take it.        
 
In justification for LLU, the United States and the FCC adopted the “stepping-stone 
theory” approach to the whole process.  Proponents once again argued that network 
externalities and the relatively high sunk costs of entering telecommunications 
markets were barriers to entry, and that new competition was feasible only if entrants 
had access to incumbents’ networks (Wallsten 2006: 4-5).  According to this theory, 
the entrants would use LLU as a “stepping stone” to building their own networks.  
Once they had attracted enough subscribers to increase market share, they would 
begin building their own facilities, resulting in real facilities-based competition 
(Wallsten 2006: 4-5).  Even with the “stepping stone theory” approach and the large 
amount of capital poured into the process LLU was largely unsuccessful in fostering 
competition, increasing broadband diffusion and increasing broadband speeds to the 
level of many European Union States, Japan and South Korea.  Wallsten (2006: 6) 
argues that many regulators, economists and studies suggest that LLU in the United 
Stated failed because it reduced incentives for incumbents to invest in high-speed 
Internet infrastructure.  Wallsten (2006: 5) further notes that cable companies, whose 
broadband services were largely unregulated, invested more quickly in their 
broadband networks than did telephone companies, who were required to share their 
broadband facilities with competitors 
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Given its controversy unbundling the local-loop is still critical in South Africa to 
encouraging and speeding up competition. But the regulatory process has to be done 
appropriately to ensure that Telkom is not able to abuse its power.  Adding 
competition to the market without access to the local-loop will bring slow to little 
change, evident in small effect Neotel is having on Internet diffusion.  As with many 
other former monopolies worldwide, it is likely that Telkom will do what it can to 
ensure the process is slow and ineffective resulting in anti-competitive behaviour.  In 
order to guarantee that anti-competitive behaviour is not practiced, there is a need for 
a strong regulator and with ICASA being an historical weak regulator, it is unlikely 
that target dates will be met and anti-competitive behaviour obverted.  Furthermore, 
given the regulatory complications and high costs associated with introducing LLU 
and ICASA’s funding and skill shortage, it is questionable whether the regulator is 
able head the process.  
 
6.3. State Ownership Patterns 
 
The South African government, at various levels, has indicated that it will continue 
with the market liberalisation process of the telecommunications sector in view of its 
objectives of increasing service penetration and reducing the costs of communication 
for all of its citizens.  This notion is in contrast with the government’s ownership 
patterns in Telkom and its intentions to rollout a broadband infrastructure of its own 
(USA 2006: 17). Barnard and Gianella (2008: 102) suggest that the involvement of 
the State in the sector is on the rise, despite many promises of liberalisation. 
 
In 1997, the South African government took one of the its most significant steps on 
the road to liberalisation by selling a thirty percent stake in the fixed-line operator, 
Telkom, to the Thintana consortium comprising of Telecom Malaysia and South-
Western Bell Corporation of the United States.  The partial privatisation of the 
operator was contingent on the guarantee of an exclusivity period of five years. The 
exclusivity focused on the ability to be the sole provider of fixed-line voice and data 
services (USA 2006: 17).  In 2004 the South-Western Bell Corporation and Malaysia 
Telecom sold their equity stake in Telkom and removed their operational personnel. 
They did this for a variety of reasons, including the impending competition 
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anticipated from a Second Network Operator, pending liberalisation, and the proposed 
advent of a new licensing regime in the form of horizontal licensing (whereby the 
network and the services run on it are licensed separately) rather than the current 
vertical integration model (which licences Telkom to own the physical network as 
well as provide services across it) (Naidoo et al 2005: 6-7).   
 
South-Western Bell Corporation and Telecom Malaysia pulling out of the South 
African telecom market, in the advent of a Second National Operator and a more 
liberalised sector, suggests that attracting much needed international investment can 
be more difficult when the telecommunications market is liberalised.  A government 
granted monopoly ensures ample profits for international corporations and a 
liberalised market with increased competition is not attractive as profits will 
inevitably decrease.  The above notion ties in with Wilson‘s (2004) view that a 
liberally diffused ICT infrastructure will always be opposed by “those who calculate 
that the introduction of these new resources undercuts in some way their own 
institutional interests as regulators, ministry officials, or telephone company 
managers” (Wilson 2004: 44). 
 
Although the South African government was applauded for selling a thirty percent 
stake in Telkom and thus commencing the liberalisation process, the South African 
government, today, is still the largest shareholder in the company.  The South African 
government owns 39.4 percent of shares and the Public Investment Corporation 
(which is wholly owned by the government), directly and indirectly, owns 15.3 
percent of shares (Telkom SA 2009b).  As a result of the Public Investment 
Corporation being owned by the government, the South African government still 
owns a 54.3 percent controlling stake in the company.      
 
The notion that ICASA is ‘soft on Telkom’ may further stem from Telkom being 54.2 
percent owned by the government.  By being ‘soft on Telkom’, ICASA and therefore 
the government are merely protecting a very profitable interest.  Winile Lamini 
suggests that “ICASA will always have to favour Telkom in terms of policies and 
leniency because of governments interests in the company”.  Lamini further suggested 
that “ICASA cannot be blamed for following the orders of the Department of 
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Communications who are in fact responsible for protecting Telkom” (interview 26 
October 2009).  Another interviewee highlighted this regulatory issue by stating that 
“in the past and in isolated incidents today, ICASA has been told to ‘go easy’ on the 
company” (anonymous interview 29 September 2009).  ICASA and the Minister of 
Communications are in a difficult position due to the complicated State ownership 
patterns found within the telecommunication sector.  As Telkom is majority State 
owned, the Minister of Communications has the responsibility in protecting 
government asset and thus guarantee the profitably and growth of Telkom whilst also 
stimulating competition and ensuring fair practice within the sector at the same time.   
 
It becomes evident that until the government relinquish their control over Telkom and 
Telkom becomes one hundred percent privately owned, it will be unlikely that other 
operators will be able to compete on the same level as the operator when it comes to 
policy and regulatory issues.  Currently there is no evidence to suggest that the 
government is willing to fully privatise Telkom.  Apart from the fact that government 
is unwilling to sell its stake in the company, the enormous growth of the mobile 
industry in South Africa and in Africa at the expense of the fixed line industry 
provides the argument that market trends dictate that government will find it 
extremely difficult to find a suitable buyer for its share.  Regulatory and policy issues 
pertaining to government ownership patterns in Telkom are consequently likely to 
continue for many years to come. 
 
The government is also committed to increasing its ownership and involvement in the 
provision of key telecommunication infrastructure.  This increased involvement is 
evident in the establishment of Broadband Infraco, a fully State-owned broadband 
company which will take over the existing telecommunication networks of Eskom 
and Transtel, Transtel being a former subsidiary of Transnet.  The South African 
government has been open in suggesting that it will continue to foster competition but 
at the same will continue in infrastructural investment and control.  This was recently 
highlighted once again in the Draft Broadband Policy of 2009, Provision 4.2.1.1 
which states that “Competition will be promoted in the market.  Where market forces 
fail, government will intervene to increase the availability of infrastructure and 
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services.”  In terms of Broadband Infraco, it could be seen that government has seen 
market failure and thus is intervening with creating another State-owned enterprise.       
 
Broadband Infraco was established by the Broadband Infraco Act of 2007 as an 
intervention to rapidly normalise telecommunications market efficiency (and address 
the cost of broadband to their industry players and end users) by making infrastructure 
in the national backbone and international connectivity area available at reduced 
prices (The Department of Public Enterprise 2008).  Under the Act, Broadband 
Infraco is also responsible for expanding the availability and affordability of ICT 
access, including in underdeveloped and under serviced areas.  This will be the 
government’s second attempt at rapidly increasing broadband penetration in South 
Africa, the first being through Sentech.    
 
In 2004, Telkom was the only operator proving broadband services through its ADSL 
offering.  In a bid to increase broadband penetration and in order to offer competition, 
the Department of Communications through Sentech began rolling out a wireless 
broadband offer, MyWireless at more competitive rates than Telkom’s ADSL 
offerings.  Initially MyWireless offering enjoyed strong uptake but major funding 
issues hindered the expansion of infrastructure and coverage.  Inadequate funding also 
made advertising and marketing of the product impossible.  Amid poor uptake, a rise 
in strong competition in the broadband market (especially from Vodacom and MTN) 
and the bad publicity it received from poor service levels, Sentech discontinued it 
offering in 2009 (MyBroadband 2010).  In 2007, it was estimated that Sentech had 
just over four thousand subscribers, representing less than one percent of the 
broadband market at the time (Esselaar and Gillwald 2007: 38).  In 2007 Sentech was 
also given the task of rolling-out an affordable broadband infrastructure solution for 
five hundred underprivileged schools at a budget of R500 million (R1 million per 
school).  The company failed to deliver and its budget had not been spent as it could 
not produce a business plan acceptable to the National Treasury (MyBroadband 
2010).  In light of government’s failure to address broadband penetration through 
Sentech, it is difficult to believe that Broadband Infraco will deliver any positive 
results.  Esselaar and Gillwald (2007: 38) support this notion by suggesting that it is 
unclear as to why the government believes that the State, clearly unable to operate 
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other State-owned, un-privatised networks in the sector efficiently, will, via 
Broadband Infraco be able to bring down infrastructure prices. 
 
The ownership and control of Broadband Infraco does not fall under the Department 
of Communications (as Sentech does) but under the Department of Public Enterprise.  
In the control of the Department of Public Enterprise, it could be possible that 
Broadband Infraco could bring about the change that Sentech was not able to. The 
Department of Public Enterprises (2008) justifies government ownership of a national 
backbone by stating that in order to achieve the goals of the accelerated economic 
growth and ensure higher ICT penetration levels and affordable broadband 
connectivity, government should continue to own and invest in communications 
infrastructure.  Although the establishment of Broadband Infraco could be seen as a 
positive move by the government in addressing Internet diffusion, it raises questions 
of the government’s liberalisation intentions.  By owning a national 
telecommunications backbone, telecommunication companies and VANS will be as 
reliant on Broadband Infraco as they are on the government owned Telkom’s national 
backbone.  Broadband Infraco will merely create a duopoly, two monopolies both 
owned and controlled by the South African government. 
 
The establishment of Broadband Infraco and its potential impact “has created heated 
debates between industry exports and industry players” (Charley Lewis, interview 2 
November 2009).  These debates tend to focus on the ownership patterns of 
Broadband Infraco.  Winile Lamini argues that “the role of government in 
infrastructural projects in South Africa is not a new trend and government 
involvement in communication infrastructure should be welcomed” (interview 26 
October 2009).  Charley Lewis agrees by stating that “although ownership of 
Broadband Infraco should be debated, focus must be put on the benefits of added 
competition within the national fibre backbone” (interview 2 November 2009).  
Although added competition within the national backbone has the potential increase 
to Internet diffusion through lower costs, it is still questionable whether Broadband 
Infraco will bring with it significant benefits. Communication consultant, Suveer 
Ramdhani has stated that “Broadband Infraco will do nothing or if anything do very 
little for South African Internet” (MyBroadband Conference 12 November 2009).  
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This statement is in light of the fact that the government has failed to address the issue 
of Internet connectivity in South Africa through its ownership of Telkom and to a 
certain extent through the ownership of Sentech.  It can thus be argued that 
Broadband Infraco, like Telkom, could be used as an additional ‘cash cow’ for the 
government at the expense of the spread of Internet diffusion.     
 
The South African governments growing involvement in the telecommunication 
industry may lead to a mix of positive and negatives effects on the diffusion of 
Internet and other ICTs.  However its involvement poses serious issue from a 
regulatory prospect and goes against world trends and international best practises. 
Esselaar and Gillwald (2007: 12) argue that globally, the move away from State 
involvement in the operational side of the sector, to a State role in determination of 
the policy framework only, has accompanied increased competition and been 
associated with improved penetration of ICT services. With an effectively regulated 
environment less involvement has also been associated with reduced prices.  Where 
the State has been an effective mobiliser of ICT development, such as in Asian largest 
economic nations, the State has been characterised by a highly-skilled bureaucracy, 
high levels of capital or the ability to mobilise private capital to deliver on 
sophisticated and integrated development plans (Esselaar and Gillwald 2007: 12).   
 
The global move towards privatisation and away for government ownership has also 
been justified in terms of the need for costly infrastructural improvements. Pisciotta 
(1997: 333) suggests that particularly in developing countries, investment in telecom 
infrastructure is considered to be a necessary foundation for economic growth. 
Massive investment is required to combat low telephone densities and poor service 
quality and to take advantage of modern technologies. Such investments are far 
beyond the reach of many governments that have other social and development 
programs in urgent need of funding. Private sector investment through privatisation of 
the national carrier or other forms of private sector involvement is often the only 
recourse. Many countries have also realised that continued lack of investment, 
particularly in new technologies, leaves the country vulnerable to loss of revenue 
through by-pass, at either the local or international level (Pisciotta 1997: 333). 
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Although it has been argued throughout this subchapter that direct government 
operational involvement in the telecommunication sector can hinder the growth of the 
market, Makaya and Roberts (2003: 45) suggest that areas in need of infrastructural 
upgrade or rollout and ambitious programmes aimed at ‘technological leapfrogging’ 
may benefit from initial government support. This is more so given the risks these 
projects pose and the externalities that they will generate.  Even in the United States 
where government involvement is kept to a minimum in the telecoms sector, 
government involvement in certain projects have been seen to be beneficial.  This is 
especially true in rural areas with poor provision and in cases where significant 
upgrading is required and where there have been problems with under-investment by 
the private sector. Direct public sector investment in infrastructure has successfully 
extended services and has been financially viable based on the returns to the 
government provider from the network use (Makaya and Roberts 2003: 45).  This 
case could be true for Broadband Infraco.  As the project is extremely capital 
intensive with the aim of providing low cost infrastructural access and low cost ICT 
access to under-serviced areas, it is unlikely that a project of this nature would be seen 
as profitable enough for a private consortium investment.  It thus might be the case 
that if not for government involvement, the project would be unlikely to materialise.   
 
However, Esselaar and Gillwald (2007: 12) state that with the challenges of human 
capital necessary to deliver on core State functions highlighted within government 
itself, and the benefits of shifting investment risk from the public to the private sector 
under conditions of increased competition, the ability of the State to deliver better 
than the market is open to question 
 
6.4. The Failures of Universal Service and Universal Access 
 
To achieve the goals of universal service and universal access as proscribed by 
governments, Universal Service Obligations are generally compelled on telecom 
operators.  Hodge (2003b: 2) agrees to the above by adding that a Universal Service 
Obligation involves imposing a target for the roll-out of either residential or 
community access over a predetermined time period as part of an operating licence. 
The target for this service will be uneconomic customers, uneconomic areas, or 
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uneconomic services (for example payphones).  The need for universal access and for 
a Universal Service Obligation placed on telecommunication operators may stem 
from the fact that economic factors dictate which areas or regions are economically 
viable to lay costly infrastructure.  The above notion leads to operators concentrating 
infrastructure in areas that will provide the largest profits and returns on investment at 
the expense of those living outside such areas. Neotel being a new telecommunication 
operator has continued to reinforce this notion by initially concentrating infrastructure 
in three major economic hubs of Gauteng, Durban and Cape Town. Universal access, 
universal service and/or Universal Service Obligations will aid in distributing 
infrastructure to all areas and regions of a country thus increasing Internet diffusion in 
the short and long term as well as aid in bridging the digital divide.  
 
To a certain extent universal access does existent in South Africa in the form of 
access to public telephones.  The South African universal access model provides for a 
public telephone to be located within a travelling distance of thirty minutes anywhere 
in the country (Gyamfi 2005: 24).  All telecommunication licensees, Telkom, 
Vodacom, MTN, Cell C and Neotel, are obliged to rollout payphones and/or 
community service telephones in under-serviced areas.  The exact number of 
payphones or community service telephones has been established under each 
company’s licence conditions.  In addition to the rollout of community telephones 
Neotel is also oblige to establish Internet laboratories in rural schools.  Sentech is 
exempt from rolling out telephone services but is obliged to establish Internet labs in 
rural schools.  As Sentech is moving away from Internet services, it is now unclear as 
to whether their Universal Service Obligation to rollout Internet services is still 
applicable.  The table below illustrates the Universal Service Obligations (rollout and 
community service obligations) for each licence holder: 
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Licence Holder Rollout Obligation Community Service Obligations 
Telkom · 2.69 million lines to be brought into 
service of which: 
· 1.676 million be in under-serviced areas 
· 20,246 for priority customers (e.g.: 
schools, clinics and libraries) 
· 3204 for  villages 
· 120,000 payphones 
Vodacom · 60 percent population coverage in 2 
years 
· 70 percent population coverage in 4 year 
· 22,000 community service 
telephones in underserviced areas 
over 5 years 
· low community service tariff 
MTN · 60 percent population coverage in 2 
years 
· 70 percent population coverage in 4 
years 
· 7,500 community service 
telephones in underserviced areas 
over 5 years 
· low community service tariff 
Cell C  ·8 percent  geographic coverage in 5 
years,  
· 40 percent with roaming agreements 
· 60 percent population coverage in 5 
years; 80 percent  through roaming 
agreements in 1 year 
· 52,000 community service 
telephones in underserviced areas 
over 7 years 
· low community service tariff 
Neotel · Coverage of all Metropolis in 5 
years 
· 80 percent of territory in 10 years 
· 30,000 community service 
telephones in rural areas over 10 
years 
· 2500 Internet labs in rural 
schools over 10 years 
Sentech None · 500 Internet labs in rural schools 
over 5 years 
Source: Hodge (2003b: 3-4); USA (2006: 20) 
  
As evident in the above table, apart from Telkom’s rollout obligation, there are no 
requirements made in the other operator’s obligations to lay telephone lines directly to 
the end users premises.  There are also no provisions made to rollout Internet access 
to ones premises.  Although the rollout of Internet access to individuals is not 
mandatory, Telkom’s obligation to install 2.69 million lines in exchange for an 
extension on its monopoly brought with it a ‘stepping stone’ to for those without 
Internet access to gain connectivity more easily.  However, as mentioned in The 
Regulator, Regulation and Policy Making subchapter, Telkom’s rollout obligations in 
the long run were a complete failure with around two thirds of all new lines being 
disconnected.  In some of the rural areas the rates of discontinuation have been as 
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high as between fifty and seventy percent.  Most lines were disconnected within a few 
months of activation due to economic and not technical reasons (Msimang 2006: 
217).  Thus in essence Telkom’s extended exclusivity was granted in exchange for the 
installation of lines in under-serviced areas and not necessarily to increase long-term 
penetration.  
 
By May 2002, Telkom completed the second highest access line cumulative annual 
growth rate in the world, second only to Deutsche Telekom’s rollout in Hungary. Over 
the five years Telkom installed some 2.61 million lines (gross) and saw its total line 
increase from 4,645,065 to 5,500,000. Similarly both Vodacom and MTN 
successfully completed the fulfilment of their respective Community Service 
Obligations (Barendse 2004: 57).  Telkom fell just 11 448 short of the 2.69 million 
target for new lines to be installed between 1997 and 2002 because the company 
elected not to rollout lines in the last year where it was deemed uneconomical to do so 
and rather selected to pay a fine instead (Makaya and Roberts 2003: 48-49).  Given 
the fact that Telkom was easily able to financially and physically rollout out it’s 
prescribe targets but did not have the ability to sustain the subscriptions suggests that 
the problems lay within the Universal Service Obligations itself.  Hodge (2003b: 6) 
attributes two reasons why Telkom’s rollout obligations were a policy failure: firstly, 
the rollout targets were themselves set with a limited information set and in an 
uncertain environment, making their suitability subject to enormous potential error. 
Secondly, the rollout targets, whether for residential use or payphone access, were 
implemented with inflexible terms, making them unable to adapt to potential changes 
in the market.  
 
Telkom’s rollout obligations came with little conditions and regulations and the 
company was left with the responsibility of defining what constituted under-serviced 
areas and what defined ‘needy people’ and ‘priority costumers’.  Furthermore, little 
insight and thought was given to the feasibility and sustainability of rolling out 
telecommunication infrastructure to rural and lower-income customers.  Supporting 
this notion, Teljeur et al (2003: 4-5) argue that the major failure points in Telkom’s 
rollout obligations was that regulation lacked and that Telkom was left to its own 
discretion on a number of issues including the identification of under-serviced areas.  
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Teljeur et al (2003: 4-5) further argue that the licence obligations provided no 
substantive measurement indicator for how long a new customer should remain on the 
network for it to be counted toward the rollout obligation before being disconnected  
because the subscriber was unable to afford the new service. 
 
This inability to adapt to market changes also proved detrimental to Telkom’s rollout 
obligations as it was not able to compete with Vodacom and MTN which were both 
experiencing enormous growth at the time as a result of high consumer uptake of 
cellular services, particularly pre-paid cellular services.  Although cell phone call 
charges were and still are considerably higher compared to fixed-line call charges 
they require no monthly fees, making them more favourable to lower income groups 
(Hodge 2003b: 9). Horwitz and Currie (2007: 446) suggest that in addition to 
inflexible terms, Telkom’s high prices for line rental and a sociologically 
inappropriate billing mechanism for rural areas were to blame for the disconnection of 
the vast majority of the new lines.  Horwitz and Currie (2007: 446) further suggest 
that  whereas access to telephone service in South Africa has improved considerably 
since the introduction of Universal Service Obligations, gains in connectivity have 
been accomplished almost entirely due to the market-led growth of pre-paid mobile 
telephony rather than by the legislatively mandated rollout of the fixed line network 
by Telkom.  It is unclear whether Telkom’s rollout obligation, had it been successful 
would have had a large impact on Internet diffusion as no audit of the operators 
rollout obligations during its exclusivity period  has ever been conducted by ICASA 
(Msimang 2006: 234).  One interviewee agreed and added that “it is a pity that 
Telkom obligations were not sustainable because its expansion could have increased 
the number of Internet users maybe not now but definitely in the future” (anonymous 
interview 29 September 2009).  
 
Penalties for not adhering to ones Universal Service Obligations can also be seen as 
having a negative effect on the rollout of services stipulated in ones obligations.  In 
2006, Telkom was fined fifteen million Rand for not providing basic services in 
under-serviced areas as outlined in their licence conditions.  The fine was minimal 
when comparing it to the R9.3 billon profit Telkom declared in the same year 
(Telecoms Action Group 2007).  Having a Universal Service Obligation does place 
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strain on telecommunication operators but is essential for the diffusion of Internet in 
the short and long-term.  By looking at the fine imposed on Telkom, it becomes clear 
that it is more affordable for telecom operators to pay the fines imposed on them 
instead of rolling out expensive infrastructure to areas where it is uneconomical to do 
so, and as outlined by their licence conditions.  Telkom has continued to prove this 
notion in the past by electing to pay monetary penalties instead honouring its 
obligations. Until stricter regulations and policies are established, it is unlikely the 
telecom operators will not adhere seriously enough to their Universal Service 
Obligation nor would the diffusion of telecoms and Internet benefit from it. 
 
Although Telkom’s rollout obligations had the long-term potential to increase Internet 
diffusion, there is still the issue that obligations have not been extended to incorporate 
Internet access in homes.  Gyamfi (2005: 24) argues that in this technological age, 
where information and communication are acquired and disseminated through 
different sources and media, access to a working telephone is no longer sufficient to 
enable people to participate in the ‘information age’.  The concept of universal access 
should therefore be expanded to include access to a telephone, a computer and the 
Internet.  Agreeing to this notion, Winile Lamini suggested that “one of the problems 
facing universal access in South Africa is that Universal Service Obligations are 
outdated and make no provisions for new technologies and the growing needs of 
people” (interview, 26 October 2009).  In order to have a positive effect on Internet 
diffusion, there is a need for Universal Service Obligations to be updated to include 
providing telephones lines to homes and telephone lines that are Internet enabled 
Great Britain is an example of a country which has continued to modernise and adjust 
Universal Service Obligations to meet different and growing demands of their 
citizens.  
 
In Britain the former State-owned monopoly, British Telecom (BT), has been given a 
Universal Service Obligation by the British communication regulator Ofcom (Office 
of Communication) that has introduced provisions for Internet access. Ofcom (2005) 
claims that a Universal Service Obligations placed on BT ensures that every Briton 
who wants a fixed line service is entitled to one, no matter their geographic location 
or their income group.  BT is also obliged to structure a repayment plan that suites all 
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income groups as well as provide a telephone line that is able to receive basic Internet 
services although the minimum required speed of the line has to be only mere 28kps: 
a speed well below world trends.  By instituting a similar Universal Service 
Obligation on the South African telecommunication operators may aid Internet 
diffusion by providing under-serviced areas with infrastructure and low-income 
groups with affordable voice and data services.  The introduction of this type of 
universal service through beneficial Universal Service Obligations promotes the 
notion that governments are attempting to help the diffusion Internet and brings ICT 
issues and policy amendments forward on the government agenda (Crémer 2001: 10). 
 
It must be understood that Britain’s geographic landscape, GDP per capita, population 
density and e-readiness allows for the rollout of infrastructure at faster and cheaper 
rate than would be possible in South Africa.  As a result, one is unable to compare 
Universal Service Obligations imposed on operators in the two countries.  However, 
the Universal Service Obligations imposed on BT provides a good example of the 
potential such obligations can have on Internet diffusion.  Currently, the UK has over 
forty six million Internet users which equates to one of the highest penetration rate in 
the world with 76.4 percent of the population having Internet access (Internet World 
Stats 2009a).  In an attempt to modernise universal service and access, the British 
government issued a recent report, entitled ‘Digital Britain’, which has made 
provisions to guarantee that every household in Britain would have broadband access 
(at speeds of at least 2Mbs) by 2012 (Tryhorn 2009).  Obligations will need to 
continually adjust to facilitate technological improvements and societies ever 
changing needs.  The updating and modernising of Universal Service Obligations are 
thus pivotal for ICT and Internet diffusion as well as necessary for a country to 
achieve its universal service and universal access goals.  One organisation in South 
Africa which has been mandated to provide recommendations on Universal Service 
Obligation changes and strive for universal access and service is the Universal Service 
and Access Agency of South Africa (USAASA). 
 
The USAASA which was established by Section 80 of the ECA has been granted the 
task of promoting the goals of universal access and universal service especially in the 
under-serviced areas of South Africa (USAASA 2008a).  Formally known as the 
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Universal Service Agency (USA), the USAASA still derives its core mandate from 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (and The Telecommunications Amendment Act 
of 2001) but underwent a name change with the enactment of the ECA.  As per its 
mandate the statuary body has the responsibility for foster the adoption and the use of 
new methods of attaining universal access and service; encourage, facilitate and offer 
guidance for the adoption of universal access and service; and manage the Universal 
Access and Service Fund (USAF).  It is also responsible for making recommendations 
to the Minister of Communications to determine what constitutes universal access 
(USAASA 2008a).  The then USA was created in order to rectify the inequalities in 
telecommunication and ICT access created by the Apartheid regime through the 
promotion of universal service and access.  In doing so, the agency would increase 
access to ICTs so that the ‘Information Age’ would start to benefit all South Africans.  
Its first objective was to create policies to promote and even entrench the notion of 
universal service into the minds of ordinary citizens as well as provide provisions for 
affordable access to telecoms and ICTs (Benjamin 1999: 198-199).   Over its lifespan 
the USA, and now the USAASA, has had the potential to have a major positive effect 
on Internet diffusion in South Africa, however, it has to large extent failed to achieve 
many of its own goals and the goals of universal access and service.     
 
As of August 2008, three years after the establishment of the USAASA, there was still 
uncertainty within the agency over the definitions of ‘universal service ’and ‘universal 
accesses’ (USAASA 2008b).   The agency has been criticised for doing very little in 
terms of promoting universal service and making little to no impact on 
telecommunication and Internet diffusion.  In 2009 the USAASA was asked by 
Parliament’s Communications Committee “if anyone would miss it if it did not exist” 
(Vecchiatto 2009).  The Committee also stated to the agency that “[we’re] not saying 
that you are not doing some good work, but the problem is that the scale is so small 
that it makes no difference” (Vecchiatto 2009).  These comments by Parliament’s 
Communications Committee have been in response to USAASA not being able to 
achieve any meaningful change as well as failing to stimulate public awareness of 
benefits of universal service and universal access.  One issue that has been attributed 
to this is agency’s lacks human resources, “like at ICASA, one of the major problems 
facing UAASA is losing skilled personal to the lucrative private sector” (Winile 
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Lamini, interview 26 October 2009).  In addition to skill shortages, the agency has 
lacked leadership following the firing of former CEO James Theledi in February 2009 
for charges of sexual harassment.  The negative publicity the agency received after the 
dismissal has led to mass exodus of top level staff and the inability to attract a suitable 
candidate for the CEO position.  Currently top level positions include the CFO, senior 
manager of human resources and the head of corporate affairs are vacant.  One 
interviewee responded to USAASA lack of top level personal by posing the following 
question: “how do you think the USAASA is going fulfil its mandate when it’s not 
even able to fill basic positions?” (anonymous interview, 29 September 2009).       
 
The policies that have been pursued by the agency have been widely seen as 
ineffective and flawed, which the USAASA has itself have recognised (Barnard and 
Gianella 2008: 104) Winile Lamini confirmed this by stating that “in the past the 
USAASA pursued many ineffective policies with very few positive outcomes” 
(interview, 20 September 2009).  Another interviewee provided insight into USAASA 
policies by claiming that “the USAASA has no desire in producing policies and 
prefers to just talk rather than actually make decisions (anonymous interview, 15 
October 2009).  Having developed no universal service policy and thus having failed 
to implement its mandate, the Agency has became the direct mechanism for 
implementing projects identified by the Department of Communication rather than an 
assessor of projects that would be implemented by other players.  Taking on an 
implementation function was neither intended by its Agency’s mandate nor by the 
legislation that created it (Teljeur et al 2003: 21). 
 
Acknowledging that policy making and Universal Service Obligations alone would 
not be sufficient to ensure a rapid increase in telecommunications access for the poor, 
government through the Telecommunication Act of 1996 created the Universal 
Service Fund (USF) which would be administered by the USAASA (under the 
Department of Communications) and would be used to contribute and subsidise the 
rollout of universal service and access programs (Gillwald 2005: 475). Universal 
Service Funds are systems designed to enhance and achieve universal service and 
access goals. Achieving universality in ICT is a capital-intensive endeavour and thus 
such funds have been used in many countries to improve access through network 
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rollouts and to finance universal service projects (Intelecon 2002).  The same purpose 
of the fund is found in South Africa but with an additional duty of paying subsidies to 
assist needy persons in accessing ICTs (Hodge 2003b: 3). 
 
With the enactment of the ECA in 2005, the USF underwent a name change and 
became known as the Universal Service and Access Fund (USAF).  The new act 
brought with it little change to the structure of the fund with the exception of minor 
changes to how it would be funded.  Currently all telecommunication licensees 
(issued by ICASA) including VANS licensees are obliged to contribute a percentage 
of their annual turnover to the fund each year.  VANS contribute no more than 0.5 
percent of their annual turnover.  As the fund depends on a percentage of turnover, the 
yearly contributions depend on the level of profitability telecommunication 
companies achieved in that particular year (Mandioma and Muyingi 2006: 4).  The 
way in which the monies get transferred into the fund is often seen as unnecessarily 
complicated and displays a lack of co-ordination between the USAASA, ICASA and 
the Department of Communication.  ICASA collects the funds from the operators and 
then sends them to the Department of Communications.  In turn the Department then 
hands over the funds to the USAASA to place into the fund.  These steps often lead to 
delays in funds being received and thus allocated (Makaya and Roberts 2003: 57).   
 
The fund has been plagued by many issues that have obstructed it from achieving its 
goals.  Such issues relate to delays in finding suitable definitions to ‘universal 
service’, ‘universal access’ and ‘needy people’ and presenting them to the Minister as 
required by the Agency’s mandate.  Furthermore, lack of policy directive and 
leadership issues has resulted in payments from the fund not being issued.  In 2008, 
around R850 million was sitting unused in the funds account with little direction to 
where that money would be best spent (Vecchiatto 2008).  One interviewee added that 
“it is still unclear to many as to why USAASA is not allocating money from the funds 
but it is speculated that it does not know who to issue the funds to which is a problem 
because it could really be put to very good use” (anonymous interview, 15 October 
2009).  In the past, and to a certain extent at present, USAASA has been inclined to 
“throw all its eggs into one basket and back the establishment of telecentres with all 
the [USAF] monies” (Hodge 2003b: 18).  The continual investment into telecentres 
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has had varying degrees of success especially in the areas of Internet and ICT 
diffusion. 
 
6.4.1. Community Access Centres 
 
Mandioma and Muyingi (2006: 4) suggest that the USAASA, by the beginning of 
2006, had established 133 telecentres nationwide in disadvantaged rural communities.  
These community access centres or telecentres are telecommunication access points 
deployed in unserviced and under-serviced rural areas to provide access to electronic 
communications services. The purpose of setting up these centres is to provide 
universal access to ICTs in communities where telecommunication infrastructure is 
limited or non-existent (Mandioma and Muyingi 2006: 4).  The unserved areas are 
defined as those that do not have telecommunications access whilst the under-serviced 
are areas that have teledensity lower than five percent.  The telecentres have enabled 
communities to access basic services like computers, telephones, the Internet and ICT 
training services.  At these multipurpose telecentres, ICT facilities and services are 
made available to the public on a pay-per-use basis. The fee charged is more 
affordable than the cost of renting a telephone line and services or purchasing a 
computer or any other ICT tool. Telecentres thus contribute to the elimination of the 
barriers that prevent people in South Africa from using ICTs (Gyamfi 2005: 25).  The 
establishment and funding of telecentres has brought with it major controversy and 
debate over how effect the rollout has been on ICT diffusion, the subsequent failures 
of the project and whether funding could have been better spent elsewhere.  The 
USAASA’s involvement in the implementation of telecentres cements the fact that the 
Agency has continued to move away from its core mandate and instead act as 
mechanism for implementer of projects identified by the Department of 
Communication as critical to universal access. 
 
A study conducted by Benjamin (2003) found that of the first 65 telecentres that had 
been established between 1997 and 2000, 21 (or 32 percent) were not operating, 12 
(18 percent) were operating without a phone, 2 (3 percent) were operating without any 
computers, and 20 (47 percent) had both phones and computers working (Benjamin 
2001: 3-4).  It is evident from the above that from their onset, telecentres have faced 
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enormous issues generally pertaining to their long-term success. Benjamin (2003: 9-
12) attributes numerous reasons that have resulted in their failure by suggesting that 
the South African styled telecentres were inappropriate for delivering broad access to 
ICTs mainly because they provided far more than was necessary and this raised the 
cost of such centres dramatically.  A typical South African telecentres would have 
cost about between R150, 000 and R250, 000 at the time and would generally 
included five computers with Internet access amongst other communication devices. 
The higher than expected costs lead to a limited number of telecentres and this has 
therefore limited the extent of improvement in ICTs.  There was little or no effort to 
match the equipment provided with the specific needs of the local area.  This was 
partly due to the centralised purchasing of equipment from the Agency’s central office 
(Benjamin 2003: 9-12; Hodge 2003: 19).  It has also been proposed by Benjamin 
(2001) that the Agency continue to rollout telecentres but within its intended functions 
of research, advocacy and monitoring of implementation, rather than be directly 
responsible for implementation. 
 
Currently none of the telecentres have proven to be profitable enough to cover the 
depreciation of equipment, let alone being able to pay back the original investment 
Teljeur (2003: 22).  In order to address the problems encountered by the telecentres, 
the USAASA has, since 2007, embarked on a rehabilitation program by upgrading 
facilities and equipment that had become obsolete.  The ongoing rehabilitation 
program (which is funded by the USAF) aims to bring the centres up to standard to 
allow them to fulfil their purpose of universal access (USAASA 2008c: 17).  Though 
the rehabilitation program can be seen as a positive move in aiding Internet diffusion, 
the issue of feasibility and sustainability of the centres are still not being addressed.  
Given the telecentres problematic history, it is still unlikely that in their current form 
they will ever be able to be self-sustainable.    
 
Although legislation has never mentioned any specific projects, from its inception the 
Department of Communications has urged the USAASA to set up telecentres. In 
practice and with monies received from the USAF, this has been the Agency’s main 
activity even though there are many other aspects to its mandate (Benjamin 2003: 1-
2).  The establishing telecentres country-wide do have the potential to have a great 
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positive effect on the diffusion of Internet, the bridging of the digital divide and at the 
same time making positive strides in achieving universal access on a larger scale.  For 
those living in areas with low teledensity and those that lack the adequate resources to 
gain Internet connectivity, telecentres may prove essential in order to access ICTs.  As 
telecentres are currently the main focus of the USAASA, steps are being taken to 
improve the telecentres model through addressing facilities and by making them more 
conducive to the areas in which they serve.  Winile Lamini stated that “it is obvious 
that the Agency has made a number of mistakes in the past when it comes to 
telecentres but as it is our main goal now, we are now pushing for a better model and 
more beneficial practices” (interview 26 October 2009).  It is still to be seen whether 
new measures will be taken to make telecentres profitable and less reliant on 
continual funding from the Agency.           
 
One of the more successful initiatives that have been created by the USAASA is the 
rollout of Cyber Laboratories in rural and underprivileged schools. Mandioma and 
Muyingi (2006: 4) highlight that schools in under-served and lower income 
communities have been used as access points to ICT through the establishment of 
Cyber Laboratories by the USAASA.  By December 2005, two hundred and thirty 
five Cyber Labs had been established in schools in all of the nine provinces of South 
Africa.  These laboratories provide ICT services and computer literacy training to the 
schools in the communities. The schools are responsible for maintenance costs while 
Internet connectivity for the initial 12 months is paid for by the Agency. The Cyber 
Laboratories are equipped with thirty computers, one photocopying machine, and one 
printer. Fax machines are provided when there is a need. The USAASA provides for 
the whole setup and security of these labs.  Once the establishment of a laboratory is 
complete, they fall under the ownership of the particular school and thus indirectly 
owned by the Department of Education.  There is a tendency that Cyber Laboratories 
have been more successful than telecentres however the uptake and usage of the 
incentive is still regarded as very low.  One likely reason for this is the fact that ICT 
training is not integrated into some school’s curriculum which leads to the 
laboratories being underutilised (USAASA 2009: 19).  This can be seen as a problem 
outside the control of the Agency and an issue that falls under the responsibility of the 
Department of Education.  The cost of installing and lack of monitory resources has 
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hindered the expansion of Cyber Laboratories in more schools across the country.  
This is most probably due to the USAASA dedicating financial and human resources 
in uplifting and expanding its failed telecentre program.  Cyber Laboratories, coupled 
with adequate training, provide the answer to enticing people from a young age to 
engage and benefit from ICTs and at the same time provides a platform for the 
expansion of Internet diffusion.   
 
6.4.2. Under-Serviced Area Licences  
 
In addition to using the USAF to fund telecentres and Cyber Laboratories, the 
USAASA in the past has been tasked with providing funding and guidance for the 
establishments of Under-Service Area Licences (USALs) as proscribed by the 
Telecommunications Amendment Act of 2001.  USALs are defined as SMMEs, black 
empowered operators who are licensed to provide public telecommunication services 
in under-serviced areas with a teledensity of five percent or less with the Minister of 
Communication determining the under-serviced areas.  Gillwald (2006b: 7) highlights 
that under section 40 of the Telecommunications Amendment Act USALs are 
required to provide telecommunications services, including Voice over Internet 
Protocol (VoIP), fixed mobile services, and public pay telephones within the areas in 
which they service.  The Act made no provision for Internet access but it was thought 
that through the provision of telephone services (especially VoIP) that Internet access 
would follow shortly afterwards.  The Minister through ICASA had granted seven of 
the initial ten applicants licences by June 200419
                                                 
19 See Appendix B for a graphic representation of the original seven USALs and the under-serviced 
areas in which they would operator.  
.  The USAASA with funding from 
the USAF would finance each licensee R5 million per annum for a period of three 
years for the development and rollout of infrastructure. With R35 million being paid 
out to operators in the first year and over R10 million in the second year, none of the 
seven operators have been successful in launching their services.  Marred in 
difficulties, funding has been subsequently suspendered by the USAASA until a 
sustainable model on the business case, regulatory, financial support and policy be 
developed (USAASA 2009: 24).  Given numerous problems and delays in issuing the 
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initial licences coupled with delays in addressing the current problems it is unlikely 
that any resolution will be found anytime soon.          
 
By June 2004 all seven USALs had been licensed but regulatory issues and delays by 
ICASA in the issuing these licences meant that the first licences only became 
operational in 2005.  Gillwald (2006b: 6) argues that regulatory challenges arising 
from the 2001 Amendment Act had overwhelmed ICASA. It had at the time been 
engaged with the Ministry in the chaotic joint licensing of the fixed-line competitor 
(Neotel) to Telkom, and the licensing of signal distributor, Sentech, to offer 
multimedia services and an international gateway. With the September 2004 
ministerial policy directives permitting VANs to offer voice services and the 
deregulation of the pay telephone market, the business case of USALs had not only 
ceased to exist, but the regulator was again forced to turn its attention to new 
developments that were underpinned by more powerful financial interests and was 
divert from issuing USAL licences.  The delays encountered as a result of ICASA’s 
inability to issue licenses has been one of the reasons recognized for the failures of 
USALs operators.  Gillwald (2006b: 7) further argues that the process and selection of 
the licence areas had been filled with controversy as the mobile and fixed line 
incumbent operators claimed that most of the areas selected had a teledensity of above 
five percent at the time.  This was due to the fact that the Ministry drew on teledensity 
figures from the 1996 census thus not taking into account the growth of the cellular 
market and expansion of Telkom’s rollout obligation. 
 
In addition to licensing issues, the USALs project has been overshadowed by various 
challenges including shortage of capital, interconnection agreements with incumbent 
operators not being favourable, lack of financial support, poor business cases and lack 
of effective policy (USAASA 2009: 24).  Given the problems facing USALs and their 
incapability to launch even after numerous years and funding from the USAF, it could 
be argued that the project was a failure from its onset.  Winile Lamini agreed to this 
notion by stating that “from the beginning USALs have always been a policy failure” 
(interview 26 October 2009).  This policy failure could be as a result of poor research 
into the potential profitably of USALs.  Charley Lewis also argued that “the operators 
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never had a sound financial plan or a suitable business case” (interview 2 November 
2009).   
 
Certain USALs had been given areas with major commercial or government centres, 
such as East London, providing them with adequate clientele and room for growth. 
However, government, business, and urban residential inhabitants were already being 
serviced by Telkom and the mobile operators.  Thus attracting these customers away 
from the better known, if not preferred operators, was unlikely without very 
innovative pricing or bundling models, which had been eroded by unsupportive 
regulatory frameworks, continued delays, and new competitors to the USALs 
(Gillwald 2006b: 7-8).  The continuous delays that USALs encountered had long term 
negative effects as one interviewee pointed out that “while USALs were waiting for 
their licences to be finalised, Vodacom, MTN and even Telkom were expanding their 
networks and operations more and more into these allege under-serviced areas” 
(anonymous interview 15 October 2009). 
 
While the USALs are SMMEs with a small licence area, they are in direct 
competition with large corporations that operate throughout South Africa and beyond. 
This difference in scale can be seen to be both an advantage and a disadvantage to the 
USALs (van Leijden and Monasso 2005: 27-28).  van Leijden and Monasso (2005: 
27-28) suggests that the greatest advantage for small operator is that they often have 
more flexibility to adjust to the needs of the customer, but at the same time has the  
disadvantage of  having less capital and human resources available. Another issue 
worth noting could be negotiations between the parties involved.  Where the large 
operators for the most part have a significant legal department, the USALs usually 
have only a few employees, especially in their start-up period.  Furthermore, any 
possible regulatory solutions that could support the USALs in their struggle against 
the larger operators could be considered as anti-competitive. 
 
Although the licensing of USALs was considerably delayed and the controversial 
process questioned, the project had the prospective to fulfil universal access and 
universal service in areas which were found to be uneconomical for Telkom and for 
other operators.  As no USALs have become operational, it is unclear what effect they 
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could and would have on Internet diffusion.  From a liberalised sector point of view, 
even with mobile and fixed line operators having a presence in such areas another 
operator would have brought additional, much needed competition which would have 
hopefully led to price reductions, innovative offerings and better service and thus 
eventually contributing positively to the diffusion of Internet.  It is likely that future 
USALs will face many issues. Offering services in areas deemed uneconomical 
presents a difficult challenge requiring effective regulation and policy directive, 
which are both currently lacking.  
 
It becomes evident from the above that South Africa has struggled to achieve 
universal access and service as set out by its various acts and policies.  The omission 
of Internet access from Universal Service Obligations can be seen as a major 
hindrance in the diffusion of Internet.  Until measures are in place to insure that 
Internet access features prominently in universal access and universal service policies, 
South Africa will continue to fall behind world standards which in turn will lead to 
even greater digital divide.  With the introduction of the Draft Broadband Policy in 
2009, it is apparent that policy makers are attempting to modernise universal service 
and access by making broadband an integral part of future programs and policies.  
Provision 1.1.2 of the Draft Broadband Policy states that “Broadband infrastructure is 
central in achieving the goal of digital inclusion, enabling universal, sustainable, 
ubiquitous and affordable access to ICT’s by all, and providing sustainable 
connectivity and access to remote and marginalized areas at national, provincial and 
municipal levels”.  Provision 4.1.1.1 also states that “Each citizen in South Africa has 
a right to have access to basic broadband”.  The policy is a positive move for 
broadband and Internet diffusion and it is hoped that regulators, policy makers and the 
USAASA will draw on problems faced in the past and produce effect policies and 
programs that will address access disparities between urban and rural areas. 
 
6.5. Pricing and Undersea Cables  
 
The high cost associated with Internet access, dialup and broadband, has been one of 
the most significant issues facing the diffusion of Internet in South Africa.  It could be 
argued that the three Critical Negotiation Issues discussed above have been a direct 
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influence on Internet access pricing structures found in the past and at present.  
Supporting this notion, it has been stated that “high prices are a direct result of policy 
outcomes” (Ewan Sutherland, IWeek 2 September 2009).  The high cost of Internet 
access are also in stark contrast with the objectives of Universal Access and Universal 
Service being promoted by the Department of Communication, the USAASA and the 
government as a whole.  Limited competition and lack of policy directives addressing 
high costs can also been seen to influencing current pricing structures.  Another 
attribution which has had a serious and lasting impact over the high costs of Internet 
access is the limited amount of undersea cables and a monopoly ownership of the only 
one of the cables that connects South Africa with the rest of the world.  
 
The South African public have continued to face some of the highest voice and data 
costs in the world.    In 2005, the South Africa Foundation (now known as Business 
Leadership South Africa) conducted a study to determine how expensive Internet 
access in South Africa was compared to the rest of world.  The comparison was 
conducted against Hong Kong, Canada, Israel, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, South 
Korea, the United States, India, Brazil, Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia and Morocco.  
These countries were selected as they give the best ‘cross-section’ of the world 
economies and certain countries selected are equivalent to South Africa in terms of 
telecommunication infrastructure and policy (South Africa Foundation 2005: 14-16).  
South Africa Foundation (2005: 18-19) showed that a Telkom’s 512kps ADSL 
offering was the most expensive of all countries studied: 148 percent more expensive 
than the average price.  This study excluded an additional ISP fee needed for ADSL 
connectivity in South Africa.  Although prices have decreased since 2005, when the 
study was compiled, prices in the comparator countries have also been dropping thus 
Internet access costs still remain the highest of all fifteen countries (Barnard and 
Gianella 2008: 103).  It is evident that the cost of fixed-line Internet access (dialup 
and broadband) is extremely high compared to the rest of the world, however, 
wireless broadband prices are internationally competitive but still expensive and out 
of reach for the majority of the population (Cohen 2008: 120).   
 
The high costs of Internet access (especially broadband Internet) are as a result of the 
high charges levied on ISPs for access to Telkom’s network.  Telkom’s former 
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government granted monopoly compelled ISPs to purchase access to vital 
infrastructure owned by Telkom at inflated prices.  These largely unregulated charges 
were in turn passed onto end-users.  Gillwald (2005: 478) argues that the high cost of 
Telkom’s basic fixed-line telephony services has been accompanied by the high 
facility-leasing and interconnection tariffs it charges ISPs. Whilst raising prices above 
cost is incentive-compatible for an incumbent required to extend its network and with 
a monopoly precisely to ensure revenues from such activities, this has impacted 
negatively on the ISPs segment of the sector, a segment that is critical to the 
development of a fully networked economy and to the diffusion of Internet. Despite 
the intention of policy and law to include the regulation of these wholesale prices, 
Telkom’s tight control of access to international data bandwidth and the relatively 
high prices ISPs are charged for access to this bandwidth tend to continue 
undisturbed.  This negative impact has not only been felt by consumers. High data 
communications costs have had a large impact on the economy as they are a major 
consideration in companies’ determination of investment destinations, even for non-
telecommunications activities (Gillwald 2005: 478).  
 
As Telkom owns and operates its own ISP (Telkom Internet), its tight control over 
international bandwidth and the high prices it charges ISPs for access to facilities can 
be seen as anti-competitive behaviour.  Horwitz and Currie (2007: 451) suggests that 
as legislation in the past provided Telkom with the power and incentive to favour its 
own offerings and/or hinder those of competitors.  This has led to artificially inflated 
prices in the provision of wholesale products which continue to affect the market 
today.  As with other VANS, over eighty percent of the ISPs’ costs accrue directly to 
Telkom for facilities and network usage.  Likewise, around eighty percent of Internet 
customer usage costs go directly to Telkom in the form of telephone line rental and 
dial-up access call charges and ADSL line rental. Thus, the vast majority of revenue 
generated through Internet service provision in South Africa has been going directly 
to Telkom (Gillwald 2005: 479).  This once again suggests that the liberalisation of 
the ISP sector alone can do very little in decreasing prices and thus increasing Internet 
diffusion.  In order for prices to come down significantly enough, liberalisation of 
Tier-1 Internet providers (e.g.: Telkom and Neotel) is necessary to provide ISPs with 
better choice in their networking and infrastructural needs.  Telkom’s monopolistic 
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and to a certain extend anti-competitive behaviour has been extended to its control of 
the South Atlantic Telecommunications cable 3/ South Africa Far East undersea cable 
system (commonly known as the SAT3/SAFE cable system). 
 
6.5.1. International Undersea Cables 
 
One of the underlying causes of the high costs of telecommunications in South Africa 
and Africa has been and continues to be the charges made for international capacity 
between countries and especially to other continents. The cost of accessing the 
Internet in South Africa remains disproportionately more expensive when compared 
to countries in the northern hemisphere.  A major factor in the high costs has in the 
past been the monopoly for voice and data transmission exercised by Telkom over 
undersea cables, landing stations and international gateways.  The monopoly of 
undersea cable systems landing in South Africa was originally granted to Telkom 
because it was held to be a ‘natural monopoly’ and that direct provision by the State 
was seen to be the most efficient option. It was also seen as a ‘cash cow’ that could 
have been used to fund the construction of national networks within the country. 
(Esselaar et al 2007: 1).  Schmidt and Stork (2008: 2) argue that these monopolistic 
practices and ownership of cable systems have impacted negatively, not only on the 
development of the ICT sector, but also, as it is a major input cost of business, on 
national economies.  With the exponential uptake and growth in business reliance on 
Internet services, increased capacity on undersea cables and a decrease in capacity 
costs are necessary for meeting world standards and improving business 
competitiveness.  Esselaar et al (2007: 1) adds that with the emergence of cellular 
providers and the increase in ISPs there has been growing demand for access to 
cheaper and competitive international connections. In addition, where competition has 
been extended to the supply of international bandwidth it has proved to be successful, 
having driven down prices and driven up demand. 
 
Up until July 2009 the SAT3/SAFE was the only cable system linking South Africa 
with Europe and Asia (Cohen 2008: 121).  Cohen (2008: 121) argues that Telkom, a 
part owner of the cable and which has had exclusivity to it in South Africa has 
generated not only a bottleneck, but the operator  has also been accused of charging 
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users exorbitant prices for access. Telkom charges many times more than other 
African countries that also use the cable system for international bandwidth.  The 
South African government has acknowledged that one of reasons for the high costs of 
Internet access is due to South Africa’s limited investment in submarine cables and 
that the government will continue to investment and to promote investment into new 
cable systems20
 
 (Department of Public Enterprise 2008). 
There have been many proposed new undersea cables which would connect South 
Africa with the rest of the world and provide additional much needed bandwidth.  
Launched in July 2009 Seacom, which links South Africa to Africa, India and Europe, 
was the first cable system built that would directly compete with the SAT3/SAFE 
system.  Through added competition and better wholesale prices, it has been 
anticipated that Seacom would dramatically reduce Internet access costs for end users 
in the short- and long-term.  Seacom began having an effect on the telecoms industry 
prior to its activation.  Anticipating completion, Telkom began upgrading capacity on 
its SAT3/SAFE cable and has reduced costs of international bandwidth sold to ISPs 
and other operators by over fifty percent (price reductions have been implemented 
year on year since 2007) (Paterson 2009).  It has been argued that had it not been for 
looming competition from Seacom, it would have unlikely that Telkom would have 
imposed such reductions (van der Merwe 2009). 
 
While costs have been reduced as a result of Seacom, prices cuts have been slow in 
reaching the end-users.  van der Merwe (2009) claims that as undersea cables are laid, 
ISPs will start having more flexible pricing schemes as they are freed from 
commitments to Telkom. This is predicted to only largely benefit the end-user after 
two years, although small decreases should start taking place before then.  
Additionally, an increase in the number of undersea cables will also drop the entry 
barrier for new ISPs, the second driver to affordable broadband.  As Goldstuck (2009) 
suggests, price reductions will take time before benefiting end-users but ISPs have 
already began passing on savings not through lower prices but through provide more 
for the same price. It been suggested that additional undersea cables will lead to the 
                                                 
20 See Appendix C for a graphic representation of current and future cable systems landing in South 
Africa. 
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fact that “costs will not come down but caps will increase, giving consumers more 
‘bang for their buck’”21
 
  ISPs such as Telkom Internet and Mweb have confirmed this 
move by beginning to increase subscriber’s bandwidth caps by between one and two 
gigabytes, depending on one’s package, with no added cost.  One interviewee stated 
that “at the moment profit margins are very tight for ISPs so it is more beneficial for 
them to give more than drop prices” (anonymous interview, 15 October 2009).  
Although this can be seen as a positive move, especially for businesses and for those 
with Internet access, it does not provide much for the diffusion of Internet.  Costs 
associated with Internet access continue to be the greatest obstacle in the uptake of 
Internet services.  Until price decreases continue to be passed on to consumers, 
Internet access will continue to be inaccessible for a major portion of the population.     
In addition to the SAT3/SAFE and Seacom cable system, numerous other cable 
systems are in various stages of development and planning.  By the end of 2011 it is 
believed that three additional cables will land in South Africa leading to increased 
completion and eventually lower prices.  One interviewee noted that “the more cable 
systems that service South Africa, the better for consumers and the Internet industry 
as a whole” (Charley Lewis, interview 2 November 2009).  East Africa Submarine 
Cable System (EASSy) is another planned cable system which will link South Africa 
with other African countries.  Prior to the opening of Seacom, East African countries 
were reliant on costly satellite uplinks to transfer international bandwidth as no 
undersea cables ran down the east coast of the continent.  EASSy was planned to fill a 
gap in undersea cable provision to East African countries and also to link up to 
landlocked countries through fibre optic cables (Esselaar et al 2007: 4-5). 
 
EASSy is the oldest planned cable project which was planned to begin construction 
by mid December 2007.  The project however has been hit with many problems that 
continue to delay its construction (Muller 2008).  Muller (2008) argues that many 
feared that numerous delays coupled with the landing of Seacom would lead to the 
EASSy project having trouble gaining continual support and funding.  This notion 
builds on the concept that the numerous cables landing in South Africa would “lead 
                                                 
21 Broadband Panel Discussion at the MyBroadband Conference, 12 November 2009. 
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too having much bandwidth available” (Ewan Sutherland, IWeek 2 September 2009).  
Added competition and an oversupply of bandwidth from a business perspective may 
lead to a sector that is oversaturated with competition which will in turn lead to low 
costs that are financially unsustainable by the cable operators and thus unfeasible22
 
.  
Neilson (2009) suggests that because of added competition and increases in the 
amount of unneeded bandwidth that will become available; it is likely that not all of 
proposed projects will materialise.  Attracting foreign investment into the projects will 
also become more difficult.  Having faced many delays, it is anticipated that EASSy 
project will be completed in second quarter of 2010; however given the numerous 
delays in the past, it is uncertain whether the project will meet its deadline.         
The WACS (West African Cable System) and the ACE (Africa Coast to Europe) are 
two undersea cable projects under early development which will link South Africa 
and Africa with Europe providing a large amount of additional bandwidth to the 
continent and to the country.  Both projects are expected to be complete during 2011 
(Song 2009).  The WACS cable has the largest capacity of any of the other systems 
that are active or are in various stages of development, with a massive 5120Gbs 
capacity.  Furthermore, Broadband Infraco is one of the largest investors in the 
WACS cable system whilst Sentech had signed a landing party agreement to use its 
telecommunications licence to land ACE in South Africa (Broadband Infraco 2009; 
MyBroadband 2010).  With Sentech and Broadband Infraco’s involvement in 
different cables, two State-owned enterprises will thus compete in the same market.  It 
also been questionable whether Sentech involvement falls outside their mandate and 
whether the company has the experience in cabling and building landing stations that 
bring the cables ashore (MyBroadband 2010).  Sentech, unlike Broadband Infraco, 
does not have an established fibre optic national network which will link the ACE 
cable system to major cities.  Given the failure of Sentech’s wireless broadband 
offering, MyWireless, and its subsequent discontinuation, the company’s poor track 
record and funding problems (as discussed in the State Ownership Pattern subchapter) 
it is arguable that the State enterprise has lost most of their telecoms expertise to the 
                                                 
22 The financial sustainability was highlighted by Ewan Sutherland in response to a question posed at 
the IWeek Conference, 2 September 2009.   
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private telecoms sector as well as lost their credibility in the telecommunication 
business.            
 
It comes as no surprise that government has elected Sentech to land the ACE cable 
system given their expanding interest in the ownership and control of infrastructure.  
The use of State-owned enterprises to rollout infrastructure is likely to continue as it is 
now being made official with the Draft Broadband Policy.  Provision 4.4.3.1 of the 
Policy states that “Government may use [State-owned enterprises] to achieve certain 
objectives but this would be determined on a case by case basis…” Government’s use 
of Sentech could also be justified terms of ‘if not Sentech then who else?’ Broadband 
Infraco is currently involved with WACS whilst Telkom, Neotel and other private 
operators are currently involved with the constructing and landing of other cable 
systems.  Sentech thus provides the only other viable option to land ACE as no other 
companies have the interest or the capital to invest in the multiple systems landing in 
the country.  
 
A fifth undersea cable system has also been proposed by the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (Nepad) called the UhuruNet cable system.  If this project is to 
materialise, it will be the biggest of all three projects.  The undersea cable system will 
circle Africa, linking both the east coast and the west coast with a transatlantic link to 
Brazil and will consist of a total of forty five thousand kilometres of cable (Kelly 
2008).  At present, the project has just been proposed and no construction and 
competition dates have been set or any concrete details have been released.  The 
likelihood of such a large and extensive cables system materialising is also debatable.  
Although worth mentioning, the project is extremely ambitious and once complete 
will compete with a vast amount of well established systems that would have already 
landed in various African States.  
 
Although the South African government has continually supported addition cable 
systems, there has been controversy over the landing of the cables on South African 
shores in the past.  The Department of Communications and the former Minister of 
Communication issued guidelines which state that any undersea cable landing in 
country had to be majority South African owned.  This posed serious problems for 
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both Seacom and EASSy who are both majority foreign owned (ISPA 2007).  The 
Minister and her Departments guidelines came under fire from industry players and 
critics who suggested that her guidelines for landing rights were merely in place to 
protect the SAT3/SAFE cable system and thus once again protect Telkom’s interests 
(Kasonde 2008).  The land rights were also in direct contrast to the government’s 
continual promise and commitments to market liberalisation.  Such guidelines also 
went against the World Bank’s recommendation that suggest that allowing all 
competing undersea cables equitable landing rights while limiting public sector 
involvement in telecommunications is the way to reduce prices (ISPA 2007).  
Broadband Infraco’s involvement in the WACS cable system and Sentech’s 
involvement in ACE also goes against the recommendation made by the WTO 
Agreement on Basic Telecommunications.  South African government involvement in 
undersea cables is on the rise as it is now indirectly involved in the WACS, 
SAT3/SAFE and ACE systems.    
 
Amid high level critique of the landing guidelines, the Department of 
Communications has begun a process of refining the landing requirements to allow 
for foreign ownership. Amongst a negative perception of the monopolistic 
SAT3/SAFE club consortium a decision was made at the Meeting of African 
Ministers in Rwanda in 2008 (in which South Africa attended) that cables that were 
not predominantly locally (African) owned would not in future be permitted to land 
on the continent (Gillwald and Stork 2009: 33).  Through local ownership must be 
welcomed it does limit the ability to attract foreign investment into such costly 
projects.  The need for attracting foreign investment into various sectors of the 
economy has been the continual goal of the South African government in order to 
fulfil its policies on development and year on year growth.  In addition, undersea 
cables are extremely costly projects and it is common practise worldwide that these 
projects relay on international backing (ISPA 2007).  Following heavy high level 
criticism over the landing rights guidelines issued by the Department of 
Communication as well as the inevitable landings of foreign backed cable systems it 
is questionable whether the government will adopt the requirement made at the 
Meeting of African Ministers. 
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The high costs associated with Internet access and telecommunication in South Africa 
has and continues to have a large negative effect on the diffusion of Internet.  High 
costs have also had an effect on universal service and access evident in the 
widespread disconnections of lines Telkom installed to meet its rollout obligations.  
As long as Telkom continues to monopolies key infrastructure needed in the provision 
of Internet services it is unlikely that prices will drop to accommodate the majority of 
the population.  The landing of Seacom which has brought an end to the SAT3/SAFE 
monopoly coupled with the addition planned cable systems will have a dramatic effect 
on pricing structures. Agreeing to this notion, Neotel’s CTO Angus Hay has stated 
with regards to cable new and future cable systems that “bandwidth prices have to 
come down” (MyBroadband Conference, 12 November 2009).  How low bandwidth 
prices will drop and if they will be significant enough for major uptake broadband 
Internet services is still uncertain as there are “a lot of costs involved with the 
provision of broadband” (Matthew Tagg, MyBroadband Conference, 12 November 
2009).  Until Telkom’s hold on key national infrastructure needed for the provision of 
Internet services is challenged by effective completion and/or regulation, it is doubtful 
whether South Africa will begin benefitting from the vast amount bandwidth capacity 
entering the country.            
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
It has been widely discussed throughout this chapter that South Africa’s low diffusion 
on Internet is as result of numerous issues plaguing the telecommunication sector. 
These issues have been derived from the three Critical Negotiation Issues identified 
and as described in the Conceptual Framework chapter.   
 
Although the country has made great strides to improve Internet diffusion through 
regulatory intervention, policies and through Universal Service and Access, 
governmental interference, regulatory delays and lack of human capital continues to 
impede developments in the diffusion of Internet.  Furthermore, these issues have 
continued to keep prices artificially high which in turn continue to act as a barrier for 
uptake. Telkom’s monopolistic behaviour, which at times is sanctioned by its major 
shareholder, the government, continues to place strain on the market in terms of anti-
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competitive behaviour and concentration of infrastructure.  Telkom’s inherent 
monopoly has also been expanded to the provision of much needed international 
bandwidth carried through undersea cable systems.  With the arrival of Seacom in 
2009, Telkom’s monopoly on international provision came to an end. This major 
event together with the arrival of future cable systems is anticipated to have a 
significant effect on Internet access cost.  However, undersea cables alone cannot 
ensure that access to the Internet becomes affordable and that Internet diffusion is 
widespread. The liberalisation of the sector coupled with effective regulation, 
governmental commitment, effective Universal Service Obligations and affordable 
access are all necessary to positively aid Internet diffusion.  
 
The need for a high diffusion of Internet is essential for continual economic and social 
growth of the country, to stay internationally competitive and for the strengthening of 
democracy.  The digital divide is apparent in South Africa and until Internet diffusion 
is widely available and evenly spread, the country will continue to be divided by those 
who have access to information and those who do not.    
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Chapter 7: Findings: The Implications of Internet Diffusion 
on e-Government  
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
The South African government on various levels and in line with its goals of 
economic growth and sustainability have begun making use of e-Government 
strategies in an attempt to speed up and streamline service delivery.  e-Government is 
often employed as an innovation mechanism to obtain greater levels of efficiency and 
effectiveness. Purportedly, because digital government offers substantial performance 
gains, it has become one of the core elements of information reform.  For most 
government operations, the use of ICTs in the provision of services has become a 
standard for achieving performance gains (Brown 2007: 178).   
 
South Africa has a strong online presence with numerous governmental departments 
and agencies having established an online presence through the development of 
websites.  Not all of these websites offer e-Government services but instead provide a 
minimum amount of information relating to the given department or agency.  For the 
purpose of this study the South African Revenue Service (SARS) and the Department 
of Labour websites23
 
 have be analysed to gain a better insight into the type of e-
Government services being offered.  These two website were selected as they provide 
an excellent example of a public agency website that is well tailored to the needs of its 
stakeholders and provides a very attractive and simple design that allows users to 
quickly find what they are looking for (United Nations 2008: 26). 
7.2. SARS and e-Filing  
 
The SARS website or online portal provides individuals and businesses with access to 
a fast amount of information pertaining to the revenue service and to governing 
policies, legislation and documentation which are all downloadable and printable.  
The SARS website also provides access to the well appointed e-filing system.  Naidoo 
                                                 
23SARS: www.sars.gov.za; Department of Labour:  www.labour.gov.za  
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(2007: 325) states that an early e-Government achievement was the introduction of 
electronic filing or e-Filing in 2001.  The initiative was in accordance with 
government’s broader e-Government strategy of service delivery and streamlining of 
government agencies.  Naidoo (2007: 325) further states that the main aim of the e-
Filing system is to facilitate the electronic submission of tax returns and payments by 
taxpayers and tax practitioners.  e-Filing is aimed at improving operational 
efficiencies in order to deliver a better and quicker service. e-Filing has also enabled 
corporate entities to submit and pay certain tax returns online. As a result of e-Filing, 
there has been an increase of over R100 billion in SARS revenue since the inception 
of the program and has lead to the reduction of personal needed.  Furthermore, the 
streamlining the program has brought has aided in the fight against corruption 
(Naidoo 2007: 325).  The benefit of e-Filing for both SARS and for its ‘customers’ 
ties in with the benefits of e-Government which have been outlined by the World 
Bank.  The World Bank (2005) suggests that making use of e-Government services 
and rolling out e-Government projects can result in “less corruption, increased 
transparency, greater convenience, revenue growth and/or cost reductions” (World 
Bank 2005). 
 
7.3. The Department of Labour 
 
The Department of Labour’s website is less developed but provides easy access to 
vital documentation and to labour related legislation.  Such information is made 
available in many of the official languages.  The website also provides a link to 
uFiling where one is able submit UIF (Unemployment Insurance Fund) payments and 
declarations.  uFiling is based on the same principle to e-Filing but is less developed 
and more limited.  The two websites can provide a vast amount of knowledge and 
documentation for both employers and employees.  Furthermore, through the 
Department of Labour’s uFiling portal those unemployed can make claims on their 
UIF.  The two portals and websites can reduce or even remove commute times and 
time wasted in lengthy queues.  Such e-Government services can have a significant 
impact on how individuals live, how companies do business and how government 
practises democracy.          
109 
 
7.4. e-Government in South Africa  
 
It has been widely discussed above that the impact of a high level of Internet diffusion 
(especially broadband diffusion) can provide major benefits for society and the 
economy through economic growth and foreign investment.  However, South Africa 
continues to suffer from a small diffusion of Internet which the government has 
struggled to address through policy, Universal Service Obligations and through 
universal service and access goals. Internet penetration is also low due to high access 
prices relative to income and broadband Internet that is priced out of the range of the 
vast majority of households (Abrahams and Newton-Reid 2008: 7).   
 
As household Internet penetration is extremely low in South Africa and majority of 
telecommunication infrastructure is concentrated in urban areas, telecentres provide 
the best opportunity to those with otherwise no Internet connection to gain access to 
e-Government services.  Heeks (2002: 7) highlights the need for telecentres of 
community access centres by arguing that in Africa (and in South Africa) there are 
two predominant models of accessing e-Government.  The first model, citizen direct 
ownership and use of ICTs, will apply to only a small fraction of the population for 
the foreseeable future.  The second model, non-ownership but direct use of ICTs, will 
apply to most South African’s who will access e-Government services at work, 
through schools, through Internet cafés and through telecentres or community access 
centres.  According to Abrahams and Newton-Reid (2008: 10), India has overcome 
the concentrated uptake of e-Government services through the rollout community-
owned information kiosks where citizens are able to gain connectivity at low costs.  
The Department of Communication through the USAASA has failed to supply a 
suitable and sustainable model for telecentres which has led to their demise.  It could 
be argued that telecentres, correctly established, provide the best means to deliver on 
universal access goals and thus benefit the spread of e-Government as they are able to 
supply ICTs to a wider market. 
 
In this sense and in line with the argument made by Makaya and Roberts (2007: 12) 
with regards to the need for initial government involvement in communication 
infrastructural projects, it could be argued that initial State involvement will become 
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necessary to achieve universal service and access to make e-Government services 
more attainable.  Furthermore, it has been discussed that markets dictate that rural and 
lower income areas will struggle to attain access through private infrastructure.  The 
Draft Broadband Policy addresses the issue of e-Government being inaccessible to 
majority of the population. Provision 4.4.1.1 of the policy states that “Involvement by 
the State will be focused on investment where instances of market failure are 
prevalent, but also with emphasis on… connecting the arms of government at all 
levels and enabling the distribution of e-Government services.”  Although this 
provision could be seen as interpretive it does suggest that government acknowledges 
the need for widespread infrastructure and connectivity for a successful e-Government 
strategy.      
 
The lack of infrastructure in South Africa has impeded the progress e-Government 
projects for both the public and private sectors. For the vast section of the population, 
infrastructure is often limited or non-existent, and is unaffordable (Kuye and Naidoo 
2003: 14).  Affordability of computers and other ICTS and human capital also provide 
a great obstacle. It is unsurprising that majority of the South African population has 
limited or no access to e-Government services given the legacy of Apartheid and the 
concentration of infrastructure. Norris (2001: 106) suggests that countries with an 
environment rich in access to many traditional forms of communication technologies, 
such as telephones, televisions and fax machines are almost likely to experience a 
high diffusion of Internet and thus a high uptake of e-Government services.    
 
In order to address the current limitations of infrastructure Universal Service 
Obligations need to be changed and modernised to include the rollout of telephone 
lines to homes which are also Internet enabled.  Although an Internet enabled 
telephone is not the only necessity to gain access to e-Government services it once 
again provides a ‘stepping stone’ to connecting to online governmental services.  
Even in areas which have the infrastructural requirements to access ICTs, high costs 
of line rentals coupled with high costs of Internet access continue to provide a barrier 
for increased uptake.  The fast tracking of liberalising, done with an effective 
regulatory process and through well appointed policies will add much needed 
competition in the fixed-line and mobile sector which inevitably will lead to lower 
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prices and wider reach.  Establishing infrastructure for e-Government access in rural 
and/or low income areas is also going to be a difficult task.  Broadband Infraco 
promises to address under-serviced and underserved areas through the rollout of much 
needed infrastructure.  Adhering to their mandate and with a strong and efficient 
regulator behind it, Broadband Infraco may just provide better access to e-
Government services.      
 
7.5. Conclusion  
 
The low diffusion of Internet will inevitably lead to a small uptake of e-Government 
services by a large portion of the population.  This will in turn lead to a vast amount 
capital being injected in programs that will benefit very few.  The South African 
government should however continue to expand and invest in e-Government projects 
to increase much needed service delivery and in doing so strengthen its democracy at 
the same time.  The SARS and Department of Labour websites both provide an 
excellent example of how effective e-Government projects can be integrated into 
traditional methods of service delivery. Furthermore, the two websites provide 
appropriate examples of the benefit e-Government projects and e-Government as a 
whole can have. One aspect nonetheless has continued to hinder the widespread 
potential and uptake of such websites: the low level of Internet diffusion.    
 
As Internet access increases, the benefits of e-Government will become more apparent 
as such websites will become better known and thus better utilised by citizens.  If 
current Internet penetration trends continue, the benefits of e-Government will merely 
aid in the exacerbating of the digital divide.  In addition the values of Batho Pele (or 
People First) objectives, as outlined in the first e-Government policy, of equal access 
to government services, more and better information, better quality of service and 
guaranteed standards, and value for money will never materialise for the majority.   
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Chapter 8: Conclusion  
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
This study has critically analysed the factors influencing Internet diffusion in South 
Africa. It has investigated the implications the low diffusion has and will have of on 
the rollout of e-Government services and projects currently underway and ones being 
implemented in the future.  In doing so, this research has answered the research 
questions and fulfilled its aim as outlined in the Introduction chapter.    
 
Critical Negotiation Issues as a conceptual framework has been utilised in the 
identification of three high contested that continue to provide the biggest impact over 
the diffusion of Internet.  The use of Critical Negotiation Issues has assisted the study 
in finding the most significant factors influencing Internet diffusion in South Africa.   
 
8.2. Conclusion and Discussion 
 
The Internet in South Africa has seen remarkable growth since its inception in the 
early 1990s and particularly in the last eight years.  Year on year growth has been for 
the most part steady; however, when compared to the rest of Africa and the rest of the 
world, it becomes evident that South Africa is falling behind in terms of the users per 
one hundred people and in terms of growth rate.  Internally, the South African 
communication landscape `is rife with inequalities.  Those living in rural areas have 
limited to no resources available to gain Internet access.  In urban areas and the four 
economical hubs, Internet penetration is also still remarkably low and concentrated in 
wealthier areas and areas with a high density of business. 
 
Many factors are hindering Internet diffusion, and if not addressed by those who have 
the power to do so, South Africa will continue to slip down the Internet user rankings 
which will in turn hinder economic growth, competitiveness and the rollout of service 
delivery.  The high cost of Internet access has been blamed for being the greatest 
barrier in the spread of Internet diffusion.  Although the high costs are a major 
influence over the uptake of Internet services, in order to further understand the 
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relationship between high costs and Internet diffusion in South Africa, prices must be 
analysed side by side with the three identified Critical Negotiation Issues.  By 
analysing high costs with the aid of Critical Negotiation Issues, it becomes apparent 
that they reflective of an industry that is still monopoly dominated with a weak 
regulator that is not in a position to enforce and produce effective policies.    
 
To address the issue of a monopolistic sector and to help spread Internet access, there 
has been a considerable move to liberalise the sector, evident in the mobile 
telecommunication industry and in provisions made for a second national fixed-line 
operator which has now, after many years of delay, become operational.  The 
government, the former and present Minister of Communication, has on numerous 
occasions made promises that the sector will continue to be liberalised at a swift rate.  
Thus far the process of liberalisation has been extremely slow.  Statements and 
regulatory actions and rulings suggest that neither the government nor the Minister 
have any intentions to liberalise the telecommunications market.   
 
ICASA has also come under fire for not effectively dealing with the issues of high 
prices or the poor diffusion of Internet access in South Africa.  ICASA is faced with 
limited resources and limited qualified personal to deal with the many issues facing 
the telecommunications industry.  Its regulatory powers are also constantly challenged 
by the government and by the communications minister who is able to overrule any 
decisions made.  The Electronic Communications Act of 2005 did bring greater 
regulatory powers to ICASA and has made provisions for less interference yet the 
Minister still holds great control over the regulatory body and interference is still a 
common occurrence.  This was clear in the late and former Ministers attempt to 
appeal the Altech versus ICASA High Court ruling.  By looking at policies, 
legislation and official statements, it becomes apparent that the notion that ICASA is 
‘soft on Telkom’ is to a large extent true.  Until ownership patterns are changed in 
Telkom and the government relinquishes its 54.3 percent controlling stake in the 
company, it is unlikely that ICASA and the government as a whole will attempt to 
challenge the extremely profitable institute. 
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There have been positives steps made by the government in terms of aiding the 
diffusion of Internet.  The USAASA has rolled out telecentres and cyber laboratories 
to underserved and under-serviced areas, providing many communities with Internet 
and other ICT access.  The deployment of such services is limited and it is 
questionable to what effect they are and will be having on Internet diffusion.  The 
USAASA, which has the role of promoting and advising on universal access and 
universal service, has also done little in promoting Universal Service Obligations 
which currently do not extend to Internet access.  Provisions have been made by the 
USAASA and ICASA to ensure all telecommunication operators rollout public and 
community telephone services.  In an era where reliance on Internet access has 
become crucial, there is no evidence that Internet access will become a Universal 
Service Obligation in the foreseeable future.  As is the case with ICASA, the 
USAASA lack human capital to produce quality policies. Additionally it lacks a clear 
mandate as to what its role is and should be. Instead of taking on an advisory job, the 
agency continues to take on an implementation role with has merely lead to 
ineffective and mismanaged projects.  
 
Although there have been many negative factors influencing Internet diffusion in 
South Africa, there are positive changes that may provide a platform for major 
Internet growth.  The landmark High Court ruling in favour of Altech played a critical 
role in the liberalisation of the telecommunications sector.  National and regional 
VANs, with the financial capabilities, now have the ability to develop and operate 
their own networks which would allow them to effectively compete with the large, 
well established, telecom operators.  ICASA not appealing the case may suggest that 
it is adhering to the calls for market liberalisation. The new undersea cables landing 
on South African shores in the near future are also likely to bring considerable, much 
needed change to the patterns of Internet diffusion.  The completion and subsequent 
operation of Seacom in mid 2009 has arguably brought with it a small but significant 
change in its short lifespan. The arrival of future international cable systems will add 
much needed competition to the Telkom controlled SAT3/SAFE cable system and 
also bring ample international bandwidth    
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The South African government has made it clear that it is highly imperative that the 
issues hindering Internet diffusion need to be addressed and challenged.  At times, the 
government’s statements and actions contradict each other but there has been 
continuity in the fact that in order to increase economic growth, provide more 
efficient and effective service delivery and to bridge the ever growing digital divide, 
the diffusion of Internet needs to grow rapidly and steadily. The current state of 
Internet diffusion in South Africa is providing a barrier to widespread uptake of e-
Government services and particular e-Government projects that have been 
successfully implemented. If current trends stay constant, the prospect of e-
Government will continue to be undermined by its contribution to the digital divide.  
 
In order achieve the goals economic growth, social empowerment and development 
the South African government will need to produce a single, strong, ICT policy that is 
adhered to on all governmental levels.  This policy will need effective regulation from 
a regulatory agency that is well funded, independent and has access to adequately 
skilled personal. Universal Service Obligations will also need to be adjusted to keep 
up with technological advancements to ensure the bridging of the digital divide.    
Furthermore, updated e-Government policies will need to be created that understands 
the need for a high diffusion of Internet for the realisation of the full potential that e-
Government holds. 
 
8.3. Recommendation for Future Research 
 
This research has only looked at how the rollout of infrastructure by public and 
private institutions coupled with an effectively regulated liberalised sector can aid in 
the uptake of Internet access thus benefiting Internet diffusion in the short- and long-
term.  As prices begin to drop as a result of an abundance of international bandwidth 
and added competition it is inevitable that website hosting costs will come down.  
Future research should look at how local hosting of content and websites can aid in 
the uptake of Internet services as a result of less reliance on costly international 
communication infrastructure. The low costs of ‘local only’ bandwidth coupled with 
more locally hosted websites may ensure greater uptake of Internet access and more 
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likely broadband offerings and could lead to the cost of international bandwidth 
becoming considerably less expensive.    
 
In addition, research undertaken on the diffusion of technology in terms of computers 
and other methods of accessing the Internet could provide significant insight into 
current and future trends in the spread of Internet access. These could also provide a 
more holistic understanding of the factors influencing Internet diffusion and its 
implications for the uptake of e-Government services. 
 
This research could have benefited from conducting more interviews. It is advisable 
that future studies conducted on factors influencing Internet diffusion and its effect on 
e-Government services make use of a substantial amount of interviews. This will 
remove the reliance on secondary sources and provide better insights from industry 
experts and industry players.  
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Appendix A  
Interview Guide  
 
Many issues plague the telecommunications sector which in turn is effecting Internet 
diffusion 
o Has this stemmed from an inherent monopoly and an incumbent not willing to 
lose its position?  
o Has South Africa truly moved away from a monopolistic telecoms market? 
o Are there benefits to a monopoly fixed like operator? 
o Are there benefits in government ownership? 
o Do monopolies lead to a stagnate sector? 
 
Has and is government still trying to own interests by keeping the sector reliant on 
Telkom? 
 
To what extent is anti-competitive behaviour still a problem? 
 
What roll do policies play in diffusion of Internet (in South Africa and elsewhere)? 
 
What is the largest influence on Internet diffusion from a policy perspective? 
o From a regulatory and governmental perspective 
o From a private sector perspective 
o Are current policies failing the industry? To what extent?  
o Are costs continuing to hinder the market?  
 
ICASA has often been seen as a weak regulator, lacking the ability to adequately 
regulate often complex sector. Why do you think this is the case? 
o Is ICASA upholding its own mandate? 
 
Many blame ICASA’s inability to speedily enforce regulations, issue licenses and 
resolve disputes 
o Is this adversely affecting the sector and country 
o Is this not understandable given the complexity of the industry and the 
complexity of many of the cases brought to them 
o Has this lead to costs continuing to be extremely high? 
 
Is the private sector as much to blame for the countries low diffusion of Internet?  
 
Are ISPs able to reduce prices and increase Internet diffusion alone? 
o Or are ISPs to reliant on Tier 1 providers to have any really influence? 
o What about ISPs now being able to self provide? 
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Will the market not dictate that prices will eventually have to decrease? 
 
Is the government / ANC using ICASA to protect its own interests?  
 
Does government have a large influence over ICASA and its decisions?  
o To what extent? 
o Can the same be said for the private sector especially big players such as 
Telkom, Vodacom and MTN? 
o Is it possible to achieve regulatory independence? 
o How does one separate the State and independent bodies given the nature of 
the Ministers vetoing powers? 
o Is South Africa alone with respect to State interference in independent 
regulatory decisions? 
 
Are license holders adhering to their individual universal service obligations? 
o Are obligations effective enough?  
 
Does universal service and universal access hold the key to increasing Internet 
diffusion and bridging the digital divide in South Africa? 
o Does universal service and access work anywhere in the developed and 
developing world? 
o Is USAASA achieving government’s goals of universal service and access? 
o Is the independence of USAASA also a contentious issue  
o Why is USAASA not achieving its own and its given goals? 
 
It is evident that USALs have failed 
o Do USALs have the potential to succeed? 
o Why have they failed, given the large investments made into them? 
o Can USALs be competitive give the strong growth of mobile telephones and 
mobile Internet in the areas in which they would operate? 
o Is USALs another example of government constant ambition to become a 
major player in the telecoms sector? 
 
Broadband Infraco is clear example of governments desire to become a player in the 
telecoms industry 
o Is there still a place for government ownership? 
o Will government ownership have negative or positive affects? 
o Will Broadband Infraco play a leading role in driving down prices and 
increasing the diffusion of Internet in South Africa 
o Will Broadband Infraco not just turn out to be another government owned 
institute that is not financially viable (i.e.: Sentech) 
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There has been major media hype with the landing of Seacom and the future of other 
undersea cables. Will undersea cables bring with them dramatic price reductions? 
 
Will South Africa ever truly see a liberalised telecommunications sector in the near 
future? 
o What is your opinion on liberalisation? 
o Is local loop unbundling a step in the right direction for liberalisation?  
o Will local loop unbundling truly bring with it change given the mixed 
results in other countries?  
o Do we have the regulatory capabilities and will to introduce 
(successfully) local loop unbundling? 
 
The growth of Internet in South Africa is on a steady increase. Is this as a result of 
any of government’s initiatives or is it purely consumer driven 
 
Are things beginning to change for the better?  
 
Is the South African telecommunications sector on the right track? 
o Is South Africa keeping up or able to keep up with international trends and 
technological advancements?  
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Appendix B 
Graphic Representation of District Municipalities with a Teledensity of Five Percent 
or less and their respective Under Serviced Area Licences. 
  
 
Compiled with data collected from: USAASA (2008c: 16); USAASA (2009: 24) 
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Appendix C 
Graphic Representation of Undersea Cables Landing in South Africa from Point of 
Origin: Active and Future System with their Individual Capacities. 
 
 
Compiled with data collected from: Song (2009); SAT-3/WASC/SAFE (2009); Seacom (2009) 
